Artillery sill too weak?

[Gunfreak]

So playing my Antitam battle, I've had 4 batteries with clear field of fire fireing at the rebs for 2 hours, so far they have stacked up a total of 15 castualties.

This is not the artillery that did 50-60% of the castualties on the battlefield.

[KG_Soldier]

Use only solid shot.

[Little Powell]

Canister does a good job too..

[Kerflumoxed]

Canister does a good job too..

Very true, if the opposition is within the range as established by the game. If it was within historical context, it would be even more devastating...perhaps, too much as some have argued. Nevertheless, the manual warned that cannister, for example in the light 12-pounder gun, Model 1857 (known by all as the Napoleon)was "not effective at over 600 yards" and should not be used at over 500 yards unless "over the most favorable ground." Quoting further, "At short ranges (less than 200 yards - BTW what is the current range at which cannister can be fired in the game?) in emergency, use double cannister." Too bad we don't have the ability to use either the appropriate range or double cannister. If we did, I suspect many of the mass charges we now see in MP would be quickly eliminated at the onset or reconsidered before giving the order! If the current range is c. 200 yards, perhaps a viable solution would be to increase the number of hits taken by the charging regiment(s) to reflect the double cannister. At 200 yards, the "cone" of fire would be roughly 64 feet in diameter (32 feet spread per 100 yards down-range). Could this be considered?

Thanks

J

[Willard]

So playing my Antitam battle, I've had 4 batteries with clear field of fire fireing at the rebs for 2 hours, so far they have stacked up a total of 15 castualties.

This is not the artillery that did 50-60% of the castualties on the battlefield.

Gunfreak -

Your estimate of 50-60% of artillery inflicted casualties is on the high end. The "accepted" range is somewhere between 10% to 50%, based upon historical sources cited. The 10% figure is based upon a Federal study during the war where doctors gave their assessment on the causes of casaulties. The problem with that study is that artillery canister wounds are very similar to that of musket wounds and consequently I believe that number is way too low. As for the 50% rate, that may be too high as artillery effectiveness is somewhat limited based upon geographical features of each particular battlefield.

There are unfortunately several problems with how artillery is modeled in SOW that are hard-coded into the game. Right off the bat, one of the big problems is that solid shot is the most effective and largest amount of round type in SOW. At Gettysburg for example, 75% of the rounds used by the Union were spherical case and shell, with the remaining 25% split equally between canister and solid. For the rebels that split was 55% for spherical case, 25% shell and the remaining 20% split equally between canister and solid. The bottom line is that overwhelming amount of rounds fired at Gettysburg were spherical case and shell at medium range (out to about 1 mile = 1760 yards).

Solid shot was used primarily for long range & counter-battery fire for accuracy to dismount guns, destroy caissons and kill horses. This type of long range fire required a slower ROF to increase acccuracy for careful aimed fire (about 1 round per 2 minutes). Effective counterbattery fire required multiple batteries to concentrate on one battery OR one battery to concentrate on one gun. In effect, overwhelming fire would be brought on that single target (either battery or gun) which would suppress the target to withdraw. Casualty rates at Gettysburg were both 3% - so effective counterbattery fire didn't inflict alot of casualties BUT it still forced guns to withdraw. To model that effectively, artillery under counterbattery fire should receive an increased morale and fatigue bonus. That will force players to pull their guns back as their morale/fatigue malus has increased which should negatively impact ROF and accuracy.

Unfortunately, my understanding is that the above cannot be modeled in game due to hard coding issues. Additionally, my understanding is also that the effectiveness of each round type (canister, case, shell and solid) can't be modeled independently either. The end result is that in-game the most effective round type is solid shot and that both CB fire/infantry fire are equally impacted when you change the effectiveness of the guns.

IMO, the stock game artillery is too effective casualty wise against infantry and artillery but too ineffective in modeling the fatigue/morale malus on both artillery and troops. You can knock out guns in stock games which is good, but because the effectiveness of the guns is too high you have way too many infantry casualties. In GCM games, the guns are nerfed too much and the reload times are too slow due gun crews being decreased by 33%. That ROF becomes a problem at close range because instead of increasing to a rapid fire pace as dictated by circumstances, the ROF remains to slow. Consequently, artillery batteries do not have either the firepower or the morale/fatigue malus to be a strong deterrent or defensive force multiplier. Additionally, as rifles are set 220 yards, there is a "20 yard gap" whereby a player can stack regiments and fire on artillery batteries but still be outside the 200 yard canister range. This swings the advantage way too far over to infantry IMO.

Using Gettysburg battle as an example, there are a couple of ways to model artillery casaulty rates:

Scenario #1 - During the 3-day battle resulted in 68,000 rounds of expended during the battle. Working with the the 10% figure based upon the number of guns deployed in battle that results in 20 rounds to inflict 1 casualty. Under that assumption, 68,000/20 rounds = 3400 casualties.

Scenario #2 - If you work with a total casualties for both sides at 46,000, 10% of that is 4600 casualties, but of course the total casulty figure also includes those capture. If you remove the 10,000 missing & captured, you end up with 3600 casualties. Effectively both measures are pretty consistent.

Under the above two scenarios, that means that if you have a battery of 6 guns expending 100 rounds each in a battle (for a battery total of 600 rounds), you could expect 60 casulties inflicted - about 10 per gun per 100 rounds expended.

I think everyone can agree that is way too low to go with those figures. If we work with the high end of 50% casualties, the above scenarios break down as follows:

Scenario #2 - Casualties of 36,000 (minus 10,000 captured and missing) @ 50% = 18,000 artillery inflicted casaulties.

Scenario #1 - 18,000 casualties with 68,000 rounds expended in battle results in 3.8 rounds fired by casualty.

At the 50% rate of 3.8 rounds per casualty - lets round up to 4 for simplicity sake - a battery of 6 guns expending 100 rounds each in a battle (for a battery total of 600 rounds), you could expect 150 casulties inflicted - about 25 per gun per 100 rounds expended in battle.

There are a few factors that skew these results - first, we are discounting 10,000 captured/missing troops in both equations so those rates are probably still a little low but I am ok with them. Second, artillery batteries generally were not all up on the line at the same time. Batteries had - for the most part - to move to the rear to replenish ammo. Plus most players do not engage in CB fire in game because it isn't effective. In essense, the above casualty rates - at the 10% and 50% range - are assuming those targets only fired on troop formations the entire battle which we no was not accurate. Prior to the start of Pickets Charge, you had 200 guns firing at each other for 90 minutes and expending approximately 15,000 rounds total in counter-battery fire ~ about 22% of the total rounds expended in the entire 3-day battle. However, the manpower loss in those 90 minutes was not that substantial given the ranges, with Union estimates at 200 men + the destruction of 12 guns and displacement of many others. If we assume the Rebs lost the same, we can account for 500 total casualties for a barrage that accounted for 22% of all rounds fired during the battle.

For our purposes, lets substract the expended rounds and casualties to determine the "real" ratios for the remainder of the battle...

Scenario #1 with a 10% casualty rate - that means the remaining 53000 rounds accounted for 2900 casualties or 18 rds per casualty. For a 6 gun battery firing 100 rounds, that results in 34 casualties total for the battery for 600 rounds or 5.5 casualties per gun per 100 rounds.

Scenario #1 with a 50% casualty rate - means the 53000 rounds accounted for 17,500 or 3 rds per casualty. For a 6 gun battery firing 100 rounds, that results in 200 total casualites per battery per 600 rounds fired or 33 casualties per gun per 100 rounds.

The biggest problem in game is that casualty rates in game are way too inflated - at Gettysburg, Lee lost 33% of his men and Meade lost 25% of his - we have casualty rates in GCM games that far exceed those percentages. This probably means that the ROF for infantry is still too high, and the morale/fatigue malus impact for units under fire is still too low. My observation is that there is not enough ebb and flow in battle, where units fall back, quickly recover morale/fatigue and can re-engage. Instead we have slugfest attrition stand-offs where the units basically square off against one antoher until one finally breaks and routs.

Conversely, artillery CB fire didn't inflict that many casualties and the result was more of a morale/fatigue malus - as should be modeled in this game - in order to reflect the effectiveness of CB fire in displacing batteries. The bottom line is that the BEST way to model the artillery impact in game is:

#1 - Increase that morale/fatigue malus on both troops and batteries. It should be counter-balanced with a higher morale/fatigue recovery factor for units not under that type of fire.
#2 - Artillery effectiveness (both casualty and morale/fatigue malus should increase as distances to target decreases. Basically the long range fire should cause a greater fatigue/morale malus and shorter range fire (essentially 400 yards and closer) should result in a higher casualty rates.
#3 - The ratio of rounds in ammo chests needs to be changed and the effectiveness of round types tweaked.

The biggest concern of "keeping the guns" back can be best accomplished through effective countery-battery fire and increased morale/fatigue penalties the closer the guns move in. Basically if a player is rolling is guns up and gets within 500 yards of CB fire, that battery should be getting knocked out not necessarily through casualties but through a huge morale/fatigue malus that drastically decreases both ROF and accuracy forcing it to be withdrawn.

[NY Cavalry]

About artillery I want to make this point. In mp the GCM games artillery has been increased in its effectiveness as of late and I do think it is for the better. I have known and have observed recently that many factors come into play with artillery effectiveness. Elevation and cover etc. If a player brings his troops out into the wrong place the enemy artillery can rip them apart. It makes me more observant of directions of attack and impresses the need for the best tactics. Then again some players haven't mastered the artillery and its placement.

The game is great in that artillery doesn't get a complete pass and is allowed to shoot anyone up at anytime, but must be used properly and then the infantry has the opportunity to make adjustments like falling back to cover or charging, etc.

Everyone uses solid shot as that is the most effective ammo type(excluding canister). Most guys use front line ammo resupply which is completely unhistorical, but its a game. I'd like to be able to target wagons with a good chance for a hit as it should be.

[garyknowz]

Great post, Willard! A lot to chew on there.

[NY Cavalry]

Willard knows his stuff when it comes to artillery.

[Michael Slaunwhite]

Great post, Willard! A lot to chew on there.

He rarely comes empty handed...don't choke on the bones.

[Willard]

Gents -

For some further discussion, I am pulling up some numbers from Picketts charge. I am rounding up slightly to make the math a bit easier and since this imperfect, I hope everyone will work the numbers.

Rebs launched the assault with 12,000 men and suffered 6000 casaulties. Of those 6000, approximately 3000 were captured and assuming some of those wounded lets work with 4000 KIA/WIA troops.

From the Yanks, taking into account losses and angles of fire, the max # of guns they could have fired effectively were 100 guns. By most accounts the charge lasted an hour, so lets work with a ROF of 1 round per minute per gun. That results in 100 guns X 60 rounds = 6000 total rounds of artillery fire.

At a 10% effective rate as outlined in my previous post, that equates to 18/1 rd per casaulty ratio. That would result in a 333 artillery casualties.

At a 50% effective rate, that equates to 3/1 rd per casaulty ratio. That would result in 2000 casaulties.

From most historical accounts, I think we can all agree that 333 artillery casualties is way too low. Given the mass of troops and open fields of convergent fire the Yanks could deliver, I think a 50% rate would have been easily attainable and possibly even exceeded for the Yanks given the circumstances.

As Harmon indicated above, a lot of this depends upon geography. If we look at Malvern Hill, Hunt was able to deliver fire of 250 guns on the rebel assault. That was from an elevated defensive position on the most dominating geographical feature of the battlefield that day.

Using the math above, we can come up with some additional numbers for discussion...

From the Yanks, Hunt had 250 guns to work with but it is highly unlikely they all engaged in battle. Until I get some more specifics, working with 125 guns engaged at ROF of 1 round per minute per gun. That results in 125 guns X 60 rounds = 7500 total rounds of artillery fire.

At a 10% effective rate as outlined in my previous post, that equates to 18/1 rd per casaulty ratio. That would result in a 416 artillery casualties.

At a 50% effective rate, that equates to 3/1 rd per casaulty ratio. That would result in 2500 casaulties.

We know that the Rebs lost 5500 and a number of both Union and Reb historical accounts attribute half that to Union artillery, so a 50% rate would match up nicely if I can confirm that 125 gun number and check to see if the Union records account anywhere for the # of shells expended. That being said, Malvern Hill, like Pickett's charge, had unique geographical features that provided defensive artillery almost optimal conditions for performance.

Regarding rates of fire, Hunt deployed 150 guns at Fredricksburg during his prepartory bombardment of town when the Yanks crossed the river. The 150 guns fired 8000 total rounds over 2 hours. That equates to 53 rounds per gun over 120 minutes or a ROF of 1 rd per 2 minutes. That was within the prescribed 1 rd per 2 minutes for a very well aimed ROF. Defending an assault, the crews easily could manage 1 rd per minute especially when targeting a mass of troops. Of course at canister range, all bets were probably off it was load and fire as fast as possible.