Re:Longstreet vs. Lee
Posted: Thu Jul 30, 2009 1:29 pm
Has anyone read Longstreet’s book, From Manassas to Appomattox?
After the civil war Lee wanted to write a memoir of the Army of Northern Virginia but he gave up the effort after only a few months. He knew the task was beyond his ability.
Lee then wrote to Longstreet and asked him to take up the task and write one of the Second Corps of the army.
Personally I think Lee trusted Longstreet more with the army than Jackson. Jackson was a great lieutenant but Longstreet was less likely to throw it all away in a reckless charge. After all Longstreet was promoted one day before Jackson as to make him Jackson’s superior and second in command of the Army. Though I will admit this was done right after the peninsula campaign when Jackson was probably in his worst physical condition of the war.
Obviously Jackson was better in overall command as witnessed by his exploits but neither of Longstreet's campaigns either in Tennessee or the Carolina’s were exactly ideal situations. Especially Tennessee where he was fighting a well dug in and supplied foe definitely not what was typical of what major campaigning armies were use to facing in the east.
Anyway I do like Longstreet more but I think the two complimented each other perfectly.
Jackson was lightening and stunned the enemy.
Longstreet was an anvil that would crush the enemy.
Lee’s greatest strength was his two corps commanders. He could give broad orders and trust Longstreet and Jackson to interpret them correctly and accomplish great tasks. Lee wasn’t just being polite by leaving options open he was leaving options open because he wanted his corps commanders to be able to think how best to do tings not just become unimaginative and attack by the book.
Second Manassas Jackson was begging for a division from Longstreet. Lee told Longstreet this but left the option open. Longstreet decided he would organize his corps and set up a grand battery on the federal flank. Longstreet wanted all his boys for the attack and figured Jackson could hold on. Then when Longstreet sensed the moment was right his artillery shattered the federal flank and the attack went forward. Lee sent an order to attack but not until the attack was well underway. Longstreet acted on his own intuitive and timing and it worked to perfection. Lee gave Jackson the same latitude.
Personally I think Longstreet and Jackson’s greatness lie partially in their ability throughout 1862-1863 to rely on each other and yet still be able to think outside the limits of strict orders. You had arguably two of the best corps commanders of the war working together under the supervision of one of the greatest commanding generals of the war.
P.S. First Post!!! Found my way here from Mad Minute.
After the civil war Lee wanted to write a memoir of the Army of Northern Virginia but he gave up the effort after only a few months. He knew the task was beyond his ability.
Lee then wrote to Longstreet and asked him to take up the task and write one of the Second Corps of the army.
Personally I think Lee trusted Longstreet more with the army than Jackson. Jackson was a great lieutenant but Longstreet was less likely to throw it all away in a reckless charge. After all Longstreet was promoted one day before Jackson as to make him Jackson’s superior and second in command of the Army. Though I will admit this was done right after the peninsula campaign when Jackson was probably in his worst physical condition of the war.
Obviously Jackson was better in overall command as witnessed by his exploits but neither of Longstreet's campaigns either in Tennessee or the Carolina’s were exactly ideal situations. Especially Tennessee where he was fighting a well dug in and supplied foe definitely not what was typical of what major campaigning armies were use to facing in the east.
Anyway I do like Longstreet more but I think the two complimented each other perfectly.
Jackson was lightening and stunned the enemy.
Longstreet was an anvil that would crush the enemy.
Lee’s greatest strength was his two corps commanders. He could give broad orders and trust Longstreet and Jackson to interpret them correctly and accomplish great tasks. Lee wasn’t just being polite by leaving options open he was leaving options open because he wanted his corps commanders to be able to think how best to do tings not just become unimaginative and attack by the book.
Second Manassas Jackson was begging for a division from Longstreet. Lee told Longstreet this but left the option open. Longstreet decided he would organize his corps and set up a grand battery on the federal flank. Longstreet wanted all his boys for the attack and figured Jackson could hold on. Then when Longstreet sensed the moment was right his artillery shattered the federal flank and the attack went forward. Lee sent an order to attack but not until the attack was well underway. Longstreet acted on his own intuitive and timing and it worked to perfection. Lee gave Jackson the same latitude.
Personally I think Longstreet and Jackson’s greatness lie partially in their ability throughout 1862-1863 to rely on each other and yet still be able to think outside the limits of strict orders. You had arguably two of the best corps commanders of the war working together under the supervision of one of the greatest commanding generals of the war.
P.S. First Post!!! Found my way here from Mad Minute.