Sickles wrecked his corp at Getty. He did change the battle and fought Longstreet further west, but what did the AOP get for it?
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I think that the Union Army delayed and interrupted what were to be a coordinated attack on their assumed position. Had Longstreet knew that Sickles would have advanced; he probably would have also altered his battle plans.
Sickles may have wrecked his Corps, but he also managed to wreck several of Longstreet’s divisions also, this preventing them from joining in the fight the following day.
The most important position was LRT where he posted no troops and the only problem the rebels had getting to it was a few sharpshooter companies
But, this great piece of real-estate only came into play on the second day, if this hill was so important, why the union army wouldn’t have placed a large amount of troops there raises several questions.
Sickles made the error of not following orders, which is a cardinal sin in the military.
I would agree if there were some exact orders, as there are several ways to issue an order.
And as far as I know, Sickles was never convicted of disobeying that order.
D,
Meades' specific comment to Sickles is telling - Upon riding up to Sickles and asking what he was doing with his troops, Sickles replied he was advancing to what appeared to be higher ground.
Yes, but it is not recorded in history that Meade said “Sickles, what in the hell are you doing way up here, and not on the round-tops” , if he clearly disobeyed orders, wouldn’t that have been the initial statement?
These maps do a very good job of showing us how the terrain may look good at this particular location, but once you start to form your battle-line units are placed at some un-favorable positions.
I’m sure that there are quite a few better hills, ridges, and knolls, scattered around these locations that would have been equally advantage to either army, but they never came into play.
It seems to me that the Wolf Hill location would have been fought out more, but I think that it was only several regiments involved with that hill.
I’m still under the impression that if Sickles had not done what he did, the fighting on this day would have been completely different, and if the round-tops were so important, Meade should have posted a lot more men on them.
davinci
The only true logic is that, there is no true logic!
I'm not sure that I agree with many of your statements regarding what Sickles did on the 2nd day. Sickles had orders to fill in from the left of the 2nd corps and to anchor his lines on LRT. He was to have covered the area in which the 12th corps left when it was moved over to the Culps Hill. So Meade knew LRT was an importan pice of property thats why Sickles was to cover the area with his crops.
Sickles did not like West Point officers and being he was a brawler and political general, they would never mix well. Sickles belived he spotted better ground in front of his assigned position and wanted to move to it. He asked Meade to look over the ground but instead Meade sent his Chief of Artillery, Henry Hunt, to overlook the position. Sickles knew he was ordered to defend his original position because he had orders from Meade through Meades aide de camp, his son. Without orders, Sickles advanced his Corp. This actually was a better position to assault for the Confederates than was his original position. It made it easier to flank his line, as the Confederates were planning on doing in the original plan. Sickles did not have enough men to hold this line. He was with Meade and aware that Meade was unhappy with his position and offered to fall back. This was when Longstreet began his attack and things went bad.
While it is true that several of Longstreet's divisions were hit very hard in this attack, it is hard to say if they would have been able to be part of the attck on the 3rd day as they would have still been involved heavily in the attack on the 3rd Corps. A constant theme in Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania was that he wanted to do serious damage to the AOP. As he told Gen. Trimble "When the enemy hears where we are, he will make forced marches thrugh Frederick. They will arrive broken down with hunger and hard marching. I shall throw an overwhelming force on their advance, crush it, follow up the success drive one corp back on another and virtually destroy their army." On the 1st day he did just that by basically deatroying the 1st and 11th corps and on the 2nd day with Sickles help, he basically destroyed the 3rd corp.
Before the war, Sickles was a major player in politics. He made a name for himself in the brawling days in New York and also by killing his wife's lover. He was the first case ever tried with the defense of tempoary insanity and he won. He knew how to turn things around to his advantage. When Meade sent out his Pie Creek circular, Sickles took this as a sign Meade did not want to fight and would retreat when he could. Sickles did what he could to make a fight and he made himself out to be the hero of Gettysburg. His political connections saved him and also helped him win the Congressional Medal of Honor for his actions at Gettysburg.
You mentioned several times that if the round tops were so important then why did not Meade have more troops on them. At the end of the 1st day of fighting, Meade sent Hancock to Gettysburg to take control of the troops there and get control of what was there. When the 12th corps troops arrived, Hancock sent them to cover the roundtops as he knwe they were important. Then throughout the rest of the day and night, as troops arrived on the field, they were placed along the lines. Mead was made awar that there was a gap between Culp's hill and the cemetary so he orderd the 12th corp over to the right and fill this gap. He then sent an order to Sickles to fill the gap vacated by the 12th Corp. Meade knew the hills were important and ordered them covered. It was Sickles who chose not to cover the hills, not Meade.
Last edited by rocky0 on Wed Aug 10, 2011 10:34 pm, edited 1 time in total.
May God have mercy on my enemies...because I sure wont. George Patton
I think that the answers to the original questions can be found in a corps history...fox's usually suffices.
I'll give a listing corps by corps to answer some questions.
First Army Corps - slightly engaged in Shenandoah, battles of 2nd Manassas, Antietam, Fredericksburg. By Gettysburg, largely intact but some brigades are have glaring weak points...mainly in size and new regiments. By Gettysburg, First Division is probably the most intact, yet reduce to half size and bolstered by two new regiments. The Second Division is a mere shadow with two brigades and very few men, all very good troops. The Third Division is entirely new and rounds the corps up to strength. Overall, the corps has good offensive power but lacks the troop count. In resonable combat shape by Gettysburg, but by far not the best corps.
Second Army Corps - perhaps the backbone of the Army of the Potomac. Parts fought in almost every battle on the peninsula, battles of Antietam, Fredericksburg; engaged at Chancellorsville. By Gettysburg this corps is a combination of great troops and new ones...strenght is only in its regiment count, but regiments are badly used up. The First Division is a wreck by Gettysburg, great fighting material, but far too few men, survives only through five newish regiments. The Second Division is the same one that charge into the West Woods at Antietam...all veterans, and due to its relatively careful handling at Fredericksburg, remains large. Perhaps the best division in the army. The Third Division is the oddest division, with a brigade that has been virtually unengaged since the valley campaign, a brigade of newer veterans (of Antietam age), and an entirely new brigade. The Second Corps is probably in the best combat shape at Gettysburg of all the Corps in the Union Army.
Third Army Corps - this corps is probably in the worst shape in the entire Army. By Gettysburg, the original brigades of Kerney's and Hooker's divisions are combined and newer regiments bolster the troop count. Winnowed by casualties from these battles: Peninsula Campaign (engaged virtually every battle), 2nd Manassas, and Chancellorsville (not engaged really at Antietam or Fredericksburg). The First Division contains excellent fighting men scattered throughout the brigades, but these regiments are far too small to hold the line. A few newer regiments bolster the brigades, but as the majority of the corps left right after Chancellorsville...the first division is low on morale due to reorganization. Fighting ability rounded out by the addition of the sharpshooters. The Second Division contains even fewer men, though just as veteran as many of those of the first. Altogether, the Third Corps is too small to put up a nice fight. NOTE: the 124th is a no account regiment in reality. They had virtually no experience...only a colonel who had some guts. I believe they are correctly portrayed in the game...sometimes unexperienced regiments can work wonders in times of crisis, which happens occasionally in the game.
Fifth Army Corps - probably the second best corps in the army. Engaged in the Seven Days, 2nd Manassas, Fredericksburg, lightly at Chancellorsville. The first division has great experience, though reduced by new regiments such as the 20th Maine (which really wasn't a great regiment, they just happened to do the right thing at the right time) to increase troop count. The fault lies in that the First Division is far too small to do much...which plagued it at Gettysburg. The Second Division is the best division in the army. The Regulars are the best trained, and fight in a large number of battles as well. Perhaps a little on the small side, they are rounded out by a new brigade of volunteers. The Third Division is just as good as the Second, with a few more battles under their belt. Altogether, this is a great corps and rivals the second corps in terms of value in battle.
Sixth Army Corps - far overrated in this game. The Sixth is virtually unengaged until the Wilderness, so it contains a lot of troops that have never fought. Although they all have been around for a while, the regiments should really be militia and volunteer caliber in this corps, not seasoned. All divisions are relatively intact from their original state...though note that the Third Division originally hails from the Fourth Corps, which makes it slightly better than the others. This corps has a few new regiments which futher increase the troops count. A good corps if you need the numbers, otherwise, really doesn't do anything.
Eleventh Army Corps - broken due to its lack of fighting. This corps fought in the Valley, at 2nd Manassas, and Chancellorsville. Far too much was expected of it when it is barely more engaged than the Sixth Corps! All divisions are made divisions by the large number of new regiments, and please note the Germans only are in the First Division, and by Gettysburg, most of them aren't even in the army anymore. Altogether, the entire corps is hampered by being new. 9 regiments are new, and they aren't even in their own seperate division, like in the First Corps. I believe that scattering the new regiments throughout the brigades really pulls down the experience of all...because if one new regiment falls back, that forces the surrounding ones to fall back, and eventually the whole corps goes, instead of them contained in one division, like the First Corps. Made of good fighting material, but far too inexperienced for a good fight.
Twelfth Army Corps - perhaps the most mediocre corps in the army. Engaged in the Valley, Cedar Mountain, and Antietam. Many of the original regiments are gone and the others are relatively new ones. Its lack of engagement makes it similar to the Sixth Corps.
I'm not sure that I agree with many of your statements regarding what Sickles did on the 2nd day. Sickles had orders to fill in from the left of the 2nd corps and to anchor his lines on LRT.
rocky0 – Thanks, that was a very detailed explanation about the events on that day. I have read the same thing years ago, except I do not actually believe that that is one-hundred-percent-true.
Not, what you have said, but what the history books have said, and no I have absolutely zero proof in this.
And, I’m still under the impression, and will always be under the impression that Sickles changed the whole course of the Gettysburg battle, for better, or for worse.
davinci
The only true logic is that, there is no true logic!
This is my point on some of this information about history , information that I’m supposed to accept as an absolute fact .
If during my almost fifty years on this planet, if I absolutely believe everything that the Government, Military, or the Press writes down, and states as-a-fact, than what would that make me?
A lot of these so-called-true’s or official stories will also be in some history book, or documented in a digital achieve somewhere in the distance future.
And someone will read these so-called-facts a hundred and fifty years from now and say “this has to be true, it’s in the history books”.
Now, does that make all of them true , how many official reports within your lifetime do you absolutely disbelieve ?
This in no way makes the official reports untrue; it just means that you do not believe them, so there are some official reports that I just do not accept as a fact, it’s that simple.
davinci
The only true logic is that, there is no true logic!
You have read the record for yourself and no one is trying to change your opinion. The fact that Sickles changed the outcome of the battle is readily accepted. In what way he changed it is up for debate. In that debate no one knows for sure how it would have been otherwise. It is one of the more interesting debates of the battle. This topic can make for interesting conversation.