In defense of McClellan at Antietam: A contrarian view

[13thnct]

Nope, I disagree. Then Lee would have had no choice but to escape across the Potomac. As it turned out, in making a stand, Lee's ego set the stage for his army to be annihilated, his back to the Potomac, with limited ground for an escape if things went south.

After the 14th Lee's Maryland Campaign was over and he knew it (ostensibly he knew it was effectively over when he discovered the loss of S.O. 191). While Lee did in a sense set the stage for annihilation by concentrating at Sharpsburg, he gambled successfully that McClellan would drag his feet long enough (most of the 15th) for Harper's Ferry to be fully secured and for a concentration at Sharpsburg. Although the garrison at Harper's Ferry was effectively doomed from the onset, Jackson didn't leave there until the afternoon of the 15th (minus Hill of course) with a longer march than the Federals had who were already concentrated within 10 miles of Sharpsburg. McClellan would have had a much easier fight had he hit Lee aggressively at Sharpsburg a day earlier and may have had a reasonable chance of mauling a wing of the ANV as Jackson's men arrived on the field.

[RebBugler]

Nope, I disagree. Then Lee would have had no choice but to escape across the Potomac. As it turned out, in making a stand, Lee's ego set the stage for his army to be annihilated, his back to the Potomac, with limited ground for an escape if things went south.

After the 14th Lee's Maryland Campaign was over and he knew it (ostensibly he knew it was effectively over when he discovered the loss of S.O. 191). While Lee did in a sense set the stage for annihilation by concentrating at Sharpsburg, he gambled successfully that McClellan would drag his feet long enough (most of the 15th) for Harper's Ferry to be fully secured and for a concentration at Sharpsburg. Although the garrison at Harper's Ferry was effectively doomed from the onset, Jackson didn't leave there until the afternoon of the 15th (minus Hill of course) with a longer march than the Federals had who were already concentrated within 10 miles of Sharpsburg. McClellan would have had a much easier fight had he hit Lee aggressively at Sharpsburg a day earlier and may have had a reasonable chance of mauling a wing of the ANV as Jackson's men arrived on the field.

Point well taken. And, as I pointed out with Burnside's 10 AM window of opportunity, timing is KEY to success on the battlefield.

MTG
Interesting thread. To pile a little more controversy onto the fire, I would submit that Burnside was the only Union commander that day to accomplish his task fully. Had McClellan supported him with V corps, the war in the east may have ended that day. Apparently, Lincoln thought so too, as Burnside was given command of the AOP shortly afterwards.

As Burnside already had at least a 10 to 1 advantage, I can't fault McClellan for not sending him another Corps to assist with his mission orders.
And wow, after Burnside's obvious delays in initiative, though he did, kinda, gain his objectives...
WHAT WAS LINCOLN THINKING! :woohoo:

[exp101]

Burnside had no opportunity to take advantage of his superior numbers until he had IX Corps across the Antietam. It was a Thermopylae/300 Spartans situation where it didn't matter how many he had at first. Also, for the reasons already expressed, I don't agree that Burnside necessarily displayed any lack of initiative -- even if it is allowed that there were some issues in his execution. If you accept the account in McClellan's first battle report, Burnside was given his orders to attack at 10:00 am and most chronologies have him launching his first attack about that time. The Georgians took full advantage of their position, beat off multiple assaults, and held the Yanks off until about 1:00 pm -- completely understandable when you look at that classic landscape. In fact, it is truly wondrous that anyone was able to survive the bridge crossing under that fire -- and possibly nobody would had the Georgians not begun running out of ammunition.

Burnside's complaint about not being supported by V Corps is legit from his point of view: McClellan had promised him earlier in the day that he would be given any support he needed. You're correct that additional troops wouldn't have been helpful before the bridge was taken, but they would likely have been decisive once IX Corps was advancing on a mile-wide front before Sharpsburg as it did around 3:00 pm. This is where McClellan let him down. I think all that can be said in McClellan's defense here is that withholding V Corps was reasonable if he really and truly believed that Lee had an extra 120,000 men lurking in ambush behind the high ground. But if he really thought that, why was he attacking anyway?

After having been on both sides of the McClellan question through the years, I've come to the conclusion that he is a contradiction in many ways. On the one hand, a good argument could be made that the Union would have been lost without his stabilizing influence and organization of the Army at critical junctures -- and quite possibly had he decisively lost at Antietam. On the other hand, given his particular and peculiar traits, I also don't believe the Union could have closed out the Rebs had he remained in command of the AoP through the rest of the war. For me, this is what makes Little Mac such an interesting topic: "Can't live with him. Can't live without him."

-WJ Palmer

[Willard]

I would trust a historian like McPherson or Sears (who said it was 50,000-55,000 for the Confederacy) any day over The Washington Post. In the charts they reference northern newspapers half the time who were just guessing at the numbers, even the official records use words like "perhaps" or 'I think" and are estimating as well. You just have to face it Willard that Lee was a better general by far than McClellan - Lincoln wouldn't have replaced McClellan otherwise. It's a well known fact the Confederates were almost always outnumbered and had better generals. Plus the fact still remains, he intercepted Lee's plans and could still not defeat Lee.

Baldwin -

Your reading comprehension is off. I am not defending McClellan. The title of my post is the same as the title of the article. The purpose of my post was to generate a discussion on whether the numbers posed by Mr. Thorp are accurate or not.

As to your comment about the WP, the article was written by Gene Thorp who appears to have some level expertise on Antietam. He contributed to The Maryland Campaign of September 1862: Volume 1, South Mountain with a series of maps and photos:

"Another enhancement is a series of maps by Gene Thorp covering movement from September third to the fifteenth. These are not standard military style maps. These maps are aerial pictures showing mountains, roads, towns and rivers. The armies are men and horses with lines of march clearly indicated. The effect is looking at a series of satellite views as the campaign on folds. The detailed maps for Harper's Ferry, Crampton's Gap, Fox's Gap and Turner's Gap capture movement in a very real way. Fifty years ago, I had the American Heritage Centennial history of the Civil War that uses this style of map. This style of mapping is easier to follow than the standard military maps and much more fun."

His WP bio states: Gene Thorp is an award winning Washington Post Cartographer. He has been a student of the American Civil War since childhood and has reenacted, volunteered for the National Park Service and worked as a designer and cartographer for the Association for the Preservation of Civil War Sites, now the Civil War Trust. Thorp is an advisor and researcher for the Post's anniversary commemoration of the Civil War. His newest interactives, Battles and Casualties of the Civil War and Fury Unleashed can be found here.

-Willard

[Willard]

Reb -

I am curious to your reaction to the article and its potential impact on scenario design. Do you believe these numbers to be true? My guess is Thorp has down a lot of research and to come forward with a claim that Lee's forces were under-counted at Antietam really provides for a completely renewed analysis of how the battle was fought and in evaluating the performance of Lee and McClellan.

-Willard

Of course any change of troop strengths alters the basic goal of a historically labeled scenario: Can you achieve better results than said General in fighting said battle? In regard to Thorp's numbers I would tend to agree because of the eventual results...Lee survived to fight another day.

Although us Rebs hate to admit it, our forefathers weren't supermen. Agreed, they were more adept to hardships and surviving by hunting and other vigorous life demands than the New England Yanks, but the life skills of the upper northwest Yanks from where the Iron Brigade originated were equally challenging, if not more...making for inherently tough troops.

But I'm thinking you want a Generaling answer here...How did McClellan fare against Lee? Given Thorp's numbers, I'd say Lee screwed up dividing his army and biting off more than he could chew. McClellan on the other hand, still had the advantage in numbers, on basically northern soil with secure supply lines, and especially, superior artillery, but didn't deploy these strengths efficiently. Still, if Burnside hadn't screwed up the main attack that last day, a McClellan smashing of Lee's army that final day would have cloaked his otherwise less than efficient strategies.

This is why I stuck my toe in this thread, I blame Burnside, so, as a 'proud to be' Reb, I honor Burnside. But bloodshed wise, it's horrific that the war continued on, especially Sherman's rape of the South's heartland, when it probably could have been ended here, with Lee's army trapped, on the banks of the Potomac.

SO, If Burnside hadn't hesitated, a full half day, to carry out crucial orders...Gives us the grandest of all WHAT IF scenarios...THE END OF THE WAR IN VIRGINIA AND THE EAST, DECEMBER, 1862, as the captured Robert E. Lee surrenders the remainder of his ANV forces, and by July 4th, 1863, Vicksburg falls, ending the last Rebel resistance IN THE WEST...BY DECEMBER, 1863, THE ACW IS OVER.

Kinda went overboard with this...but you asked, and I've never been one to trivialize. :ohmy:

Thanks for the comments. I was actually thinking more along the lines of based upon NSD's research, are Thorp's numbers accurate? Meaning if Thorp's analysis is correct, the "gaming" of Antietam whether it be NSD or Sid Meier or HPS is off. Obviously I agree that when you tweak the numbers there will be an impact on gameplay if the engine has been designed to "compensate" for factors to create a historical gameplay.

For example, it is my understanding that the movement speed on the Antietam map is different to not enable the Union player to committ all his forces at once and overwhelm the Rebs. IF Thorp's numbers are to be trusted, then the addition of 15,000 men really does make a difference in the OOB, strategy and how the game can play out.

Hope this explains what I was trying to get at.

The second question is that in the event that Thorp's numbers are accurate or more accurate, does that mean NSD will look at the OOB?

[KG_Soldier]

Plus the fact still remains, he intercepted Lee's plans and could still not defeat Lee.

There is no other way to look at Antietam but as a defeat for Lee.

[13thnct]

Point well taken. And, as I pointed out with Burnside's 10 AM window of opportunity, timing is KEY to success on the battlefield.
:

A bit of cross talk caused by me, my OP was a combination of a response to the Washington Post article covering McClellan's failure (or not) to act on S.O.191 but glossing over his failure to act on his sucess in seizing the three gaps. This got combined with your mentioning alternate scenarios in game. Burnsides's bridge is probably the ultimate 'what if' at Antietam and is fun to speculate both historically and in the game itself .

[Baldwin]

Plus the fact still remains, he intercepted Lee's plans and could still not defeat Lee.

There is no other way to look at Antietam but as a defeat for Lee.

Tactically inconclusive. Strategic Union Victory.

http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/md003.htm

[RebBugler]

Willard
Thanks for the comments. I was actually thinking more along the lines of based upon NSD's research, are Thorp's numbers accurate? Meaning if Thorp's analysis is correct, the "gaming" of Antietam whether it be NSD or Sid Meier or HPS is off. Obviously I agree that when you tweak the numbers there will be an impact on gameplay if the engine has been designed to "compensate" for factors to create a historical gameplay.

For example, it is my understanding that the movement speed on the Antietam map is different to not enable the Union player to committ all his forces at once and overwhelm the Rebs. IF Thorp's numbers are to be trusted, then the addition of 15,000 men really does make a difference in the OOB, strategy and how the game can play out.

Hope this explains what I was trying to get at.

The second question is that in the event that Thorp's numbers are accurate or more accurate, does that mean NSD will look at the OOB?

You mean I said all that for nothing...just funnin'
I had the impossible task of scripting the full battle, Union Side, The Bloodiest Day, scenario. Thank goodness I had to keep it historical, or it would have been an embarrassingly easy slaughter. Does that answer your immediate question?

In addition, Antietam as designed is set in stone, it will never be patched, just like Jesus will never be married. :whistle:

That being said, it can always be modded, and I'm sure that this could happen along the way as more facts and acceptable new data is introduced. In fact, this would be a really interesting group project to undertake in the future. And on a really positive note, it sure would make for a much more interesting battle, the sides being more equal that is. Being able to unleash all the Union forces at once, and still presenting a challenge, would be really cool.

Edit: Oops, overlooked your main question and point about movement speeds. Nope, movement speeds are not tweaked at all for this design. Adherence to historical occurrences is strictly done by unlocking units and making them available for movement and action.

[Baldwin]

Just make sure in Chancellorsville the Morale is set to 9 for units in the OOB, since everything is set in stone.