Scourge of War Boards

Any less spacing and if a battalion did need to deploy into line it would be unable to due to the proximity of another battalion to its flank.

Good point. The attack columns or columns by division were positioned with enough interval/space to deploy into Line formation. It might indeed be unusual to see a commander trying to concentrate two battalions on one enemy battalion. But even so, in Griffith's book, which is a part of the game's bibliography, he describes and illustrates the attack of Balland's soldats on Wattignies in 1793. Griffith's description and the accompanying illustration shows Balland's battalions in attack column over expansive, non-rough ground, with intervals insufficient for deployment into line formation. The attack was completed without attempt to deploy into line.

Given that the numbers include a very significant proportion of column attacks because otherwise the ground was impractical to attack over at all is what is important. We should remove those instances then look again at the percentage of French formations that were not decided for them by the terrain they advanced over. Clearly "rough or narrow ground" can only be understood to be a viable consideration if it means "ground unsuitable for other types of formation of either wider frontage or more susceptible to being disordered" (in other words line and l'ordre mixte). This is why Mr Griffith's statistics need to be studied carefully rather than being accepted as a general overall example of the frequency of different formations used by French infantry to attack an enemy. Fully 2/3rds of the statistical sample is not a true reflection of a French commander's choice of which formation to use but was rather constrained upon local commanders by circumstance.

I agree with your overarching point about taking the chart as a platform for more inquiry. You also made a point that's most accurate and important about the preferred French method being to soften up an enemy defense line with artillery fire. If an enemy defense line is properly disrupted by artillery, whether the attacking battalions are in one formation or another is not going to determine the issue.

IMHO, we can accept that Griffith's research and conclusions mean that some bayonet attacks were executed in Column of Divisions. From a game developer's perspective, we should try to answer the question: Which ones? Griffith doesn't tell us that column of attack was only used when external constraints required it, and at no other time, so, I would not conclude that this is inferred by his writings.

One helpful quote from Griffith is:
"However, it does seem that French column attacks would sometimes remain undeployed simply because the quality of the opposition seemed sufficiently low."

Could we, as students of Napoleonic tactics, assume that good-quality enemy infantry in line that's been a bit disrupted by artillery might also cause an attacker to choose attack columns? Seems like a reasonable assumption to me.

Narrow ground that required the a compact battalion attack formation dictates the choice, so that doesn't help us to learn more about the preferred formation. Rough ground that is expansive would seem to dictate the Attack Column because the compact formation would retain more cohesion during movement over a battalion in Line. So, we can discount rough ground and narrow ground because it doesn't help us determine the preferred formation when there are no external constraints. Mr. Griffith is no longer alive to help us along, so, we are on our own.

In sum, you are correct. We need to add to this thread as we read through our books and find some info that updates and adds to the conversation. Perhaps the example of Wattignies in 1793 can help us gain more insight.