I am basing my opinion on the Union political outcry if they had played a waiting game against Lee. I agree that the sound strategy would have been to for the North to position itself to the south of Lee. But that would also mean a rising degree of panic in the eastern states. Imagine having Lee's legendary (to the north and south) army camping out in your state for a week if you are the governor of Pennsylvania. Your state capitol would be under constant threat, your lines of communication to other Northern cities would be threatened, your railroads would be subject to raids. In 1863 the state governors held a great degree of power. They were the ones that raised troops for the Federal army. They were the ones that initiated Home Guard regiments in case of Rebel proximity. They would have horded their resources if they felt an imminent threat.
The second thing to consider would be the growing disillusionment against Lincoln if Meade withdrew after the first day. Meade was Lincoln's choice but there were other generals who were championed in the North to be the head of the AOP. Meade was too new to the job to retain the loyalty of all the staffs who were remnants of the last (Hooker) regime if he failed on the first day. Wouldn't it be logical to assume that there would be an external and internal clamor for a Northern "savior" general who would be proactive in the face of the Southern invasion?
Thirdly, we today assume that Lee would not have struck East. Lee held his cards close to his chest on this. The most important thing to remember is that NO ONE in the North knew what Lee was going to do. It is uncertainty in the face of danger that makes armies do irrational things. Burnside should never have attacked Fredricksburg after the delay in getting his pontoon bridges delivered but he was under the weight of political pressure not to turn back. What Federal army could sit at Pipe's Creek and wait for Lee? All Lee had to do was to feint towards the cities of Baltimore, Philadelphia or Washington to draw out the AOP. In this situation Lee's well known reputation for doing the unimagined would have greatly unnerved the North. The speculation on what Lee's next move would be would have created fear from Boston to Washington. This anxiety would have forced the North's hand.
Longstreet vs. Lee
Re:Longstreet vs. Lee
Hey Dale,
You have, as always, brought up some great points. At the risk of highjacking this post, I'd like to continue this discussion.
Regarding Lee's turn to the east. Ewell had Hill take Carlisle, PA. He did and was given new orders to gain the Columbia RR bridge south of Harrisburg. It was a wood bridge on stone pillars 1 and 1/4 miles long with a RR track, a wagon path and a canal tow path. Upon securing this objective, he was then to take Lancaster and the approach Harrisburg from the east. Upon reaching the Columbia bridge he found that it had been set ablaze by the local militia and was unusable. He then turned north on the west side of the Susquehanna. Harrisburg being completely on the east side of the river was being defended by 30 regiments of PA militia, 19 regiments of NY militia supported artillery and cavalry under the command of Couch. The bridge was set to be burned and no doubt this would have occurred had Hill attempted to take it. I doubt Lee had brought enough pontoons to replace it, it probably would have needed to span 3/4 miles. That leaves the way east cut off. Harrisburg although threatened was safe. The next crossing place would have been 50 miles north at Sunbury, PA and that was not feasible. That now leaves south, north and west. North is out due to his already stretched supply lines and really nothing of military significance up there and terrible north south roads. So now there is south and west to defend against. West is out because he would have had to have gone to Altoona/Johnstown, PA before he hit a place of significance and the roads to there are terrible and there is no place to concentrate the ANV. So that now leaves southwest and south to defend. The Pipe creek Line area affords a great position to counter a move in any of those two directions. A feint to the east probably would have been picked up by Federal cavalry and was limited in scope by the Susquehanna. So as I see it, Meade would be in a great place at Pipe Creek regardless of his loosing the field the first day at Gettysburg.
I grant you that Meade had no political support aside from Lincoln, but neither did Grant. How can anyone blame him for loosing the first day of Gettysburg when he wasn't even there and had command of the AOP for less than a week. He moved the army very well prior to the battle. His loosing Reynold's on the first day was the equivalent of Lee loosing Jackson. Considering that, he performed about as well as anyone could have.
Concerning the outcry in the north had Lee remained some time. It seems no matter what the circumstances there was always an outcry in the north. Lee took steps to insure that the PA population at large was pacified during the invasion. Governor Curtin called for 60,000 militia. No need to unite the north against the invading ANV by laying waste to southern PA. There was certainly overt concern in PA and neighboring states but there was not panic. Pa was not on fire. The stock market in NY didn't even take a hit as of July 1, 1863. Railroad stocks even traded even as the ANV tore up its tracks. Many southern cities fell and the south continued to fight well past when all hope was lost and the writing was on the wall. It was chalked up to southern resolve. Meade was prepared not to attack Lee when he assumed a defensive posture, they think that, " I will attack them when they would play their old game of shooting us from behind breastworks." Lincoln was prepared to back him up. "I had always believed - making my beliefs a hobby possibly - that the main rebel army going north of the Potomac could never return, if well attended to." Abraham Lincoln. I don't think Lee camped in southern PA breaks the Union resolve. They lived through at least three shattered armies pouring into Washington, 5 or more generals who couldn't get the job done and still they sent troops. They weren't happy but they sent them none the less. Meade would have to have been dismantled by the ANV then maybe the south can sue for peace and independence. It dosen't matter if Meade is at Pipe Creek or Gettysburg, that probably dosen't happen and the war goes on.
Just my thoughts.
Greg B)
You have, as always, brought up some great points. At the risk of highjacking this post, I'd like to continue this discussion.
Regarding Lee's turn to the east. Ewell had Hill take Carlisle, PA. He did and was given new orders to gain the Columbia RR bridge south of Harrisburg. It was a wood bridge on stone pillars 1 and 1/4 miles long with a RR track, a wagon path and a canal tow path. Upon securing this objective, he was then to take Lancaster and the approach Harrisburg from the east. Upon reaching the Columbia bridge he found that it had been set ablaze by the local militia and was unusable. He then turned north on the west side of the Susquehanna. Harrisburg being completely on the east side of the river was being defended by 30 regiments of PA militia, 19 regiments of NY militia supported artillery and cavalry under the command of Couch. The bridge was set to be burned and no doubt this would have occurred had Hill attempted to take it. I doubt Lee had brought enough pontoons to replace it, it probably would have needed to span 3/4 miles. That leaves the way east cut off. Harrisburg although threatened was safe. The next crossing place would have been 50 miles north at Sunbury, PA and that was not feasible. That now leaves south, north and west. North is out due to his already stretched supply lines and really nothing of military significance up there and terrible north south roads. So now there is south and west to defend against. West is out because he would have had to have gone to Altoona/Johnstown, PA before he hit a place of significance and the roads to there are terrible and there is no place to concentrate the ANV. So that now leaves southwest and south to defend. The Pipe creek Line area affords a great position to counter a move in any of those two directions. A feint to the east probably would have been picked up by Federal cavalry and was limited in scope by the Susquehanna. So as I see it, Meade would be in a great place at Pipe Creek regardless of his loosing the field the first day at Gettysburg.
I grant you that Meade had no political support aside from Lincoln, but neither did Grant. How can anyone blame him for loosing the first day of Gettysburg when he wasn't even there and had command of the AOP for less than a week. He moved the army very well prior to the battle. His loosing Reynold's on the first day was the equivalent of Lee loosing Jackson. Considering that, he performed about as well as anyone could have.
Concerning the outcry in the north had Lee remained some time. It seems no matter what the circumstances there was always an outcry in the north. Lee took steps to insure that the PA population at large was pacified during the invasion. Governor Curtin called for 60,000 militia. No need to unite the north against the invading ANV by laying waste to southern PA. There was certainly overt concern in PA and neighboring states but there was not panic. Pa was not on fire. The stock market in NY didn't even take a hit as of July 1, 1863. Railroad stocks even traded even as the ANV tore up its tracks. Many southern cities fell and the south continued to fight well past when all hope was lost and the writing was on the wall. It was chalked up to southern resolve. Meade was prepared not to attack Lee when he assumed a defensive posture, they think that, " I will attack them when they would play their old game of shooting us from behind breastworks." Lincoln was prepared to back him up. "I had always believed - making my beliefs a hobby possibly - that the main rebel army going north of the Potomac could never return, if well attended to." Abraham Lincoln. I don't think Lee camped in southern PA breaks the Union resolve. They lived through at least three shattered armies pouring into Washington, 5 or more generals who couldn't get the job done and still they sent troops. They weren't happy but they sent them none the less. Meade would have to have been dismantled by the ANV then maybe the south can sue for peace and independence. It dosen't matter if Meade is at Pipe Creek or Gettysburg, that probably dosen't happen and the war goes on.
Just my thoughts.
Greg B)
Last edited by Gfran64 on Fri May 22, 2009 12:14 am, edited 1 time in total.
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Hancock the Superb
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Re:Longstreet vs. Lee
My best idea for Lee to win the campaign, and the war, is that you need to get a stunning victory, where you keep the AotP at Gettysburg, but have another force march to Winchester FROM THE SOUTH. Had Lee been reinforced by DH Hill's division and the 2 remaining brigades of Pickett's Division, he would have had much more manoverability - for once actually outnumbering his opponent. He would have to have his rear Corps swing south through Emmitsburg on Day 2, while keeping Meade's attention at Gettysburg with the remainder of the army, push the corps all the way to Westminister, then have them dig in at Pipe Creek. He should then send two divisions to Taneytown, and 2 divisions to the north flank - this would essentially "box" the AotP in. According to Newt Gingrich, this should be possible in 48 hours.
Then, Grant would come over and try to demolish Lee, and that would be interesting.
Then, Grant would come over and try to demolish Lee, and that would be interesting.
Hancock the Superb
Re:Longstreet vs. Lee
Very good countering points, Greg,
In hindsight Lee had few options. The best scenario for Lee would have been an attack by the Federals once he had captured Cemetary Ridge. I know that Meade's council of war amongst the corps commanders made the decision to hold the ridge at first and then go onto the attack subsequent to that. Thus the AOP was disposed to attacking. If Lee had gained the ridge July 1, would Meade's corps commanders have opted to throw themselves at Lee? If Meade could see a majority of the corps commanders were choosing to attack would he have gone with tide?
The greatest fear that a Civil War general had was losing the initiative. Jackson won his Valley Campaign by seizing and holding the initiative, even if it cost him in men.
Lee seized the initiative away from McClellan at the Seven Days battles and did the same to Hooker at Chancellorsville. There were generals in the AOP who had been victimized by Lee on several occasions this way. Wouldn't their reaction be "Oh no, not again.?" Sickles, of course, comes to mind.
What I would love to speculate on is what would Lee have done if he had seized the high ground at Gettysburg. Would he have continued to press the AOP, throwing out flanking columns? Would he have sent his cavalry out to raid supplies? Would he have moved in a southernly direction to insure his supply line? Would Lee have the patience to await a Federal offensive? Speculating on Lee is fun because he was capable of fighting any kind of campaign. If there were a lull of a couple of days in the fighting would it be likely that Jefferson Davis would have made suggestions to Lee? Perhaps he would have ordered Lee to attack Washington or Baltimore as a counter to the loss of Vicksburg. Davis may have decided that invading the North was a luxury he could not sustain and would have ordered Lee south of the Potomac. He may have convinced Lee that the prudent course would be to send a corps to the west to counter Grant. One can never separate the politics from the discussion of strategy either on the North or South.
In hindsight Lee had few options. The best scenario for Lee would have been an attack by the Federals once he had captured Cemetary Ridge. I know that Meade's council of war amongst the corps commanders made the decision to hold the ridge at first and then go onto the attack subsequent to that. Thus the AOP was disposed to attacking. If Lee had gained the ridge July 1, would Meade's corps commanders have opted to throw themselves at Lee? If Meade could see a majority of the corps commanders were choosing to attack would he have gone with tide?
The greatest fear that a Civil War general had was losing the initiative. Jackson won his Valley Campaign by seizing and holding the initiative, even if it cost him in men.
Lee seized the initiative away from McClellan at the Seven Days battles and did the same to Hooker at Chancellorsville. There were generals in the AOP who had been victimized by Lee on several occasions this way. Wouldn't their reaction be "Oh no, not again.?" Sickles, of course, comes to mind.
What I would love to speculate on is what would Lee have done if he had seized the high ground at Gettysburg. Would he have continued to press the AOP, throwing out flanking columns? Would he have sent his cavalry out to raid supplies? Would he have moved in a southernly direction to insure his supply line? Would Lee have the patience to await a Federal offensive? Speculating on Lee is fun because he was capable of fighting any kind of campaign. If there were a lull of a couple of days in the fighting would it be likely that Jefferson Davis would have made suggestions to Lee? Perhaps he would have ordered Lee to attack Washington or Baltimore as a counter to the loss of Vicksburg. Davis may have decided that invading the North was a luxury he could not sustain and would have ordered Lee south of the Potomac. He may have convinced Lee that the prudent course would be to send a corps to the west to counter Grant. One can never separate the politics from the discussion of strategy either on the North or South.
Re:Longstreet vs. Lee
IMO, Lee would have held the ground until Stuart appeared. I think that there would have been enough attacks on the ridge line to keep him busy until he got his eyes and ears back.
Re:Longstreet vs. Lee
Longstreet was a good commander as was Lee...At Gettysburg many things went wrong for the South...Slow communications for one along with some Generals who were new to their commands. Longstreet was seasond as a Corps commander and knew what Lee expected of him. Although it may be true that he was fighting the thought of attacking on the 2nd and third days I cannot say what some will tell you and will write about that he was on the verge of insobordination. The second day at Gettysburg has to be one of the best days Longstreet had in the war. His troops were put to the test and were kicking some major union butt..This was because he made sure that his troops knew the attack plan and as Corps Commander took on his responsibility to see these troops got into action. On the other hand you have to ask yourself where was AP HIll...since the attack broke down within his Corps..Lees planning for the attack was great and should have, would have worked. Enter AP HILL to screw things up....But we cannot blame Longstreet for the failure of the 2nd day attack..He gave it his all..If the 2nd day at GB was Longstreets best day in the war the third day was his worst. Even if he could not convince Lee not to make the attack he still should have gave it the best he had..He made many mistakes on day three and one was to try to put blame on Porter Alexander...The supports that were to be sent out were not sent or sent too late to do anything since the attack had already failed..Poor planning because his heart was not in it and I think he just about willed it to fail. Some say Lee should have never went through with the attack but we must realize that Lees army was getting smaller and the Unions was getting bigger by the day and Lee could only sustain himself for so long in enemy country. Lee desperatly needed that Northern Victory to put the pressure on Washington to sue for peace...And I believe if things would have went a bit different and his subordinates would have carried out his wishes he may have carried that battle. I dont believe Meade was a super general but he was a cautious one and his Commanders other than Sickles made all the right moves..I would have to say Hancock was the best General on the Field at Gettysburg and if it was not for his witt and fast thinking things may have been bleak for the Union..
Sal
Sal
Suh, the enemy is there and I will strike him there....
Re:Longstreet vs. Lee
Good reasoning. I guess that we'll just have to run it in the game and see if the attack could have worked if everyone was 100% committed! 
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Armchair General
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Re:Longstreet vs. Lee
Salmin wrote:
Just a quick thought, if Lee's army was getting indeed smaller, and the Union's ever bigger, then that should have been another reason not to order the attack. The thousands he wasted against Meade's line should have never been sent forward; Lee knew that, he had seen the carnage attacks like those caused, such as at Malvern Hill, and Fredericksburg.
........Some say Lee should have never went through with the attack but we must realize that Lees army was getting smaller and the Unions was getting bigger by the day and Lee could only sustain himself for so long in enemy country. Lee desperatly needed that Northern Victory to put the pressure on Washington to sue for peace...And I believe if things would have went a bit different and his subordinates would have carried out his wishes he may have carried that battle.
Sal
Just a quick thought, if Lee's army was getting indeed smaller, and the Union's ever bigger, then that should have been another reason not to order the attack. The thousands he wasted against Meade's line should have never been sent forward; Lee knew that, he had seen the carnage attacks like those caused, such as at Malvern Hill, and Fredericksburg.
Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure.
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Hancock the Superb
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Re:Longstreet vs. Lee
I can't remember who told him, but during the apex of the charge, someone told him that this was Malvern Hill all over again.
I agree with Salim. Longstreet sent in two divisions, and tied up over half the Union army (along with Anderson's division, so 3 divisions). Theoretically, Ewell and Hill should have been able to defeat the other troops, however, bungled attacks created a lost oppurtunity. Just to show how the Union army was tied up:
1st Corps: (Demolished) Culps Hill, Cemetary Ridge Reserve - total: no combat ability
2nd Corps: (Normal) Cemetary Ridge, Wheatfield - total: fighting on Cemetary Ridge only
3rd Corps: (Demolished) Rear - total: no combat ability
5th Corps: (Normal) South Cemetary Ridge, Round Tops - total: fighting on south only
6th Corps: (Normal) Rear of S. Cemetary Ridge - total: only active reserve loc: south of Cemetary Hill
11th Corps: (Demolished) Cemetary Hill - total: little fighting along front
12th Corps: (Normal) lost - total: little fightability
So, had Ewell pushed the attack at Culps Hill earlier and added Rhode's Division to the Cemetary Hill thrust, both hills could have been in Confederate hands at nightfall with no chance of a counter-attack (due to night)
Now, I don't believe Ewell is to blame here. He did his job semi-well on the 1st day, and ordered his troops to action, but, he had very unruly division commanders, eg. Early didn't want to do anything, Johnson didn't have the will to use a decent battle plan, and Rhodes didn't even move.
So, to AP Hill, who is new to Corps command. Unfortunatly, Anderson failed the confederate army miserably, instead of attacking in depth, he attacked across the front and only three brigades moved forward (out of 5). Had he attacked like McLaws and Hood, he should have been able to tie up the 6 Corps easily, alowing Ewell to create a successful attack.
I believe that Lee, still used to a Jackson and a Longstreet balancing the defensiveness and daringness, became unbalanced and lost control of his army of new officers. He didn't commit troops at the right time, and lost control of the battle plan before he even started.
For example, when McLaws was moving into position, he failed to use the tracks that Alexander's artillery use to get to the front, and ironically, blamed Longstreet for the loss of the battle.
Lee - getting old at this point, probably needed to take a few months to find commanders and train them, instead of launching the Gettysburg campaign quickly. The Federals weren't going anywhere any time soon, they had just lost Chancelorsville. So, the blame goes around, but should be focused more on incomptemt or outraged divisional and brigade commanders.
I agree with Salim. Longstreet sent in two divisions, and tied up over half the Union army (along with Anderson's division, so 3 divisions). Theoretically, Ewell and Hill should have been able to defeat the other troops, however, bungled attacks created a lost oppurtunity. Just to show how the Union army was tied up:
1st Corps: (Demolished) Culps Hill, Cemetary Ridge Reserve - total: no combat ability
2nd Corps: (Normal) Cemetary Ridge, Wheatfield - total: fighting on Cemetary Ridge only
3rd Corps: (Demolished) Rear - total: no combat ability
5th Corps: (Normal) South Cemetary Ridge, Round Tops - total: fighting on south only
6th Corps: (Normal) Rear of S. Cemetary Ridge - total: only active reserve loc: south of Cemetary Hill
11th Corps: (Demolished) Cemetary Hill - total: little fighting along front
12th Corps: (Normal) lost - total: little fightability
So, had Ewell pushed the attack at Culps Hill earlier and added Rhode's Division to the Cemetary Hill thrust, both hills could have been in Confederate hands at nightfall with no chance of a counter-attack (due to night)
Now, I don't believe Ewell is to blame here. He did his job semi-well on the 1st day, and ordered his troops to action, but, he had very unruly division commanders, eg. Early didn't want to do anything, Johnson didn't have the will to use a decent battle plan, and Rhodes didn't even move.
So, to AP Hill, who is new to Corps command. Unfortunatly, Anderson failed the confederate army miserably, instead of attacking in depth, he attacked across the front and only three brigades moved forward (out of 5). Had he attacked like McLaws and Hood, he should have been able to tie up the 6 Corps easily, alowing Ewell to create a successful attack.
I believe that Lee, still used to a Jackson and a Longstreet balancing the defensiveness and daringness, became unbalanced and lost control of his army of new officers. He didn't commit troops at the right time, and lost control of the battle plan before he even started.
For example, when McLaws was moving into position, he failed to use the tracks that Alexander's artillery use to get to the front, and ironically, blamed Longstreet for the loss of the battle.
Lee - getting old at this point, probably needed to take a few months to find commanders and train them, instead of launching the Gettysburg campaign quickly. The Federals weren't going anywhere any time soon, they had just lost Chancelorsville. So, the blame goes around, but should be focused more on incomptemt or outraged divisional and brigade commanders.
Hancock the Superb
Re:Longstreet vs. Lee
"Lee - getting old at this point, probably needed to take a few months to find commanders and train them, instead of launching the Gettysburg campaign quickly. The Federals weren't going anywhere any time soon, they had just lost Chancelorsville. So, the blame goes around, but should be focused more on incomptemt or outraged divisional and brigade commanders."
Think of the fighting between the AOP and ANV as two boxers in the ring. The AOP is bigger and tries to swing with haymakers, all it needed to do was connect once and the bout would be over. By contrast the ANV was scoring by weaving inside of the AOP's wide swings and hitting the ribs, it was able to knock the wind out of the bigger opponent but never could connect on a punch that would knock out the opponent. Lee wanted to land a knockout punch, he felt that he could not last 15 rounds with this opponent. All it would take for the North to win was one significant defeat of Lee on Virginia soil and the AOP would have Richmond as a prize. Lee could not gamble that every Union general would be as incompetent as McClellan, Hooker, Burnside or Pope. Eventually one was going to beat him when they were waging an offensive campaign. Lee knew that he would lose a war of attrition and a war of seige. He had to gamble when the opportunity afforded it. If he had waited two months in mid summer the Union would have mounted another offensive within that time and Lee was not confident that he could keep up his streak of consecutive victories over the AOP. Remember that each time the Union was able to gather itself into an offensive it outnumbered the ANV by tens of thousands of troops.
Think of the fighting between the AOP and ANV as two boxers in the ring. The AOP is bigger and tries to swing with haymakers, all it needed to do was connect once and the bout would be over. By contrast the ANV was scoring by weaving inside of the AOP's wide swings and hitting the ribs, it was able to knock the wind out of the bigger opponent but never could connect on a punch that would knock out the opponent. Lee wanted to land a knockout punch, he felt that he could not last 15 rounds with this opponent. All it would take for the North to win was one significant defeat of Lee on Virginia soil and the AOP would have Richmond as a prize. Lee could not gamble that every Union general would be as incompetent as McClellan, Hooker, Burnside or Pope. Eventually one was going to beat him when they were waging an offensive campaign. Lee knew that he would lose a war of attrition and a war of seige. He had to gamble when the opportunity afforded it. If he had waited two months in mid summer the Union would have mounted another offensive within that time and Lee was not confident that he could keep up his streak of consecutive victories over the AOP. Remember that each time the Union was able to gather itself into an offensive it outnumbered the ANV by tens of thousands of troops.