Artillery Observation Question

[Olszowy]

I am not sure if this is an issue or merely a reflection of the numbers and not a complaint. My friends and I play multi-corps three hour battles every Thursday, typically 3-4 corps versus the ANV. We reduced batteries in the Union corps down to 4 batteries each. Two Napolean and two 3in or 10 pdr Parrot or one each parrot and 3in. This was to increase the challenge. Something we noticed over the last couple of fights that seems odd, maybe not. The score received by the 3in and 1Opdr Parrot batteries was almost always double or triple the score of the 12pd Napolean batteries. Of the four corps we fought with last night I, III, VI, and XII the doubling of the score held true across each corps regardless of how many points were scored by the artillery. VI Corps had almost 3500 points scored by artillery and it was distributed across the batteries the same as XII Corps that only had about 500 total points. The 3in and 10pdrs had at least double or triple the score of the Napolean batteries.
I, III, and VI corps had lovely fields of fire and engaged multiple divisions with all batteries firing from the saem location into the same engagement area and we all moved batteries around. I tend to move Napoleans to areas where reb infantry were thickest and closest to take advantage of canister. Even with that the 3in and 10pdrs clearly outperformed the 12pdrs.
I looked at the various tables and do not see anything very obvious that would cause this. Anybody notice this before or have numbers as to why this might be occuring? Maybe it is correct? We have not altered any of the artillery tables.
One last thing, can we get games to last indefinitely instead of cutting off at a score or at three hours?

[Marching Thru Georgia]

Actually, your ratio is a bit lower than mine. I usually have a ratio of ~3:1 for rifled vs smoothbore guns. Of course I've modded my arty values a bit. Historically, rifled cannon did much more damage than smoothbores. They are the greatest reason that massed cavalry charges were rare. Cavalry formations were such large targets that they could not form without coming to the attention of the artillery. The accuracy of the rifles guns was devastating.

Your numbers sound about right. Maybe just goose the values for those 3 inch guns up a bit.

[Olszowy]

Interesting, some of the rifled gun batteries were or at 3-1 but only in I and VI Corps. I am a big believer in Gen Hunt and his comments he could have stopped Picketts Charge with artillery alone , but always assumed without good numbers that the Napoleans were doing the bulk of the damage due to close range firing. Certainly, against other batteries and cavalry I knew the rifled guns were nasty. Based on your comments I went back through various books on artillerly actions. Sure enough, it is rifled guns generally being mentioned. I just did a quick look fo the entire AoP(nto just Gburg) does show about twice as many rifled batteries verus Napoleans. Antietam the fire the rebel artillery found most descrutive was long range rifled fire. Union forces at Vicksburg and Helena also preferred rifled guns. I think I am victim of my own convention thinking. I assumed 12pdrs did the bulk of the damage.

[NY Cavalry]

I am not meaning to be argumentative, but I have read and always thought that most civil war casualties came from small arms fire and canister(napoleons). That rifled guns attributed to maybe 9% of civil war casualties.

Something that was brought to my attention recently was:
Pickett's charge faced almost the entire AOP artillery. There was the various division artillery and also several batteries from the artillery reserve. There, is still seams, that the formations held up relatively well until they entered canister and then small arm range.

I am constantly reading civil war books etc. What are some good sources for casualties in regard to the types of weapons used?

[Marching Thru Georgia]

NY Cavalry wrote:

That rifled guns attributed to maybe 9% of civil war casualties.

I think that was a number estimated by a battlefield surgeon for the total number of casualties due to all artillery. However, it seems that the number is generally seen as inaccurate. He simply counted the number of obvious artillery wounds he saw in the field hospital. The flaw of that counting method is apparent. Many wounds were caused by shrapnel. The balls from that round are similar in size to the musket rounds fired, so they would be easily confused. Also, rounds such as solid, shell and close range canister kill many more than they wound. Even the overpressure wave from the shrapnel round explosion would kill those nearby. None of these entered into the surgeon's calculation.

I remember reading in a couple of places, (although I don't remember where), that ~30% of the war's casualties were caused by artillery. This number would also be in keeping with the 19th century European wars that occurred both before and after the CW.

Now I remember; P. Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War, p.165ff. The book is well worth buying. It gives a number of interesting arguments that counter many orthodoxies concerning civil war battles.

[Jack ONeill]

All,

I agree with MTG. I have both Griffiths books. They are an excellent reference source for a variety of situations. I have quoted them several times on this forum.

Jack B)

[Willard]

MTG and Jack are pretty good footing here.

The CW era study examined about 130,000 wounds and came up with a figure of 9% as being the result of artillery. The problem, as indicated above, is that many artillery wounds are similar to that resulting from a CW smalls arm fire. The likelyhood is that artillery wounds were underestimated due to that similarity.

This website - http://johnsmilitaryhistory.com/cwarmy.html - cites the Paddy Griffith research that puts forward a 20&-50% figure. I personally think the 50% figure is too high, although it also depends upon the engagement studied, such as Malvern Hill or Fredericksburg, where the rate was certainly much higher than 9%.

An additional look on the subject also takes into account the density on the battlefield:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/gab ... br0022.htm

If you look at table 1 and table 2 in the above link, you will see two big spikes in the percentage of troop casualties during the Napoleonic and ACW - those both happen to nicely correlate with density on the battlefield and implementation of more efficient killing weapons in the musket and artillery.

For example, cavalry tactics evolved during the ACW from the NW due to the fact that artillery ranges had expanded greatly in 50 years. Cavalry requires a large amount of open space to form up for a charge - something deficient on the battlefields of the ACW. These large formations need time and space to deploy on and with expanded ranges of artillery they could easily be disrupted using ACW artillery. In SOW, a player can use ahistorically use cavalry to successfully charge batteries with great effect. The reality is that it simply wasn't possible on a large scale as the units would have been disrupted by the batteries given the greater ranges. That, plus the terrain issue resulted in cavalry being used as mobile light infantry rather than the shock troops of the NW.

The bottom-line, from a gaming perspective, is that players do not want to play a game where artillery is generating on average 50% of the casualties. I think a 10% rate is way too low and negatively impacts the delicate game balance. I think if the game engine is tweaked properly we should be getting results in a range of about 20-35% depending upon force composition, geography of the battlefield and locations of VPs.

IMO, the one BIG issue that is not reflected adequately in game is the impact of artillery on morale and fatigue. The impact of not enough morale/fatigue malus is amplified in CB fire. As it stands now, there is no need to maintain an artillery reserve in SOW as CB fire isn't effective (especially in GCM, though the stock game is much better). CB fire during the ACW knocked out guns, destroyed caissons and killed horses - all the while causing a "morale" and "fatigue" malus that we should see game. Batteries had their fair share of casualties, but more often than not they were driven off after being supressed by CB fire. The best way to model this would be to increase that morale/fatigue malus for batteries engaged in CB fire.

It would be beneficial if that morale/fatigue malus was increased on infantry units as well. Artillery had a great psychological impact on infantry especially by summer 1864. Understanding that players don't want a game were artillery inflicts 50% casualties, that can be compensated by increasing that morale/fatigue malus which was a very tangible battlefield stress.

As for the range issue, that will be a problem until such time as the arty design is overhauled. The 3inch rifles were great a CB fire but didnt have the weight to inflict as much damage as the 10pd or 12pd guns. Of course the ranges for the 10pd and 12pd guns were much shorter but the lethality was far greater at those shorter distances.

Finally, SOW's rounds are screwed up - at Gettysburg about 70% of the rounds in the caissons and fired were shrapnel and case vice round and canister. Those shrapnel rounds were more effective than the round as the balls had a tendancy to bounce and miss targets completely. Canister was very effective but was also used beginning at 400 yards - though the effectiveness wasn't as great as 200 yards in as modeled in SOW.

[Jack ONeill]

Willard makes some excellent points. Allow me to add one further - the U.S. Army artillery manual of the day stated a well served battery of 6 guns should be able to keep its frontage clear of enemy troops with well directed cannister fire, regardless of incoming fire, as long as their ammo holds out. I think, but cannot be sure, Paddy Griffith states this also. This is something the game does not do, unless massed batteries are parked all together. Rather unhistorical, though.

Jack B)

[Chris G.]

I am not meaning to be argumentative, but I have read and always thought that most civil war casualties came from small arms fire and canister(napoleons). That rifled guns attributed to maybe 9% of civil war casualties.

Something that was brought to my attention recently was:
Pickett's charge faced almost the entire AOP artillery. There was the various division artillery and also several batteries from the artillery reserve. There, is still seams, that the formations held up relatively well until they entered canister and then small arm range.

I am constantly reading civil war books etc. What are some good sources for casualties in regard to the types of weapons used?

I tend to agree with NY, the men in Pickett's charge crossed that entire distance under long range artillery fire, and then even as they closed in to close range canister fire they were able to push ahead to the wall. They even managed to momentarily capture a few of the guns that had been firing on them. The same thing can be said for the Yankee attacks on Marye's Heights at Fredricksburg. Those federal troops crossed a long expanse of open ground under long range artillery fire and were able to form up and trade volleys with the Rebs behind the stone wall, all while being well within reb artillery canister range. I wouldn't say that artillery is overrated per se, but I don't think its the "king" of the field either...just my opinion fellas.

[Gabordiz]

During defensive fire, units are normally not returned to their originating hex to be subject to enemy fire. Is a unit returned to its originating hex to be affected by incoming artillery fire?
PLEASE HELP This will settle a weeklong dispute.