dale Wrote:I have no doubt that had Jackson been present on Day 1 the Union would have been off of Cemetary Ridge by that night.
Agreed, an early pocession of Culp's Hill then strongly reenforced would of certainly changed the dynamics of the battle and the strategic positioning of Meade's forces. Meade would not have the advantage of interior lines.
But what what Meade of done if Culp's Hill was strongly occupied on day 1?
Would he try to assault it?
Would he try to concentrate his troops on the high ground of the Round Tops?
Would he redeploy to another defensive position towards Washington?
Because of Lincoln's paranoia regarding the real potential threat on Washington, pressure most likely would of been put on Meade to stay in the area and assault Culp's Hill. But then again if that happened, Lee's forces could of successfully assaulted the Federal center which would of not been strongly fortified at that early stage of the battle. And Longstreet's Corp was always there threatening the enemy's left.
If there was an early Confederate capture of Culp's Hill, the outcome of the Gettysburg battle would probably have been very different.
Meade had gone on to the attack while Lee was attempting a large flanking maneuver the results could have been devastating for Lee's weakened center, because the Army of Northern Virginia would now have been split in two, in enemy territory.
Not too sure about this. For the most part, Lee's artillery was still concentrated along his line and the Federals would now be the ones' to march across that 1 mile open field. The Reb artillery could of been rapidly redeployed where it would do the most good. Elements of Longstreet's Corp. could of been redeployed to attack the left flank of that grand Yankee assault. And Ewell would of been in position to attack or at least harass the right flank of the assault.
Of course if Meade's assault on the Confederate center worked, the war probably would of ended in 1863.
Can't wait to try these ideas (what-ifs) in OP in the new game if possible to replacate. The stock What-ifs could be anything that NSD dreams up, Jim said it would be two I believe. IMO there should be more, cause the player does not know what to expect in those scenerios until you unwrap the game, a challange you won't find in any book, hence, uncharted results, you're on your own. Does the AI in SP have a strong strategic flavor or reactionary in nature? I'm not sure at this time what to expect from the AI? A summation from NSD about how the AI is programed on different levels of the gameplay/setup could explain as to what to expect. That stuff is all complicated to me, cause I'm just a player.
Once again, I think what Reinhart, Dale and Ironsight are doing one heck of a job.
Thanks, Hoistingman4
Last edited by BOSTON on Mon Jan 19, 2009 2:00 pm, edited 1 time in total.
If Culp's Hill was occupied on July 1 by Hill's corps then Meade would of had to assemble his army well beyond that point. The Union army was coming in from roads that all intersected at Gettysburg. Had he not had Gettysburg as a focal point the Union army would have been much more dispersed on the morning of July 2. Would they even of had enough troops on hand to mount an effective counter attack? Meade never showed any disposition to be an effective attacker from the time he became commander of the AOP. with the South occupying the best position around I think that Meade would have been content to find another spot to fight a defensive battle.
Meade may have been content to shadow Lee, now that he had firmly located him. His strategic objective would be to act as a shield to keep Lee from Washington, Baltimore and Philadelphia. It would have been an interesting situation with both armies concentrated, staying within grasp of each other and each looking for the other's weak spot and the opportunity to attack. Who would blink first?
Both armies would consume mountains of supplies, but Lee would be further from his base than Meade. Lee would have to worry about getting cut off from the Potomac River crossings. If at some point a Federal corp could be spared to head south and east of Lee, toward Fredricksburg, then Lee would have no choice but to attack the main body of the AOP or quickly retreat south. I think that there would have been a major battle within two days march of Gettysburg.
As for the possibility of Meade attacking Lee's center--
Meade actually considered attacking Lee on July 3 and had a council of war the night before to put the option to a vote. It was decided that if no attack came on July 3 then the North would go on the offensive. If Longstreet had his way and used his whole corp for a flank attack on the Union left he would have had to take most of July 3 to get into position. July 4 may have opened with both sides simultaneously attacking. Lee's artillery would be split, some supporting Hill's corps in a diversionary attack on the Union right, some would have traveled with Longstreet on a long march around the Round Tops. He would not of had the concentration of artillery that he had on July 3. Nonetheless what he did have on Seminary Ridge would have had a horrific affect on the Federal infanty. Meade would have opened the attack with at least as large of a bombardment as Lee used on July 3. Meade would not have had to be as frugal with his ammunition either. His artillery would probably of had a greater affect on Lee's responding guns and troops. Meade had more troops to use than Lee had at his disposal on July 3. He probably would have committed more of his men to the attack than what Lee committed. If Lee's line was stripped of the fresh troops to march with Longstreet then the situation could have been very precarious for Lee. All in all it would be a fascinating scenario to play out.
Entertaining the mythical assumtion that the Rebs occupied Cemetery ridge by the 2nd day with the early capture of Culps Hill, the entire Gburg area would of then been secured and occupied by Lee adding to Lincoln's paranoia for Meade to attack and attack now not unlike his disposition with McClellan earlier.
Meade most certainly would have retreated or at best strategically redeployed. But where would Longstreet's Corp. be or ordered to as this fantasy scenario unfolded? The probable logical strategic thing for Longstreet would be to occupy the 'other' high ground namely the Round Tops to place fire on the enemy if practical or possible in order to prevent the Federalis from regrouping, add to their confusion or even accelerate their retreat.
Now if all this played out, what would Lee do then?
Fortify and hold his newly gained ground for a most likely impending Federal assault?
Hold the ground for a day or two while Meade is reenforcing, declare victory and head back to Virginia?
Redeploy elsewhere to a good defensive position to the delight of Longstreet?
Redeploy to threaten Washington?
Immediately attack Meade while his forces were still in somewhat confusion?
The fascinating thing about the Gettysburg battle is that the positions, objectives and yes the ultimate blunders of the combatants were not overly complicated. They're pretty much straight forward making it almost the perfect military strategic chess game which is why the 'what ifs' persist til this day.
Found a web site titled CWSAC subtitled; Battle summeries, something to do with the National Park Service, which lists battles by state.
Sure enough in Maryland it lists; Battle of Williamsport (July 6-16-1863) with references to Hagerstown. Now I know what you were talking about earlier.
Funny, that on another website it did'nt mention that battle at all, size of the battle might hae been a determing factor.. I did'nt save the site for the CWSAC site was more informative.
I thought you were making reference to a fictious battle What-if?.
I think Lee's biggest mistake in the Pennsylvania campaign was a lack of a cohesive strategy in the beginning. The Maryland Campaign had more clearly identified objectives, ie: the capture of Harper's Ferry and the dividing of his army and the drawing of the AOP out of VA. With the Pennsylvania Campaign he seemed to have no grand plan, aside from drawing the AOP out of VA, but rather seemed willing to react to the movements of the AOP as events unfolded. This was perhaps due to the significant pressure he received from Richmond to move hostilities out of Virginia. He overestimated the positive reaction he would receive in Maryland upon his arrival. He failed to account for the actions of the local Pennsylvanian's who delayed his progress by felling trees, removing/changing road signs, etc. This was much the same for the AOP when it moved through Virginia. He was unfamiliar with the terrain, roads and rails. Remember that Lee was very familiar with all the battlefields prior to Gettysburg, except Antietam, as he had lived in those areas all his life.
The Susquehanna River proved a great barrier and presented an interesting decision for Lee. If he was to threaten either NYC or Philadelphia he would have to cross it. That would put 2 major rivers, the Susquehanna and the Potomac between him and his base of supply. There is no way he would have been able to maintain this supply line open for any length of time. His men would have been able to live off the land rather well that time of year but munitions are a different story. There would have only been enough ammunition for one major engagement. The AOP would probably have either chased him or been moved, partly or entirely, by ship to the east side of the Susquehanna. This would place Lee in a very tight spot and he would run the risk of being totally cut off from his path back to Virginia having to fight his way back over one and possibly 2 rivers with only the munitions he had with him.
I believe Lee concluded this and chose to find some good defensible position west of the Susquehanna and have Hooker, being pressured by Washington, attack him on the ground of his choosing. If the AOP could be beaten badly, and he had no reason to think it couldn't based on what he had accomplished previously, he could then turn his attentions to probably Baltimore as it was his shortest line of supply provided the rail line at Monocacy was secured, he could then come at Washington from the North and West and still maintain a line of supply and path of retreat.
The problem was that he didn't find that piece of ground in time and set the table and wait for Hooker to arrive. He was all strung out with no orders to concentrate his army until it was to late. This was in no small part due to his lack of intelligence from Stuart and his being unfamiliar with the area and getting little help from the locals and the rapid pursuit of the AOP. No doubt this is what drove Longstreet to offer his strong support for a move more southward. Rather, Buford found the ground and Reynolds/French set the table and Meade arrived instead of Hooker. Hence, Lee is pushed by Richmond into Pennsylvania and drawn into a battle before he is ready on ground not of his choosing that he is not familiar with and eventually looses the initiative on the second day never to regain it on the third.
There are plenty of what if's within the battle, (what if Sickle's stayed put), as there are with all battles. But I believe it was his late choice to concentrate at Gettysburg that doomed the campaign. Perhaps if he chose a point more North, (Biglerville), or West, (Cashtown), the outcome may have been different. I personally believe that Biglerville, (just North of Gettysburg), would have been the better choice. It had multiple roads leading to it from the north, west and east, (where Lee was coming from), but only one from the South, (where the Union was coming from). Lee had to know that the AOP was probably going to concentrate at Gettysburg as that is where all the roads from the south converge. But to fight there he would have to have arrived there first and in force, and he didn't.
Just my thoughts,
Regards,
GregB)
Last edited by Gfran64 on Mon Jan 19, 2009 9:58 pm, edited 1 time in total.
You are correct, there was a battle there but not a large one, mostly cavalry I think. I was just speculating that if Meade really tied to cut off Lee's retreat then he would have done it at Williamsport by arriving in force in Lee's rear with more than just cavalry.
Greg
Last edited by Gfran64 on Mon Jan 19, 2009 8:22 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Greg, interesting thoughts!
Lee argued with his Defense Dept. and Jeff Davis that the best strategy to relieve Vicksburg and free up Pembroke's 18,000 or so troops was to threaten Washington, hopefully win a strategic battle on Northern territory gaining foreign recognition of the CSA and last but not least take the war to Northern soil. On paper it sounded like a good plan, but in practice it ended up a failure. Why? You'd think after Lee's almost disaterous Antietam debacle he'd of learned his lesson.
After all is said and done, IMO i put the blame on Lee and Lee himself. Instead of logically looking over the facts, his over confidence got the best of him.
Take into account the South had nowhere near the troop levels of the North never mind the supply issues Lee faced. IMO the South should of fought a strict defensive strategy considering the logistics imbalance in favor of the North. The somewhat aggressive Lee shined when battles were fought on Southern territory and should have stuck to that strategy. If one thinks on it, how can a much lesser force with supply issues conquer a much larger force with no supply issues.
In the final analysis, major historical strategic blunders of the CSA too numerous to mention sealed their fate. The proof?... they lost the war and their independance as a soverign country. If, just if the South held out another year or two, peace talks could of been in the works. Both NYC and other larger Northern cities along with Northern industrialists who wanted the Mississippi River opened to the Gulf were calling for an end to hostilities. The Northern draft of soldiers to enter the grind also contributed to all this.
IMO Gen. Lee was aggresive enough to win battles in Southern territory but too aggressive to win the war.
The AOP invasions of Virginia in 1862 and 1863 did end in defeats but with each invasion there was a chance that they could have taken Richmond. McClellan was actually within a few days of starting a siege of Richmond in 1862 when Lee counterattacked. (If he had actually attacked Madgruder at Yorktown he would of had odds of 100000 to 10,000 and he would of had been at the gates of Richmond before Johnston's army could redeploy from northern Virginia.) If Burnsides' pontoon bridges had been delivered on time he would not of had to attack at Fredricksburg but upriver where the he could have crossed the Rappahannock virtually unopposed. If Hooker had not left his right flank hanging in mid air he would have been able to engage Lee in a grand battle. In each of these cases the Union army far outnumbered the Confederates and if the Union commander was able to engage all of his units he could have driven Lee from the field. I think that Lee knew how close an issue it was on every occasion. I view Lee's invasion in 1863 as one where he wanted to give a knockout blow to the AOP. As long as the AOP could keep mounting two invasions a year there was a good chance that one of them would succeed. If they could take Richmond then they would have knocked out the Tradegar Iron works, making it virtually impossible for the South to rearm and reequip. It would have also driven away the hope of a European power aiding their cause and it would have reinvigorated the Northern cause.
If you look at the total OOB's of the two armies in July 1863 you will notice that the AOP was more diminished than it had been in a good while. This was due to the two year enlistments expiring. When AOP had invaded Virginia earlier it had I believe over 100,000 men. Now I believe that Lee was as close to parity with the AOP as he had ever been. In a qualitative value, Lee was superior if you consider that the AOP had grabbed up a lot of untested garrison troops and Pennsylvania muster militia. I think that Lee knew that this was his best chance of inflicting a mortal blow. His invasion immediately after Chancellorsville was a way for him to not only bring the war to the North but also to deliver a stunning hit to the AOP before it could regroup. If Lee had stayed in Virginia the AOP would would have licked its wounds, and replenished its losses and mounted yet another invasion before September.
Found a map at www.mapsofpa.com/antiquemapshtm a dated overview map of Gettysburg battlelines. Plus there are other dated maps of the Penn, Maryland, Virginia area circa 1863. Thought it might be good for reference in the discussions, I don't know how to post pictures like you do. If you have better battlefield maps post them, I'd appreciate it.
Thanks, Hoistingman4
If that address does not work, try Yahoo search 1863 eastern Pennsylvainia maps you will see the selections.
Last edited by BOSTON on Tue Jan 20, 2009 8:05 am, edited 1 time in total.
