Scourge of War Boards

Artillery Post 2, please read Artillery Post 1 first.

What is and what was.

“So great was the loss of horses, there being over a hundred in this battery killed in battle, that during the last year of the war they were unhitched from the guns after going into action and taken to the rear for safety.” Edward A. Moore, Rockbridge Artillery, ANV.

"A converging storm of iron slammed into the batteries
from front and flank. Wheels were smashed, men knocked down,
horses sent screaming, to stay in the field was to sacrifice
units needlessly."

"I could hear the bones crash in my division
like glass in a hail storm."

“The battle over, orders were sent around for ammunition-chests and cartridge-boxes to be refilled.” General James Longstreet, Antietam

"A savage continual thunder that cannot compare
to any sound I ever heard." Confederate soldier at Antietam

"Nothing could be heard but the infernal din of their discharge, and nothing seen through the smoke but a great ascension of dust from the smitten soil. When all was over and the dust cloud had lifted, the spectacle was too dreadful to describe. The Confederates were still there -- all of them, it seemed -- some almost under the muzzles of the guns. But not a man of all those brave fellows was on his feet, and so thickly were all covered with dust that they looked as if they had been reclothed in yellow. `We bury our dead,' said a gunner grimly." Ambrose Bierce, Union battery, Chickamauga.

I make no pretences that I have the remotest idea as to what happens under the hood of this game. I am not sure I even want to know. So I have no preconceptions as to what is possible and what is not. I do know that the infantry and cavalry sides of the game function pretty well considering the number of moving parts, albeit the infantry functions better. The re-supply side seems less realistic and the artillery seems somewhat realistic up until the accuracy of the shot. The questions then become, what are the major differences between the game's use of artillery and the historical use of artillery, can the differences be accounted for by the programmers and are they actually desired by the community at large.

The differences as I see it between the historic use of artillery and the game's use of artillery is that long range and counter battery fire is significantly less effective than it actually was. Federal artillery for the most part was superior to Confederate artillery due in part to their manufacture/rifling, ordnance, fuses, and abundance. Longstreet complained throughout the war about the Federal’s “superior metal.” The old axiom is also true that infantry hates artillery. The effective placement of artillery many times stopped attacks before they even started.

"We often hear the sneering criticism that at such and such a battle but 1 or 2 per cent of the enemy's loss was due to the fire of artillery. Any such test is entirely erroneous. Not only do the guns exert a tremendous moral effect in support of their infantry, and adverse to the enemy, but they do far more. They often actually preclude heavy damage from the enemy by preventing him from essaying an assault against the position the guns occupy. Then, again, by forcing the enemy to seek cover, they eliminate their antagonists to that extent...Let us hear no more of artillery efficiency as measured by the number of its victims." Colonel Wise

An attacking commander seeing his objective being reinforced with a battery or 2 of artillery had to be a somewhat dismayed. “The human cost for this attack just got a lot more expensive.” There are reports of Union commanders at Fredericksburg advanced their troops on Marye’s Heights and suffering only enough casualties to substantiate that they fulfilled their orders before ordering a retreat.

Dale and Ironsite stole some of my thunder. Artillery did not move well through the woods at all. Currently troops and artillery move at about the same rate.

Confederate batteries had only 4 horses per gun and Federal batteries 6, but they both fatigue at the same rate when double quicked from one place to another.

Guns were not typically re-supplied until after the battle. As Dale and Hancock point out, the rate of long range fire was slowed to conserve ammunition and improved the aiming but in the game the rate of fire is consistent. Ammunition wagons were not brought anywhere near an active battery. The caissons went to the wagon which was typically in a very rear area. I was not able to find any logistical information as to how troops re-supplied. I don’t know if some munitions where held in a forward distribution area or the unit that was low had to go the whole way to the rear.

Each gun had 3 ammunition chests, 1 with the limber and 2 with the caisson. If the limber or caisson was hit and exploded then that gun would lose one third or two thirds of it available ammunition. The current TC2M game does not factor this.

Should men be lost in a battery they would be substituted for with the reserve men from the rear area of the battery. The current game just decreases the men for the gun. I’m not sure if it changes the loading time or not.

Batteries typically utilized many different types of ordinance on a target. Currently all batteries tend to fire the distance appropriate ordnance.

Batteries tended to concentrate fire at selected enemy batteries/guns, (Dale), to destroy or force their redeployment. TC2M fires at the entire battery.

The loss of horses was a consistent problem for batteries. If you loose a lot of horses you are going to have a difficult time moving your battery. This is also not accounted for.

Occasionally a gun would be damaged, (most likely a wheel), and would be out of service for some time do to repairs. Sometimes guns would explode. Neither of these eventualities occurs in TC2M.

Once a gun reached the ramming stage of the loading process, the round could not be changed. If the gun targeted some new troops within canister range, it had to fire whatever round was in the gun and then reload with canister. Currently TC2M, and I’m not absolutely certain, seems to be able to change rounds during the loading process.

Also, as Dale points out, there were other options available to gunners if they ran out of canister. Fuses could be cut very short. Solid shot directed obliquely down your flank had to be at least as deadly as canister to your front. Ordnance is also not able to be shared within the battery. Currently, if a guns runs out of canister in a close in fight, it retreats.

Artillery was never left unguarded. If it was stationary, (especially in the woods), it would have deployed pickets. The unit had many men armed with cap and ball pistols. TC2M many times leaves artillery totally unguarded.

Guns, limbers and caissons were abandoned on the field if the unit had to make a hasty retreat or lost more horses than could pull the objects to the new position. TC2M does not account for this.

Guns barrels weighed about 800 lbs and the gun itself about 1700 lbs. Troops would not have been able to move a gun any significant distance on flat ground. It would not have been able to be moved at all up a steep incline or in the woods. TC2M guns can be moved by troops anywhere on the map even if the crew is exhausted.

Finally, I bet you guys are happy to hear that, this concerning the capture and use of enemy guns. If a battery is attacked from behind, it would not have been able to wheel the guns 180 degrees and fire. Remember that your horses, limbers, caissons and reserves are back there. TC2M, as currently configured, allows this.

I have not been able to find any descriptions of infantry using a skirmish formation to capture or fire on guns. It would seem to make sense that the spreading of troops would decrease their losses in such a circumstance but I cannot find it documented. It is more often described as a probing/delaying formation. I have found references to troops lying down just before the guns fire, then rising up quickly and advancing until the next "Fire!" and then lying down again.

I have not been able to find in the literature any account of where an artillery piece was captured and used against the enemy for any significant length of time. Plenty of pieces were captured, especially by the ANV, but few were used in combat immediately. Remember that certain tools were needed to fire the gun; sponge/rammer, vent pick, vent brush, lanyard, fuse punch and saw, gun site, and friction primers. Should the artillerymen have retreated with these implements then the gun would not have been operable. These were not point and shoot weapons. Calculations had to be made and tables needed to be read. Given the literacy rates, not all soldiers would have been able to load and fire a captured gun. Dale points out that some units were taught how to fire a gun or cross trained on artillery from both armies but I would suggest that they would still be at a green status as they would be firing the guns for the first time provided that they had the equipment to do so.

If an enemy gun was captured then it could be attached to an artillery unit. Once attached, it would be operated by the reserve artillerymen of that battery and therefore have a much higher operational grade. It would also have been able to be limbered and moved by that unit's extra horses. TC2M does not allow this.

Well gentlemen that is it for post 2. Post 3 to follow.

Regards,

Greg

Excellent post, Greg!

There are some other points that I have been thinking about between posts.

Weather--Artillery was barely moveable when the ground was wet. Even on dirt roads the movement of artillery was a brutal endeavor once the mud was stirred up, there were often accounts of entire pieces sinking out of sight along with the horses. Reference the "Mud March" of AOP.

Enfilading fire--Not sure if there is a multiplier effect for artillery damage in TCSM for artillery fire from the flank. There should be. Reference Marye's heights and Second Manassas.

Defective ammunition--This ties in with Greg's post. One Conferate battery at Gettysburg lost the use of 3 guns because the diameter of the shell was slightly bigger than it should have been. The shells were jammed into the barrel and rendered the guns unuseable for the entire battle. Union ordnance was manufactured to a much tighter tolerance. Confederate fuses were inferior to Northern fuses as well, with different settings based upon if the shell was manufactured in Charleston or Richmond.

Heating of the barrel--I know that the barrel itself would be grow hotter if in constant use and that this affected the accuracy of the shots. I do not know how long it was until the battery commander would have the guns cooled down. This may tie in with Hunt's directive to average two minutes per shot for long range fire. "Captain William Crenshaw's Virginia Battery...retired with two of its Napoleons disabled with broken axles and the other two too hot from continuous firing to be fired safely again." (Stephen Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, refering to action at Gaines Mill.)


The true effect of counterbattery fire-- reference Malvern Hill. Range 1000 yards. 37 Federal guns vs 16 Confederate. All three Confederate batteries driven from the position some bareley being able to withdraw due to the loss of horses and caisons. Later that day three more Confederate batteries tried to maintain that position and were driven from the field. Losses were 59 men. The effect of the fire was not so much in loss of personell but of equipment and the psychological effects of being targeted. TCSM measures the breaking point of a battery solely in terms of men killed, which is not right. Note also the effect of artillery at 1000 yards! One effect of the Malvern Hill artillery duels was that after this battle Lee saw to it that a Grand Battery division would be formed to counter the Union artillery organization.


Range of cannister- Malvern Hill again. "Wright's charge carried to within 300 yards of this line. losing men at every step and then it would go no further. The artillery fire, canister at this range, was deadly." (Stephen Sears, The Guns of Malvern Hill, To The Gates of Richmond) The Confederates had over 5000 killed or wounded, half due to artillery. So the TCSM range of cannister of 200 yards seems very inappropriate.

Bravo! To both of you!

Infantry rounds were distributed by the Ordnance team, walking to each individual, with the wagon usually 1000 yards behind the line. In an emergency, they would be 500 yards (that is within firing range) and the same way of distrabution.

that is why the Artillery is known as the "King of Battle"

Hey Greg,
a great sequel to your Part 1!;)
dale, good stuff too!

I agree with the vast majority of what was said however FWIW here's some comments.

Enfilading fire--Not sure if there is a multiplier effect for artillery damage in TCSM for artillery fire from the flank

Bingo! Enfilading fire means absolutely nothing to an enemy battery in TC2M. As i mentioned in another thread and if one reads historical accounts, batteries were commonly 'silenced' by superior fire power from the enemy's metal. This just ain't so in TC2M. Your reference to the Yankee cannonade at Malvern Hill illustrates this well.

Heating of the barrel..

This could be a factor for long range accuracy only. Heated barrels can warp somewhat affecting accuracy but just as important is the buildup of Black Powder fouling especially in rifled barrels. Under intense rapid fire situations, hap hazard wet swabbing of the barrel might not remove enough of the fouling to permit optimum long range accuracy. In addition, the hotter the drier the weather the worse fouling affects accuracy for a rifled barrel. Further, brass barrels when hyper heated tend to become brittle presenting burst barrel potential as opposed to ferrous barrels which would tend to be annealed under extreme heat but probably warp more.

Weather

This is certainly a factor and not only for artillery. Black powder when damp or wet plain and simple won't ignite. This is the reason major battles were not fought in rainy weather. Mud is probably the main enemy of 19th century artillery on the move. Those skinny width wheels supporting all that weight is a sinking stuck in the mud disaster waiting to happen.

Defective ammunition...Confederate fuses were inferior to Northern fuses

From everything i read this is basically true however the Federals had their share of defective fuses also. At Fredericksburg, the Yankee fuses were so bad with some batteries that they were ordered to quit firing because they were taking out their own troops.
Many Northern (sub) contractors produced inferior ordinance during the war including muskets, etc. Quick bucks to be had i suppose.

Finally, I bet you guys are happy to hear that, this concerning the capture and use of enemy guns. If a battery is attacked from behind, it would not have been able to wheel the guns 180 degrees and fire. Remember that your horses, limbers, caissons and reserves are back there. TC2M, as currently configured, allows this.

One thing to keep in mind, there are no horses around in TC2M when batteries are unlimbered. This is unrealistic because as you mentioned killing horses basically crippled batteries for immediate deployment elsewhere on the battlefield. Further, grand batteries are deployed somethimes in the middle of a big field with none of the support horses in sight, yet when these batteries redeploy or retreat, why their horses appear out of nowhere. Having said that, i realize this is a game and practical trade-offs have to be made.

These were not point and shoot weapons. Calculations had to be made and tables needed to be read. Given the literacy rates, not all soldiers would have been able to load and fire a captured gun.

At close cannister range for example they could certainly be considered point and shoot. To expect any kind of long range accuracy from a non-artillerist trained crew is an entirely different matter altogather. I would think except in extreme emergency 'close range' situations, that captured guns were typically taken to the rear, re-fitted and assigned an artillery officer and then re-deployed. Can't say for sure.

I have not been able to find any descriptions of infantry using a skirmish formation to capture or fire on guns. It would seem to make sense that the spreading of troops would decrease their losses..

This would at first glance seem the logical way of capturing a gun or battery. However, the officer's strategy at the time was to keep the men together for commanding order purposes (no walkie-talkie's) and mainly to keep em from running if individual soldiers were relatively far from each other. Remember, we're basically talking slow loading single shot muskets as opposed to modern day automatic weapons with banana clips.
I've found the skirmish formation in TC2M is basically useless and seldom use it except for probing for the enemy in the woods during mop up. But then when and if they do find the enemy, expect em to run. I always have a support brigade or regiments behind the skirmishers because of this.

A whole regiment wouldn't be routed by artillery. Part of it would be destroyed, then it would reform, then take the battery.