I think options for a fourth day of battle are limited. Both sides were about spent. Command structures were a mess. The only fresh Corp was the AOP's 6th Corp and that was holding the center/left of the line on day 4. A frontal assault was probably out. That leaves the sending the 6th on a flanking move to the ANV right. That would leave Meade weak in the center and he would have to commit Sykes to hold that position and he was pretty badly beaten up from the 2nd day's affairs. 3rd Corp was spent and wouldn't provide much of a reserve.
I think Meade had French in reserve at Frederick. MD. Perhaps having him come in and and try to get between the ANV and the Potomac at South Mountain or Williamsport or Sharpsburg might be the way to go.
Greg
Review: One Continuous Fight (Gettysburg Retreat)
Re:Review: One Continuous Fight (Gettysburg Retreat)
Last edited by Gfran64 on Mon Mar 02, 2009 12:41 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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Re:Review: One Continuous Fight (Gettysburg Retreat)
I got this book for my birthday with a personal signing by Nugent. Presently I'm reading about the evacuation of Confederate wounded by the wagon trains under Imboden.
Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure.
Re:Review: One Continuous Fight (Gettysburg Retreat)
It is interesting that Meade actually considered going on the attack on Day 3 and held a council of war among his corps commanders to discuss the prospects of it.
Seizing and holding the initiative was of paramount importance within the mind of the Civil War general. Being deep within enemy territory, Lee could not afford to let the initiative swing to the Union at any point in the campaign. He could not afford the risk of adopting Longstreet's counsel of letting the Union troops attack them. I would argue that by quickly abandoning Gettysburg on July 4, Lee was still in control of the initiative pendulum--since he was choosing when to fight. I will at some point read this book on Lee's retreat to Virginia. I suspect that I will agree with Lincoln that a more forceful general in charge of the AOP could have ended the war in July, 1863.
Seizing and holding the initiative was of paramount importance within the mind of the Civil War general. Being deep within enemy territory, Lee could not afford to let the initiative swing to the Union at any point in the campaign. He could not afford the risk of adopting Longstreet's counsel of letting the Union troops attack them. I would argue that by quickly abandoning Gettysburg on July 4, Lee was still in control of the initiative pendulum--since he was choosing when to fight. I will at some point read this book on Lee's retreat to Virginia. I suspect that I will agree with Lincoln that a more forceful general in charge of the AOP could have ended the war in July, 1863.
Re:Review: One Continuous Fight (Gettysburg Retreat)
Dale,
Thought you might like to read this.
http://www.emmitsburg.net/archive_list/ ... untain.htm
Enjoy,
Greg B)
Thought you might like to read this.
http://www.emmitsburg.net/archive_list/ ... untain.htm
Enjoy,
Greg B)
Re:Review: One Continuous Fight (Gettysburg Retreat)
Had to take a power nap after reading that article, there was so much movement after GB it makes one realize what a good storey it is.
Hoistingman4
Hoistingman4
HOISTINGMAN4
Drafted in Boston
Drafted in Boston