How Could Lee Have Won GB?

[Anthropoid]

That is very interesting MTG. I didn't know that specifically, but it makes perfect sense given that the CSA was impoverished in nearly all respects. All things considered it seems rather remarkable that the CSA put up as much of a fight and for as many years as they did.

Have reinstalled and been playing Crown of Glory Emperor's Edition here recently so my ears perked up when you mentioned Napoleonic wars *sigh* ah a game that combined the marvels of those WCS designs with the marvels of the NSD 'engine.' I would so love to be involved in building something like that. But I digress . . .

Being only superficially familiar with 18th and 19th century military organization, I'm curious what "staff" would comprise? Would this be non-commissioned officers? Junior officers? Would these guys be on horseback or walking? Would be they be accompanying Lee or distributed throughout the army?

The one thing that sticks out to me as having been a rather major blunder on Lee's part: failure to direct his subordinates to retain sufficient proximity to one another to be self-supporting throughout the campaign. Disadvantages in intelligence, lack of staff, and defensive terrain aside, it seems to me that Lee's army was far too strung out, which made proper coordination and concentration of force at a favorable point an unlikely eventuality given they were marching in hostile territory deep behind enemy lines.

I mean its bad enough that he gives Stuart vague and open-ended orders that contribute to an entire cavalry corp being absent for most of the battle and completely useless to support the army. On top of that Ewell's corp is spread out all across the north, Hill's corp is spread out, and Longstreet's corp is so far behind it didn't arrive until Day 2?

Would it have been that difficult to advance north with the cavalry held in close reserve and small screening parties of troopers advancing a mile or two in advance of the army, as well as with each corp properly arrayed to deploy intact in a timely manner? Hell, Ewell's and Hill's Corp were so strung out, I think I read that Lee himself didn't even arrive until very late on Day 1?

Just seems strangely unprofessional and sloppy for a man who was clearly such a gifted General.

Even if the operational organization of the ANV as it advanced had been 'proper' the other factors described may well have still led to defeat. But deploying into an enemy occupied battlefield in dribs and drabs and engaging piecemeal seems completely antithetical to the goal of _destroying_ the enemy army.

I wouldn't have guessed that Robert E. Lee would have been vulnerable to 'over-confidence' as a result of the CSA's relative success with their audacious efforts up to that point. I suppose it is safe to say that the CSA was "winning" up to that point, but that is a rather squishy concept I think. Despite the various stellar victories the CSA had achieved, they had also had a few very close calls if not pyrrhic victories which were far too costly in blood and treasure. Not to mention that, as the video Calvin809 posted points out: Lee was keenly aware that what he needed to do was not simply to win battles but to destroy enemy ARMIES. He was a smart man so he must have been aware that many of the CSA's victories had been as much attributable to poor Union leadership as to CSA esprit du corps.

So on the one hand, I cannot imagine Lee getting sloppy in the operational execution of his campaign as a result of over-confidence. But on the other, his operational execution of the advance does seem to have been completely lacking and set him up for failure at GB.

[Marching Thru Georgia]

Operationally, Lee was probably the best the south had. His two forays north are testimony to that. That especially being true given the poor transportation system that plagued the south the entire war and the inadequate amount of supplies his army was receiving. He was no Sherman, but he certainly wasn't incompetent in that regard.

But his strategic abilities were mediocre at best. His two forays north are ample proof of that too. As you point out, his army was disconnected while in enemy territory, and the whole time he had no idea of the location of the enemy. Stuart's infamous ride was bad enough, but Lee had substantial cavalry with him that he made little use of. That's not the mark of a general that instills confidence in his campaigning abilities. Again, he was certainly no Sherman or Grant. Unfortunately for the south, they had no one who was in Sherman's or Grant's league.

As you point out he did have the ability to read his opponent and take full advantage of his weaknesses. Tactically, he was very capable of placing his army in a position to maximize its effectiveness in battle. But his actual battlefield tactics were certainly not equal to many of his subordinates. His West VA. adventures and Peninsula battles are proof of that. But to his credit, he readily acknowledged that. He said it was his job to maneuver the army into a favorable position. It was then the job of his generals to fight and win it. That sort of honest self-assessment is always refreshing. I suppose the counter-argument to this observation was his brilliant performance at Antietam. He directed that battle nearly single-handed and was able to fight a much larger but horrendously ill-managed northern army to a draw.

[Baldwin]

Ignore all the Union propaganda from these guys. Everyone knows Lee was much better than Sherman or Grant. Sherman just burned towns to the ground with superior numbers and Grant bashed away with superior numbers with no regards to his men (i.e. nickname 'butcher'). If Lee had listened to Longstreet and shifted to better ground to the SE he could have won for sure. Remember Meade was not very good at pressing all out attacks without advice from Grant so he would have been timid and attacked piecemeal or uncoordinated. Meade would have suffered at least 50-60% casualties attacking the high ground against Lee and would have given up after a day or two of that and try to maneuver back to D.C. taking a long route.

[Marching Thru Georgia]

Ignore all the Union propaganda from these guys. Everyone knows Lee was much better than Sherman or Grant. Sherman just burned towns to the ground with superior numbers and Grant bashed away with superior numbers with no regards to his men (i.e. nickname 'butcher'). If Lee had listened to Longstreet and shifted to better ground to the SE he could have won for sure. Remember Meade was not very good at pressing all out attacks without advice from Grant so he would have been timid and attacked piecemeal or uncoordinated. Meade would have suffered at least 50-60% casualties attacking the high ground against Lee and would have given up after a day or two of that and try to maneuver back to D.C. taking a long route.

Ah, the wet dreams of the lost causers. :laugh:

[Anthropoid]

Ignore all the Union propaganda from these guys. Everyone knows Lee was much better than Sherman or Grant. Sherman just burned towns to the ground with superior numbers and Grant bashed away with superior numbers with no regards to his men (i.e. nickname 'butcher'). If Lee had listened to Longstreet and shifted to better ground to the SE he could have won for sure. Remember Meade was not very good at pressing all out attacks without advice from Grant so he would have been timid and attacked piecemeal or uncoordinated. Meade would have suffered at least 50-60% casualties attacking the high ground against Lee and would have given up after a day or two of that and try to maneuver back to D.C. taking a long route.

Ah, the wet dreams of the lost causers. :laugh:

Its nice that after 150 years we can all share a friendly / brotherly chuckle about this stuff

Seems to me there is some truth to what everyone is saying.

I just still cannot believe that Lee let his army advance into Pennsylvania in such a uselessly dispersed array. That is antithetical not only to his campaign goal but to his most incontrovertible forte "maneuver the army into a favorable position."

One could naturally conclude that his statement's to Davis that it was "all my fault" were just his gentlemanly nature. But in this case, I think he was right. He completely misused his army in that campaign (well following Chancellorsville anyway) and any chance the CSA had to win the campaign and the war were seriously impeded by his failing.

Thank God. One shudders to imagine the world if the CSA had not been driven to unconditional surrender and re-assimilation.

[Baldwin]

Technically Lee did win the first day so if he withdrew to better ground after that he would have won the battle of Gettysburg. So that right there answers the question. Lee just extended the battle to 3 days and wanted to annihilate the Union army with one fell swoop.