Willard's 10 Maxims on Use of Artillery
Re:Willard's 10 Maxims on Use of Artillery
I know you are being sincere Little Powell. I forget that I come across like an old smartass sometimes. Just ask RebBuglar, Braxton Bragg or some of the other Curmudgeons around here.
Re:Willard's 10 Maxims on Use of Artillery
J Canuck wrote:
I think "superb" and "expertise" maybe overstating my abilities. However I do think you are correct that artillery use is very nuanced in the game. You need to be very particular in its use to get optimal results.
I think most people write off artillery as only useful in canister range. That really isn't the case and especially in MP, now that everyone knows how devestating artillery is, they are leery of attacking it straight on or are targeting it early with counter-battery fire and targeted attacks. If you leave your guns out front in MP you will lose them. Consequently, in MP, you don't have the luxury of micromanging each gun. You need to constantly be checking to see if you can redeploy guns to better position and ensure they aren't endanger of being over-run OR needed to temporarily plug a gap.
Willard, I just read your excellent treatise on artillery tactics. I have now come to appreciate artillery’s nuances (Little Powell are you reading this?! > nuances) in the game, which can dictate a battle’s success.Considering your superb tactical expertise, would you mind commenting on the use of artillery ordinance within the construct of SOWGB?
I think "superb" and "expertise" maybe overstating my abilities. However I do think you are correct that artillery use is very nuanced in the game. You need to be very particular in its use to get optimal results.
I always TC each individual battery commander so they and the battery don't roam. The reason I do this is that I am very particular about the ground I chose to deploy a battery on and based upon my MP experience, the ground selection for artillery is the single most important factor in artillery success. The issue you are referring to about the flag is important with enfilade fire at greater than 200 yards. From a casualty perspective, the KIA hits are increased for all types of guns BUT the morale/fatigue malus is HUGE. If a regiment/brigade is engaged in line with enemy infantry and under that type of fire, it will break very very quickly.Could you also address the issue of having to take command in order to force the AI selection of shot, but which creates the problem of TC automatically forcing individual guns to remain stationary, hence eliminating their ability to aim directly at a moved enemy unit? I understand (but I may be incorrect) the construct of the game dictates the more accurately one’s guns point directly at an enemy unit’s flag, the greater damage one’s fire inflicts.
When I TC my batteries, I let them choose their own shot type. I very very rarely target individual batteries and I usually leave target selection to AI or "target artillery." I don't target each gun seperately per se. I will scroll thru each battery very quickly to ensure the guns are engaged and may slightly adjust an individual gun placement. Most of the time I can tell within about 15 mins whether my initial gun placement was good or not and more often than not, when I have chosen poorly - especially in MP - the game is lost. Artillery units can quickly recover fatigue if you limber them and pull them off the line. You only need about 5 mins of gametime for them to recover.Furthermore, which is better: allow the AI to select a gun’s type of shot and target repositioned enemy units; or, TC to force shot selection and freeze the guns thus stop fatigue caused by moving?
I think most people write off artillery as only useful in canister range. That really isn't the case and especially in MP, now that everyone knows how devestating artillery is, they are leery of attacking it straight on or are targeting it early with counter-battery fire and targeted attacks. If you leave your guns out front in MP you will lose them. Consequently, in MP, you don't have the luxury of micromanging each gun. You need to constantly be checking to see if you can redeploy guns to better position and ensure they aren't endanger of being over-run OR needed to temporarily plug a gap.
Re:Willard's 10 Maxims on Use of Artillery
Can we get this topic stickied? Before it ends up lost in the shuffle. There's some great info in here.
Re:Willard's 10 Maxims on Use of Artillery
Willard, thank you very much for taking the time for such an insightful and comprehensive reply. This will be my first Karma presentation if I can figure out how. :unsure:
EDIT:
You just jumped from 4 to 5.
EDIT:
You just jumped from 4 to 5.
Last edited by J Canuck on Thu Aug 05, 2010 5:24 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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Kerflumoxed
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Re:Willard's 10 Maxims on Use of Artillery
To resurrect an old thread, as well as reopening the controversial topic of infantry fire versus artillery guncrews, here is a great treatise from 2008 addressing Civil War tactics:
http://johnsmilitaryhistory.com/cwarmy.html
Included in the body of this study is an interesting comment regarding the effectiveness of infantry fire upon the crews manning the artillery guns:
"We have seen that the effectiveness of rifled muskets wasn't as great as is often portrayed. So far, we haven't said much about Civil War artillery. The supposed threat that rifled muskets posed to artillerymen is largely an illusion. Artillery units suffered lower casualty rates than the infantry, in line with experience in previous wars. New rifled artillery pieces were accurate at long range, making columns vulnerable. At ranges less than 1,000 yards, brass Napoleon guns were more useful. (Fratt 50)"
Author John Hamill continues:
"Could the increased effectiveness of Civil War era artillery help explain the tactical changes since Napoleon's time? Perhaps advances in artillery explain why it was rare for infantry to advance in maneuver columns, and almost never with cavalry support. Prussian observer Justus Scheibert says as much; "Americans tried the column for offense and gave it up because artillery poured murder on their columns." (Scheibert 41) The only alternative, advancing over long distances in line, was cumbersome and likely to result in confusion. Better discipline and better coordination between units was required to successfully attack in line.....For short range defense against infantry attack, the 12 pounder (Napoleon) was a great advancement from the past because a canister round from a 12 pounder not only contained more projectiles, those projectiles could be shot much further. This made the weapon much deadlier than its smaller rivals. (Eighteenth century tests showed that canister projectiles spread 32 feet per 100 yards of range.) (Hughes 35)"
Finally, Hamill concludes by stating:
"Another beneficial advance of the 12-pounder Napoleon was far and away the most important and dramatic. Before and during the Napoleonic Wars, guns, which are direct fire weapons, were limited to firing round shot or canister. Howitzers, for indirect fire at a higher trajectory, fired a shell, a hollow projectile filled with explosive detonated by a fuse which was set alight during firing. Around 1800, Henry Shrapnel invented the round that bears his name, a shell filled with powder and small round balls, a much more lethal round than the simple shell that it made obsolete. When it was invented, the shrapnel round could only be fired by howitzers, a small fraction of the artillery pieces in use. With advances in metal technology, however, and with a reduction in the powder charge from 1/3 to 1/4 of the weight of the projectile, the shrapnel round could be fired from a standard piece styled a "gun-howitzer", the famed Napoleon gun-howitzer. Seventy eight bullets were contained in a single 12 pounder shrapnel round. (Coggins 67) No longer was the artilleryman limited to roundshot at long range. Now he could deliver killing power said to approach that of canister at nearly a mile's range. In British peacetime experiments, around 10% of the bullets in a shrapnel round hit a target. (Hughes 38) Both enemy infantry and cavalry were made more vulnerable. Brent Nosworthy notes that during the 1859 Italian War, artillery disrupted a cavalry unit from over a mile away, preventing it from forming and attacking. Confirming that this thinking was prevalent during the Civil War, in 1865, Francis Lippitt wrote in "A Treatise on the Tactical Use of the Three Arms, Infantry, Artillery and Cavalry",
Since the introduction of the new rifled arms, exposing cavalry masses to a deadly fire at far greater distances than ever before known, a fire often reaching to the reserves, it seemed doubtful whether the maneuvering and charging in heavy compact masses, which formerly
rendered cavalry of the line so formidable, would any longer be practical.
So more than any other cause, advances in artillery technology made the combined use of cavalry and infantry for decisive combat a difficult proposition.
Despite all this, many historians still believe that artillery wasn't important during the war. Casualties caused by artillery fire were negligible - or so they say. A frequently cited example is the Wilderness, where artillery was said to account for only about 6% of all casualties. Paddy Griffith points out that many casualties attributed to small arms fire may in fact have been caused by artillery, specifically by the small round balls in Shrapnel rounds. Griffith suggests that the percentage of casualties caused by artillery in this battle were probably in proportion to the percentage of artillerymen in the armies. Because of the terrain, this battle, and this result, represent an extreme case. Lee knew that he was deficient in artillery, and he fought in the Wilderness in order to negate the Union advantage. The relative ineffectiveness of artillery in this battle is clearly an aberration. Chancellorsville was also fought in the Wilderness. In this battle, perhaps only the Confederate guns at Hazel Grove allowed Lee to capture Fairview Heights and defeat the Union army. Look at Spotsylvania a year later, also fought in the Wilderness. The massive Union attack on the Mule Shoe broke through because Lee had withdrawn his artillery the night before. Several days later, a Union attack on the base of the salient failed quickly and decisively due to Confederate artillery fire. And we must remember that most ground was NOT as unfavorable as the Wilderness. Take a look at Malvern Hill, Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Gettysburg and the importance of artillery is obvious. Clearly artillery was important or army commanders wouldn't have eagerly added to their stocks of guns up until the last year of the war. In fact, Paddy Griffith suggests that in some battles, artillery accounted for 20 to 50% of casualties. Those who over-estimate the advantages of the rifled musket say that it threatened to make the artilleryman obsolete, but perhaps the opposite was more true. Although many historians do not stress this point, or even acknowledge it, advances in the artillery arm had made Napoleonic combined arms tactics difficult to impossible."
Which leads to the reasoning why SoW:GB artillery commanders advance the guns so close to the infantry lines: Simply stated, the game does not accurately reflect the effectiveness, even with the latest adjustment, of the impact of direct artillery fire at the typical Civil War ranges leading to the advanced placements of the guns in the game. The advancement of infantry columns within 1,000 yards of the frontline is historically inaccurate and does not reflect the tactics of the period, nor the ineffectiveness of artillery fire upon their massed, rank advance.
Hamill's dissertation is well-researched and documented and easily demonstrates the (in)effectiveness of Civil War tactics. I apologize for the length of this post, but I do hope that everyone will take a few minutes to read his conclusions.
J
http://johnsmilitaryhistory.com/cwarmy.html
Included in the body of this study is an interesting comment regarding the effectiveness of infantry fire upon the crews manning the artillery guns:
"We have seen that the effectiveness of rifled muskets wasn't as great as is often portrayed. So far, we haven't said much about Civil War artillery. The supposed threat that rifled muskets posed to artillerymen is largely an illusion. Artillery units suffered lower casualty rates than the infantry, in line with experience in previous wars. New rifled artillery pieces were accurate at long range, making columns vulnerable. At ranges less than 1,000 yards, brass Napoleon guns were more useful. (Fratt 50)"
Author John Hamill continues:
"Could the increased effectiveness of Civil War era artillery help explain the tactical changes since Napoleon's time? Perhaps advances in artillery explain why it was rare for infantry to advance in maneuver columns, and almost never with cavalry support. Prussian observer Justus Scheibert says as much; "Americans tried the column for offense and gave it up because artillery poured murder on their columns." (Scheibert 41) The only alternative, advancing over long distances in line, was cumbersome and likely to result in confusion. Better discipline and better coordination between units was required to successfully attack in line.....For short range defense against infantry attack, the 12 pounder (Napoleon) was a great advancement from the past because a canister round from a 12 pounder not only contained more projectiles, those projectiles could be shot much further. This made the weapon much deadlier than its smaller rivals. (Eighteenth century tests showed that canister projectiles spread 32 feet per 100 yards of range.) (Hughes 35)"
Finally, Hamill concludes by stating:
"Another beneficial advance of the 12-pounder Napoleon was far and away the most important and dramatic. Before and during the Napoleonic Wars, guns, which are direct fire weapons, were limited to firing round shot or canister. Howitzers, for indirect fire at a higher trajectory, fired a shell, a hollow projectile filled with explosive detonated by a fuse which was set alight during firing. Around 1800, Henry Shrapnel invented the round that bears his name, a shell filled with powder and small round balls, a much more lethal round than the simple shell that it made obsolete. When it was invented, the shrapnel round could only be fired by howitzers, a small fraction of the artillery pieces in use. With advances in metal technology, however, and with a reduction in the powder charge from 1/3 to 1/4 of the weight of the projectile, the shrapnel round could be fired from a standard piece styled a "gun-howitzer", the famed Napoleon gun-howitzer. Seventy eight bullets were contained in a single 12 pounder shrapnel round. (Coggins 67) No longer was the artilleryman limited to roundshot at long range. Now he could deliver killing power said to approach that of canister at nearly a mile's range. In British peacetime experiments, around 10% of the bullets in a shrapnel round hit a target. (Hughes 38) Both enemy infantry and cavalry were made more vulnerable. Brent Nosworthy notes that during the 1859 Italian War, artillery disrupted a cavalry unit from over a mile away, preventing it from forming and attacking. Confirming that this thinking was prevalent during the Civil War, in 1865, Francis Lippitt wrote in "A Treatise on the Tactical Use of the Three Arms, Infantry, Artillery and Cavalry",
Since the introduction of the new rifled arms, exposing cavalry masses to a deadly fire at far greater distances than ever before known, a fire often reaching to the reserves, it seemed doubtful whether the maneuvering and charging in heavy compact masses, which formerly
rendered cavalry of the line so formidable, would any longer be practical.
So more than any other cause, advances in artillery technology made the combined use of cavalry and infantry for decisive combat a difficult proposition.
Despite all this, many historians still believe that artillery wasn't important during the war. Casualties caused by artillery fire were negligible - or so they say. A frequently cited example is the Wilderness, where artillery was said to account for only about 6% of all casualties. Paddy Griffith points out that many casualties attributed to small arms fire may in fact have been caused by artillery, specifically by the small round balls in Shrapnel rounds. Griffith suggests that the percentage of casualties caused by artillery in this battle were probably in proportion to the percentage of artillerymen in the armies. Because of the terrain, this battle, and this result, represent an extreme case. Lee knew that he was deficient in artillery, and he fought in the Wilderness in order to negate the Union advantage. The relative ineffectiveness of artillery in this battle is clearly an aberration. Chancellorsville was also fought in the Wilderness. In this battle, perhaps only the Confederate guns at Hazel Grove allowed Lee to capture Fairview Heights and defeat the Union army. Look at Spotsylvania a year later, also fought in the Wilderness. The massive Union attack on the Mule Shoe broke through because Lee had withdrawn his artillery the night before. Several days later, a Union attack on the base of the salient failed quickly and decisively due to Confederate artillery fire. And we must remember that most ground was NOT as unfavorable as the Wilderness. Take a look at Malvern Hill, Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Gettysburg and the importance of artillery is obvious. Clearly artillery was important or army commanders wouldn't have eagerly added to their stocks of guns up until the last year of the war. In fact, Paddy Griffith suggests that in some battles, artillery accounted for 20 to 50% of casualties. Those who over-estimate the advantages of the rifled musket say that it threatened to make the artilleryman obsolete, but perhaps the opposite was more true. Although many historians do not stress this point, or even acknowledge it, advances in the artillery arm had made Napoleonic combined arms tactics difficult to impossible."
Which leads to the reasoning why SoW:GB artillery commanders advance the guns so close to the infantry lines: Simply stated, the game does not accurately reflect the effectiveness, even with the latest adjustment, of the impact of direct artillery fire at the typical Civil War ranges leading to the advanced placements of the guns in the game. The advancement of infantry columns within 1,000 yards of the frontline is historically inaccurate and does not reflect the tactics of the period, nor the ineffectiveness of artillery fire upon their massed, rank advance.
Hamill's dissertation is well-researched and documented and easily demonstrates the (in)effectiveness of Civil War tactics. I apologize for the length of this post, but I do hope that everyone will take a few minutes to read his conclusions.
J
Last edited by Kerflumoxed on Fri Aug 20, 2010 2:05 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Jack Hanger
Fremont, NE[/size]
"Boys, if we have to stand in a straight line as stationary targets for the Yankees to shoot at, this old Texas Brigade is going to run like hell!" J. B. Poley, 4th Texas Infantry, Hood's Texas Brigade
Fremont, NE[/size]
"Boys, if we have to stand in a straight line as stationary targets for the Yankees to shoot at, this old Texas Brigade is going to run like hell!" J. B. Poley, 4th Texas Infantry, Hood's Texas Brigade
Re:Willard's 10 Maxims on Use of Artillery
Another very informative, Kerflumoxed post. And well worth reading. B)
OHIO UNIVERSITY
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NY Cavalry
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Re:Willard's 10 Maxims on Use of Artillery
In actual game play, some players bring the guns up to 200 yards of the infantry line. This was never done in the civil war or could it. They would have been targeted by everyone and their mom. So, if infantry fire is adjusted to be more damaging to artillery, I think this evens out an ugly situation. Infantry commanders need options in dealing with artillery. Especially massed artillery.
You cannot rate the effective rate of fire for artillery in the wilderness battle. It was a wilderness. Artillery was not fully employed because of the nature of the terrain. Most infantry units never saw the enemy line or position they just kept up a rate of fire against incoming fire, or smoke, or sounds, or in just the general direction that they thought the enemy was.
Artillery was never left on a line by themselves without infantry unless it was an emergency like a last stand gun line. If they did they were not expected to last for long. So artillery commanders always pulled out. The game does not reflect this. Even at ranges of 40 to 50 yards kill rates vs artillery is extremely low.
When Lee massed his guns on day 3 gettysburg he didn't get the results he wanted. He was unable to weaken the infantry to his front or blast holes for his infantry. He wasn't able to knock out very many Union guns making an infantry assault successful. It did cause some casualties, but not even near enough at the front line and against the Union artillery. Civil war artillery developed into a major effective force. Still though, most civil war casualties were from small arms fire and canister. Not rifled guns and not hand to hand combat.
Also, artillery vs artillery kept each side honest. 600 yards was thought to be very close for artillery. You took real risks bringing guns up close. There are instances where in the civil war the Union artillerymen realized that the Rebs had few or no guns so they brought their own guns up very close and their fire was extremely effective.
Just some thoughts. I think overall things are really in line and only need to be tweaked.
You cannot rate the effective rate of fire for artillery in the wilderness battle. It was a wilderness. Artillery was not fully employed because of the nature of the terrain. Most infantry units never saw the enemy line or position they just kept up a rate of fire against incoming fire, or smoke, or sounds, or in just the general direction that they thought the enemy was.
Artillery was never left on a line by themselves without infantry unless it was an emergency like a last stand gun line. If they did they were not expected to last for long. So artillery commanders always pulled out. The game does not reflect this. Even at ranges of 40 to 50 yards kill rates vs artillery is extremely low.
When Lee massed his guns on day 3 gettysburg he didn't get the results he wanted. He was unable to weaken the infantry to his front or blast holes for his infantry. He wasn't able to knock out very many Union guns making an infantry assault successful. It did cause some casualties, but not even near enough at the front line and against the Union artillery. Civil war artillery developed into a major effective force. Still though, most civil war casualties were from small arms fire and canister. Not rifled guns and not hand to hand combat.
Also, artillery vs artillery kept each side honest. 600 yards was thought to be very close for artillery. You took real risks bringing guns up close. There are instances where in the civil war the Union artillerymen realized that the Rebs had few or no guns so they brought their own guns up very close and their fire was extremely effective.
Just some thoughts. I think overall things are really in line and only need to be tweaked.
Last edited by NY Cavalry on Fri Aug 20, 2010 5:20 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Re:Willard's 10 Maxims on Use of Artillery
I think both Kerflumoxed and NYCav's concerns can both be addressed with just a couple of tweaks to the existing game engine.
First, I agree that infantry max range needs to be tweaked and pushed out to 200 yards. I am assuming - I don't know for sure - that the current max range of 160 yards has a scaled level of effectiveness so that the closer range you move in, the more effective/accurate the fire. If that is done, than 200 yards would be a good starting point provided it isn't deadly accurate like being at 50 yards.
As it stands now in MP, I think the actually engagement range is usually about 100 yards per side - that is my perception of how close the infantry are standing apart and certainly not a scientific study! By pushing the max range of infantry out to 200 it will push that average engagement range back to about 150 yards. I read either in those forum or in another website that the average engagement range at Gettysburg was 150-160 yards and that by 1864 it had pushed back to almost 200 yards. From what I recall (and I will try to find the thread) that was due to advancements in the rifle and artillery effectiveness.
Second, part of the problem with the closer in ranges in MP play is that artillery does not have the ability to disrupt infantry and artillery at further range. In game, basically we are limited to a max range for artillery of about 1000 yards. That being said, troops didn't move into battle formation as quickly as they do in game and certainly not while moving in column (4 abreast). Artillery fire was accurate enough to disrupt infantry moving in column so as a result, the troops were deployed into line where artillery would cause less disruption.
To solve this problem, we basically have a couple of options. #1 - increase the effectiveness of arty fire on infantry in column. This will force players not to manuever in the open in column and use more historical tactics to deal with more historical casualty rates. #2 - Increase the damage to batteries from counter-battery fire the closer the range. This will prevent batteries from rolling up in the open as they do now. That doesn't mean it can't be done, it just means it won't be successful unless you have driven off the enemy guns OR you are willing to accept the casualties. #3 - Decrease the speed of infantry as they deploy from/into different formations. As it stands now, infantry moves way too fast into/out of different formations which essentially means you can rush your troops up really close in column formation and deploy at less than 200 yards. This wasn't historically done either as it took a long time to deploy the troops into line.
By making these 4 tweaks, I think you will push the engagement distance further out and force players to keep the artillery back as well. Because they will need to and because there will be a great benefit to keeping the guns back and a greater disadvantage to pushing them up. I would also like to see a 5th change in tweaking the ability of a regiment to charge by increasing the fatigue/morale hit for charging units, adding a morale check before a charge and slowing down the speed in which a unit reforms after a charge. This will still allow charging, but will prevent the absurd ability for a unit under fire from 3 directions having the ability to charge.
First, I agree that infantry max range needs to be tweaked and pushed out to 200 yards. I am assuming - I don't know for sure - that the current max range of 160 yards has a scaled level of effectiveness so that the closer range you move in, the more effective/accurate the fire. If that is done, than 200 yards would be a good starting point provided it isn't deadly accurate like being at 50 yards.
As it stands now in MP, I think the actually engagement range is usually about 100 yards per side - that is my perception of how close the infantry are standing apart and certainly not a scientific study! By pushing the max range of infantry out to 200 it will push that average engagement range back to about 150 yards. I read either in those forum or in another website that the average engagement range at Gettysburg was 150-160 yards and that by 1864 it had pushed back to almost 200 yards. From what I recall (and I will try to find the thread) that was due to advancements in the rifle and artillery effectiveness.
Second, part of the problem with the closer in ranges in MP play is that artillery does not have the ability to disrupt infantry and artillery at further range. In game, basically we are limited to a max range for artillery of about 1000 yards. That being said, troops didn't move into battle formation as quickly as they do in game and certainly not while moving in column (4 abreast). Artillery fire was accurate enough to disrupt infantry moving in column so as a result, the troops were deployed into line where artillery would cause less disruption.
To solve this problem, we basically have a couple of options. #1 - increase the effectiveness of arty fire on infantry in column. This will force players not to manuever in the open in column and use more historical tactics to deal with more historical casualty rates. #2 - Increase the damage to batteries from counter-battery fire the closer the range. This will prevent batteries from rolling up in the open as they do now. That doesn't mean it can't be done, it just means it won't be successful unless you have driven off the enemy guns OR you are willing to accept the casualties. #3 - Decrease the speed of infantry as they deploy from/into different formations. As it stands now, infantry moves way too fast into/out of different formations which essentially means you can rush your troops up really close in column formation and deploy at less than 200 yards. This wasn't historically done either as it took a long time to deploy the troops into line.
By making these 4 tweaks, I think you will push the engagement distance further out and force players to keep the artillery back as well. Because they will need to and because there will be a great benefit to keeping the guns back and a greater disadvantage to pushing them up. I would also like to see a 5th change in tweaking the ability of a regiment to charge by increasing the fatigue/morale hit for charging units, adding a morale check before a charge and slowing down the speed in which a unit reforms after a charge. This will still allow charging, but will prevent the absurd ability for a unit under fire from 3 directions having the ability to charge.
Re:Willard's 10 Maxims on Use of Artillery
Willard, I have to say thank you again for this thread. Since reading it, I've been playing Sandbox games using Hancock's Corps, but just commanding Hazards Artillery. This has been as much fun as I could've hoped for. I look for places to post my batteries to try and fire on the flanks of enemy columns, or at least bring the columns under fire well before they are able to go into battleline. And it is so much fun to start hitting the enemy at 800yrds.
I also try and do all the damage I can without advancing my guns to canister range. It's amazing how much damage you can do without relying on canister, and how much effect shrapnel and shell has on a moving regiment. And you know when the battery fire is getting to them, because they start running to their destination. Once the enemy makes contact with Hancock's infantry, I begin concentrating fire where the fighting is the hottest, to lend support.
When the enemy artillery arrives, they're under fire before they can unlimber. And counter-battery fire is great fun as well. Most of the time I can handle the enemy artillery with two batteries. A 6gun battery of 3inch guns, and a 4gun battery of 10lb Parrotts, are usually all I need. Now I'm not saying that I'm routing the enemy guns that easily, though they can be routed, but causing casualties does slow their rate of fire. There is also another 6gun battery of 3inch guns, and two 6gun batteries of Napoleons. And I have been pleasantly surprised just how effective Napoleons are at 400/500yrds.
Another thing I have learned to do, is move my batteries during a fight, to take better advantage of different firing positions, as the enemy lines shift in the course of a battle. It keeps me jumping.
The experience has turned me into an Artillery enthusiast. When I finally do make the leap to MP, I hope to try it as an artillery commander. Though I still have more to learn, this has been a new kind of fun for me.
And I doubt that I ever would have tried it if not for this thread. So thanks again Willard for taking the time to post your Maxims, because they're very useful indeed.
I also try and do all the damage I can without advancing my guns to canister range. It's amazing how much damage you can do without relying on canister, and how much effect shrapnel and shell has on a moving regiment. And you know when the battery fire is getting to them, because they start running to their destination. Once the enemy makes contact with Hancock's infantry, I begin concentrating fire where the fighting is the hottest, to lend support.
When the enemy artillery arrives, they're under fire before they can unlimber. And counter-battery fire is great fun as well. Most of the time I can handle the enemy artillery with two batteries. A 6gun battery of 3inch guns, and a 4gun battery of 10lb Parrotts, are usually all I need. Now I'm not saying that I'm routing the enemy guns that easily, though they can be routed, but causing casualties does slow their rate of fire. There is also another 6gun battery of 3inch guns, and two 6gun batteries of Napoleons. And I have been pleasantly surprised just how effective Napoleons are at 400/500yrds.
Another thing I have learned to do, is move my batteries during a fight, to take better advantage of different firing positions, as the enemy lines shift in the course of a battle. It keeps me jumping.
The experience has turned me into an Artillery enthusiast. When I finally do make the leap to MP, I hope to try it as an artillery commander. Though I still have more to learn, this has been a new kind of fun for me.
And I doubt that I ever would have tried it if not for this thread. So thanks again Willard for taking the time to post your Maxims, because they're very useful indeed.
Last edited by Ephrum on Tue Aug 24, 2010 7:16 am, edited 1 time in total.
OHIO UNIVERSITY
Re:Willard's 10 Maxims on Use of Artillery
Ephrum -
Thanks for the feedback.
There are some things I would like to still see tweaked in artillery but overall it is pretty good as it is now.
Artillery is very hard to master and I learn something new every game I play.
That being said, it is often overlooked or dismissed as an important facet of game play, especially among players who have become frustrated in using in properly.
Consequently, in my opinion, players "hide" the artillery problem by either further nerfing its abilities by changing its stats, spreading it out in the OOB or eliminating it from OOBs altogether.
Obviously that is each individual player's choice, but I believe that these steps impact the delicate game balance established.
When you are ready to make the jump to MP, send me or PM or check out the MP forum and to see if any games are scheduled. We would love to have you join us in the MP community!!!
*S*
Willard
Thanks for the feedback.
There are some things I would like to still see tweaked in artillery but overall it is pretty good as it is now.
Artillery is very hard to master and I learn something new every game I play.
That being said, it is often overlooked or dismissed as an important facet of game play, especially among players who have become frustrated in using in properly.
Consequently, in my opinion, players "hide" the artillery problem by either further nerfing its abilities by changing its stats, spreading it out in the OOB or eliminating it from OOBs altogether.
Obviously that is each individual player's choice, but I believe that these steps impact the delicate game balance established.
When you are ready to make the jump to MP, send me or PM or check out the MP forum and to see if any games are scheduled. We would love to have you join us in the MP community!!!
*S*
Willard