Lee - the Strategic Commander vs. the Tactical Commander

[Armchair General]

CupOHemlock wrote:

O. O. Howard wrote:

CupOHemlock wrote:

I hate to say it, but Lee is almost entirely the reason the Confederacy lost at Gettysburg.

I think the Army of the Potomac also had something to do with it.

I did say, "almost entirely"

As a way of proving my point, I will gladly challenge you to the scenario of your choice upon release. I will take the Confederacy and will not make any of Lee's mistakes. After moping the floor with your digital soldiers we can compare notes again.

Hindsight is a lovely gift that generals of the Civil War have given us.

[O. O. Howard]

CupOHemlock wrote:

O. O. Howard wrote:

CupOHemlock wrote:

I hate to say it, but Lee is almost entirely the reason the Confederacy lost at Gettysburg.

I think the Army of the Potomac also had something to do with it.

I did say, "almost entirely"

As a way of proving my point, I will gladly challenge you to the scenario of your choice upon release. I will take the Confederacy and will not make any of Lee's mistakes. After moping the floor with your digital soldiers we can compare notes again.

I hear you Hemlock. I don't think a cyber replay will really prove anything though, especially with the advantage of knowing where troops are at the starting point or where they will be coming from and when. I remember playing the 1st Day scenario in Sid Meier's Gettyburg! (as Army of the Potomac, of course). I could almost always win, because I knew that Rhodes was going to come in from the north and Early was going to come in from the direction of York; something Doubleday and Howard weren't quite as clear about. It is never quite the same the second time around with even just slightly less fog of war.

Let's say I were to play Union on the 2nd Day. You can be sure I would not advance the 3rd Corps the way Sickles did. That changes the whole context of the battle from what Lee and co. ran into. There are a lot of decisions and random events on both sides that impact the outcome. I am not sure how you would account for that in a re-match. If the Union side plays out exactly the same as it did in July 1863, you know what is going to happen. If it doesn't, it is not the same battle Lee fought.

[MrSpkr]

Actually, I think Lee might have been a good administrator, but he was a horrible strategist in terms of Grand Strategy.

A word here -- I use the term strategy to mean operational movements (in which Lee was often quite good, or, at least, he could find good lieutenants to execute his ideas). "Grand Strategy" means the overall conduct of the war; the plan upon which all other plans should be based to win the conflict. "Tactics" refers to battleground actions (and Lee was very human here; look at Malvern Hill and Gettysburg as two good examples of issues he had in this arena).

From the beginning, Lee and Davis knew the South could not afford to trade losses with the North and have any hope of winning. Yet Lee consistently went on the offensive in 1862-1863, winning some spectacular victories but paying far too high a cost in manpower. Lee himself acknowledged the necessity of preserving his force as much as possible in letters to Davis in 1862; however, he did not act in such a manner as to preserve his force, losing over 100,000 men inside of an 11 month period from September 1862 through late July, 1863. Lee would ahve been much better served by remaining on the defensive, choosing ground and forcing the federal troops to come to him rather than trying to take the fight to the Union. Here, I think Longstreet was a better tactician and strategist than Lee.

I know that there are arguments against this theory, namely that (a) he had no other choice; and (b) he had to do it to win the big victory that would bring on English involvement in the war. I don't buy those arguments. There were alternatives to Lee's strategy, and, quite frankly, I find the possibility of English ground troops entering the war to be fantastic at best. Perhaps the English might have acted to break the naval blockade; however, even that seems less than likely for a variety of reasons.

Yes, I know this goes against the grain of the Cult of Lee mentality, but, as good as the old man was, he has been vastly overrated through history.

Discuss.

Steve

[Hancock the Superb]

MrSpkr - I don't think it is possible to state it too much better.

Though, perhaps, you don't give Lee quite enough credit - he is a very good campaign strategic commander, if he doesn't become focused on the ground.

[UglyElmo]

Reminds me of an old saying;

"Those that can . . . do."
"Those that can't . . . coach." or in this case Administrate.


Most battles are not won on the battlefield, but won before the battle is even begun. Bringing in the right amount of supply, numbers, and quality of troops determines the victor in most cases. The great battlefield tacticians just determine how many troops get killed before one side gives up.

[Braxton Bragg]

You Say Lee would step aside at a battle, well this is right, the General in chief's main job is to bring together his forces on the most favorable ground, the Tactical fight is quite rightly left to the corps commanders.

Braxton Bragg

[burymeonthefield]

Lee firmly believed in the attack. Even in 65 he ordered brigades to attack to re-gain positions even against troops armed with Henry's. He didn't want to stay in the trenches of Petersburg, he wanted to retreat and fight in the open. He wanted to be able to attack!

Lee was taught by his mentor, Winfield Scott, to make a plan of battle and then give the orders to subordinates. This resulted in sometimes horrific consequences. Lee knew that Hill was incapacitated from a flare of his chronic prostatitis. What would have happened if he had taken over Hill's corp on July 2. Mahone would have been forced into the attack, as would have Pender's division. Would that not have brought success on that day. Why did Lee accept the idea of Ewell's that moving his corps around to the right would cause a loss of morale. This was ridiculous. If Jackson had been alive, he might not have been able to take Culp's Hill, but he would have moved his men around to the right to mount a massive assault on the 2nd.


Lee understood what it was going to take the win the war, arm the Slaves and bring them into the Army. With the addition of thousands of slaves, Lee could have turned on the offensive. Lee thought the slaves would be very good soldiers, contrary to many in the doomed Confederate Government.

Burymeonthefield

[Hampton Legion HQ]

Lee was good wherever he was. Consider Chancellorsville? Great performance.
Lee was a great General, and whenever he had a fair fight, he beat the Yankees. He lost because of his country, he had no reserves left.

[MrSpkr]

Not true, Hampton. Lee was tactically and, to a lesser extent, operationally, quite gifted. However, he knew of his country's strategic problems -- lack of manpower and materials -- and failed to adjust his strategic plans accordingly. Going on the offensive, even after such a victory at Chancellorsville, was foolhardy. Continuing the battle at Gettysburg, particularly after the first day, was foolish. Ordering Pickett's charge on the third day was utter madness. An utter waste of manpower in pursuit of a victory that would have been Pyrrhic at best.

Steve

[Hampton Legion HQ]

Maybe the loss of both Campaigns into the North was just a coincidence?