Scourge of War Boards

Willard,

Brilliant, as usual. My only question is this - have you allowed for the closing of the range to cannister range? (Or did I miss that somewhere?). Re; Malvern Hill - several Confederate accounts from Hood's troops recount horrific casualties from Federal artillery cannister fire during the attack. Also, it is probably bloody hard to distinguish where double and/or triple cannister charges were being fired.
Just my ha'penny's worth.

Jack B)

Willard,

Brilliant, as usual. My only question is this - have you allowed for the closing of the range to cannister range? (Or did I miss that somewhere?). Re; Malvern Hill - several Confederate accounts from Hood's troops recount horrific casualties from Federal artillery cannister fire during the attack. Also, it is probably bloody hard to distinguish where double and/or triple cannister charges were being fired.
Just my ha'penny's worth.

Jack B)

Agreed Jack - Check out the last paragraph of my initial post. It would be difficult to distinguish as you suggest and the numbers are obviously *average* across the board.

Willard,

Brilliant, as usual. My only question is this - have you allowed for the closing of the range to cannister range? (Or did I miss that somewhere?). Re; Malvern Hill - several Confederate accounts from Hood's troops recount horrific casualties from Federal artillery cannister fire during the attack. Also, it is probably bloody hard to distinguish where double and/or triple cannister charges were being fired.
Just my ha'penny's worth.

Jack B)

Actually, Jack, the cannister ranges are already there as I noted in an earlier post including the cannister range relevant to the individual gun in the Table of Fire glued to the lid of each limber chest (200 yards for a Nap to effectively use double cannister - see post no. 2) as well as in Article Third: Pointing and Ranges, p. 26 - 36 in the INSTRUCTION FOR FIELD ARTILLERY. The same Nap, at an elevation of 5 degrees, firing a powder charge of 2.5 pounds would throw a solid shot 1,685 yards (over 5,000 feet or just short of a mile) before it first touched the ground.

J

Baylor,

I don't think you are considering how unbalanced the game would become if artillery was made to mimic its historical counterparts, especially in regards to canister. If we had canister that could reach out 400 yards, everyone's infantry would route before getting close enough to engage anything. I will agree that some tweaking needs to be done, but that's all.

As to your problem with the auto-charge, stop marching so close to the enemy. There's no reason to be close enough to trip the auto-charge unless you plan on assaulting anyways.

Just my 2 cents on the subject...

--
Muleskinner

Turbotay wrote:

I don't think you are considering how unbalanced the game would become if artillery was made to mimic its historical counterparts, especially in regards to canister. If we had canister that could reach out 400 yards, everyone's infantry would route before getting close enough to engage anything.

Why would it be unbalanced? That was the reality of 19th century warfare. Napoleon called artillery, "the queen of the battlefield." If you charged the guns, you were going to take massive casualties. No regiment could expect to succeed in a frontal assault on a battery. In SOW it's child's play.

Well, try modding your rifle ranges to about 80 yards and see how much more powerful artillery becomes. I'm not saying artillery should be weak. I'm just saying that some limiting needs to be in place in order to make the game more fun for more people in MP. If anyone wants stronger arty in SP, turn everything up to 11 for all I care.

Turb,

I HAVE modded my ranges in the NAP Mod to 100 yards for standard Line Infantry and 120 yards for Skirmishers/Voltigeurs/Jagers. (Gunship's Mod ranges were 120 yards and 130 yards respectively.) It is Brutal to close with field guns firing cannister, AND this is with marginally more professional troops then American CW troops.

Jack B)

Cannister fire in the Civil War seems to be a place of mixed views.

I will provide exerpts from two of the major artillery battles in the Civil War (Antietam and Gettysburg), then draw a conclusion, and leave the rest for everyone else.

To start, I remember reading in an artillery manual that a supported battery was expected to hold a regimental frontage in a sustained fight. That is what we need to focus on. The guide does not say, defeat a force on a regimental frontage. It says that it will hold a certain area. It seems to me that people believe that cannister fire is used to defeat the enemy. I believe that the use of cannister fire in the Civil war was to halt, and hold, the enemy. Cannister fire is used to prevent the enemy from advancing further.

At Antietam, Battery B of the 4th Regiment of United States Artillery, indirectly supported by troops from Gibbons and Patrick's brigades, halts the Confederate drive along the turnpike on the West edge of the Cornfield.

At Antietam, several of Meade's Pennsylvania batteries are unsupported, and promptly shot up by Law's advancing troops.

At Antietam, two batteries halt some of Kershaw's troops from taking the East Woods; however, Kershaw turns and drives south, through the gap in the Union lines in the Cornfield.

At Gettysburg, Captain Hall's Maine Battery forces the 55th North Carolina to move northwest, into the 147th New York.

At Gettysburg, 5 Union batteries start to retreat under Kershaw's pressure before Kershaw's troops make an accidental right wheel.

At Gettysburg, Bigelow's RI Battery engages the 21st Mississippi for 30 minutes at ranges under 100 yards. The 21st remains intact.

Based off of these incidences, I can try to come up with several fits-all rules.

The first is: commanders naturally try to strike the weakest link in the line. Kershaw's advance at Antietam swings north when he encounters Federal artillery in the East Woods. Why try to take on cannon when you can march north through a giant gap in the lines? At Gettysburg, the 21st engaged Bigelow because he was the easiest target.

The second: cannister is used to halt the enemy, not defeat the enemy. In all of the above situations, cannister was used. In most cases, the advancing enemy troops halted, due to the moral effects of firing cannister. The battery commander then had to decide whether he would limber up (since the enemy was halted), or if he would wait for support. Many cases fit in here. Law's shooting up of Meade's guns at Antietam fits this bill: if the guns wait and do nothing but fire cannister, they will get shot to pieces. What doesn't fit in is Bigelow's success at preventing the 21st from taking his guns for 30 minutes. However, he was retiring by prolonge (How do you spell it?), so that might have had something to do with it.

Based on this, I think it is safe to conclude that first: cannister was used to halt the enemy. The battery commander then needed to decide whether to pull out or not at this point. Second: a supported battery can hold a regimental frontage. So if one side has two regiments and a battery, and the other side has three regiments, both sides would shoot each other to pieces, but neither would be defeated.

In SOW, cannister fire does not halt enemy regiments. In a stand up, supported fight, sometimes the attacking infantry will be destroyed by cannon, and sometimes the cannon will be destroyed by infantry. This does not highlight the fact that infantry and cannon ought to survive for at least 30 minutes, as Bigelow was able to do.

Remember, under infantry fire, cannon loading speed decreases, because the crew would have to load between volleys to prevent excessive casualties. However, if the infantry is charging, there is nothing to prevent the gun crew from loading twice a minute.

Cannister fire in the Civil War seems to be a place of mixed views.


Remember, under infantry fire, cannon loading speed decreases, because the crew would have to load between volleys to prevent excessive casualties. However, if the infantry is charging, there is nothing to prevent the gun crew from loading twice a minute.

The only consideration that I would offer to Mr. Hancock's observations is that infantry volley fire may have been offered at first contact but after the initial volley, the men resorted to loading and firing "at will". In other words, there would be no extended and continued volley fire by the infantry after the initial volley, especially when under fire by the artillery and possibly supporting infantry. Further, if anything, I would suspect that loading and firing speed would decrease as the enemy fired or closed, i.e. less time needed/used to reload the piece, as no self-respecting gunner would allow his gun crew to cower under fire!

J