Looking at Rob's doubts about the historical validity of having skirmisher units operating some way off from the parent unit. I suggest you consider the garrison of La Haye Sainte. These were actually skirmish companies spun off from the 2nd KGL Light Battalion and were operating far in front of their parent unit with the intention of breaking up any French attack. Probably for purely game mechanics reasons these 3 units are treated as if they are tiny battalions rather than skirmishers. similarly the 95th rifles unit in the sandpit was in reality a couple of Companies from the 1st Btn. Again I assume for game implementation reasons the rest of the battalion which historically was over the ridge behind Rogers' Battery has been omitted from the battle.
I think this outlines perfectly why I have so little faith in historians, and in particular British historians and their accounts of the battle. I realised over forty years ago that the majority of British accounts of the battle could not be trusted and were essentially based on early propaganda and plaquerised from one book to the next without actually being researched or verified.
That's really why in my determination to understand what really happened at Waterloo i stopped accepting anything in a published account at face value and began going back to sources and researching or at least verifying what the historians claim happened.
As far as the defence of La Haie Sainte is concerned there are several accounts that detail the composition of the garrison and the support it received over the course of the day, and they differ in detail as some of the witnesses were only present part of the time, and others were only aware of part of the activity around the building.
However, the most reliable account is probably that of Major Georg Baring himself, the commander of the 2nd Light Battalion KGL and of the garrison of La Haie Sainte. He was fortunate to have survived the entire battle up to the point when the farm fell and so gives a lucid account of the sequence of events that occurred in its defence including the troops that fell under his command. The only slight gap in his account was around mid-day when the surprise attack of Crabbe's Cuirassiers caught him and part of his garrison in the open wheat field west of the farm and he was forced to abandon his command and ride up into the main Allied position to avoid capture. But it is unlikely that the composition of the garrison changed at all in his absence.
So, he tells us that the entire of his battalion (2nd Light Battalion KGL) were assigned to the garrison of La Haie Sainte with him in command both of the battalion and the farms defence. At this time the KGL battalion strength had been reduced to six companies due to a shortage of recruits.
He goes on to state that one company of the battalion consisting of about 100 men were posted in the orchard to the south of the farm, and these were the men that interfered with the deployment of the French artillery on the rise 50 paces further south and prevented the farm coming under direct artillery fire. they remained in this position until the skirmishers of the 13e Legere suddenly appeared on the ridge crest and forced them to retire into the farmyard. His second in command was killed at this early stage.
The 13e Legere then invested the farm, surrounding it and occupying both the wheatfield to the west and the kitchen garden to the north, effectively cutting off the garrison from supply and support. At this point he mentions that a temporary reprieve was granted by two companies from the 1st Light Battalion KGL (about 200 men) who were dispatched by the brigade to clear the kitchen garden and reopen communications.
However, the reprieve was temporary and eventually at around 12:30 Alten ordered the entire Luneberg battalion forward to clear both the Kitchen garden and the wheat field of French infantry. This attack was entirely successful and the French were forced to abandon their positions and withdraw on their supports. During the course of which retreat the garrison led by himself sallied out through the gate into the wheatfield in order to hasten their retreat and intercept as many as possible.
It was during this pursuit of the French infantry that Baring states he was suddenly set upon by a French cuirassier and forced to flee across the sunken road and back to the safety of the Allied positions on the ridge. Most of the Luneberg Battalion and a significant portion of the garrison that had sallied out of the farm were caught in the open in a state of disarray and either cut down, scattered or driven back up the ridge. Very few of them managed to escape and the Cuirassiers chased them right up to the sunken lane and then began to circumvent the farm overrunning the two guns of Ross' battery (not Roger's at originally stated) posted to overlook the road and its temporary barricade.
[This then triggered the counter-attack by the Household Brigade, which drove off Crabbes Cuirassiers and then escalated to include the rest of the French cavalry and the entire Union Brigade including the Scots Grey's.]
Baring doesn't say how long it took him to get back to his command, but at that point his depleted garrison was reinforced by 2 companies from the 1st Light Battalion (probably the same two that cleared the kitchen garden earlier), and shortly afterwards by 200 x Schutzen detached from the 5th Line Battalion KGL. (Schutzen were effectively volunteer riflemen attached to manay German regiments at the time, and usually young trainee NCO's or officers. A bit like Royal Naval midshipmen, of officer cadets. They operated outside the normal regimental system and were often attached or detached to other units.)
So, in the final stages of the defence the garrison would have been a hybrid mix of the survivors from the 2nd Light plus detachments from the 1st Light and 5th Line Battalion. The garrison was once more cut off as soon as the cavalry battle had subsided and once again Alten tried to re-open communications with it, by sending forward the 5th Line Battalion, with predicable and well documented results. The inability of the Allied cavalry to prevent the farm being isolated coupled with the repeated failure of troops from the main position to keep the communications with it open eventually led to the garrison running out of ammunition despite repeated heroic messengers running the gauntlet to urge Ompteda to send more cartridges.
So, I'm not sure this proves anything about detaching skirmishers except that detachments were made to defend vital points and supply lines etc. A more convoluted example can be found in the fluctuating composition of the garrison of Hougoumont which was constantly been supplemented and reduced as circumstances varied during the day.
However, as a general rule skirmishers were not detached from their parent battalions and generally conformed to the movements of their parent unit. The way it works in SOW is a-historic and already easy to exploit as DarkRob has demonstrated
For D'Erlons' attack some historians have estimated that 20% or more of his strength came forward as skirmishers in front of the advancing columns. Thus from a historic perspective there is nothing wrong in skirmishers operating several hundred yards away from their parent nor in there being large numbers of skirmishers deployed.
I don't really understand how one would make that assumption, but it seems plausible that the forward most skirmisher might find himself 100 paces ahead of his parent unit, as long as his supports and his reserves managed to maintain contact with it. There are diagrams in books like 'Imperial Bayonets' that explain how skirmish lines operated and most deployed in three lines each slightly denser than the first, culminating in the company reserve that would act as a rally point if the line was driven in. So, if each line was say 50 paces apart the foremost line could be up to 200 paces in advance of the main battalion.
The topic of the effective range of canister is a popular one on many internet forums but there cannot be any real doubt that the game's standard limit of 200 yards is well below what it really was. The fact that the French and others developed two types of canister (heavy and light) with heavy typically being used at ranges about 200 yards longer than light clearly demonstrates that a total limit of 200 yards is inappropriate. I do not expect or ask the designers to change it because it does have an impact on other design decisions e.g. the strange choice to have to shoot people out of buildings rather than the historic forcing of doors and windows. I personally would like the facility for a battery commander to select munitions because I have a mod that extends the standard range of canister, but, even disregarding whether increased range is desirable, I think it is a command that historically should be available at battery level in the standard game.
Most wargame rules use this arbitrary limit simply to prevent the player abusing history, which is what they always do given a chance.
If one was to allow canister to be fired at its full range potential one would need to balance this by having the quantity available limited to 2-3 minutes of fire per battle. That way the player can fire it off willy-nilly if they wish but then suffer the consequences if they need it later to defend the battery. Which would be a more historical representation of the real situation faced.
Sometimes it isn't about what happened historically. Sometimes it's just about what works best for the game. There is no doubt that in the games current state skirmishers are overpowered. I've proved it time and time again. And the overpowered aspect is largely based on the sheer numbers of skirmishers you can kick out, and then being able to send them anywhere.
I agree! Historically no unit deployed more than 30% of its strength as skirmishers and depending on the tactical drills of the nation involved only about 1/3rd of the men assigned to skirmishing were actually engaged in skirmishing at any point in time. So, a 600 man battalion might at a pinch deploy a 60 strong skirmish line, with a support line of 60 and a local reserve of another 60. But the game doesn't actually model that arrangement at all.
I had a try putting all of D'Erlons call onto all out attack at the beginning of the standard entire army Waterloo scenario. The result was that two brigades out of 8 threw out two sets of skirmishers each from one battalion with strengths of 50 and 56 men in each case. The brigades were the ones nearest to enemy forces at LHS and Frischermont.
Funnily enough that sounds about right. 50 men per skirmish unit would be about half a company/peleton per battalion which sounds reasonably accurate given the tactical drills for their use.
