Lee - the Strategic Commander vs. the Tactical Commander

[Hancock the Superb]

I would disagree, Hampton. Lee was very good at being on the strategic defense, even if he was on the offensive. Here is my line of thinking:

7 Days, while the bloodiest of Lee's campaigns, he never attempted such elaborate manoevers that many of his opponents attempted. However, he successfully made McClellan believe that his position was useless and demolished the V Corps (it was never again seen as the prized formation that it was, again).

However, with the Second Manassas Campaign, Lee is stretching the limits. While he wins and astounding victory of Pope, he loses more men than he can afford in such a vicious battle and now must make a move, because he cannot surrender the iniative to the federals.

With the Antietam Campaign, Lee overextended himself. After a summer's worth of hard fighting and marching, his men were simply not up to the task needed in Maryland. Jackson was uncustomarily late in his schedual to seize Harpers Ferry, Lee misunderestimated the resolve of the Federals at Martinsburg (they needed to actually be chased into Harpers Ferry), and the day after the battle of Antietam, recieved 5,000 stragglers! That is a division within the Army of Northern Virginia at the time! Lee simply pushed his men too hard and paid the price of forfeiting the Maryland Campaign.

Fredericksburg, well rested men, put in secure defensive positions. Not much of a fight, except for Jackson's ill-advised counter-attack that resulted in Early's Division getting chewed up.

Chancerlorsville, a great battle with so few men. Perhaps Lee expected too much out of the battle - he expected to annihilate the Federal Army, yet there were more than enough fords for the Yankees to escape upon and only 1/3 of the Yankee army was engaged. Again, a lot of casualties for such a little achievement. However, the Army of the Potomac was never the same again, and Lee now could do whatever he wanted to do for at least 3 months.

Gettysburg, Lee overextends himself again. He has troops spread across Pennsylvania and Maryland, and cannot concentrate them in time. Union forces seize the best ground with the most men first, and Lee has no good way out of the situation unless he can find a way to encircle the Federals and come at them from the Washington DC side.

While the generals in all these battles may be different, I've noticed that Lee does very well when he is confined to blunting an offensive, or playing and offensive defensive. When he is on the strategic offensive, Lee often overextends himself, expects too much of his troops, and cannot bring all the elements of his army together at the battlefield. When the terrain is confined, and the army is together, Lee does a masterful job of dealing the Army of the Potomac harsh blows, and performs very well.

[Hampton Legion HQ]

Does it matter where the ground he fought on was? He could just as easily won the the battle in the North, because ground is ground. He could have swung south and around between the AOTP and Washington, and won a battle there on the defensive.

He didn't really lose at Sharpsburg so much as not win. His army was still there, and he had fought a good battle. But he couldn't go on with so few men, so he had to retreat.

But I see what you mean. He overstretched his men in the campaigns in the North.

[Hancock the Superb]

However, Lee couldn't attack at Sharpsburg, in fear of getting mauled. McClellan was unwilling to give up the ground that he gained. All in all, Lee lost - he couldn't stay at Sharpsburg forever, due to foraging problems, while the Union Army could.

[Armchair General]

Hampton Legion HQ wrote:

Maybe the loss of both Campaigns into the North was just a coincidence?

Or perhaps it has to do with what Lincoln said when he appointed Meade. (Paraphrasing): "He is from Pennsylvania- he will fight well on his own dunghill." It was the Northern troops' turn to fight for the safety of their homes.

[Hampton Legion HQ]

You realize that lots of lives could have been saved by Lee winning Sharpsburg?

[Armchair General]

Hampton Legion HQ wrote:

You realize that lots of lives could have been saved by Lee winning Sharpsburg?

More lives could have been saved had the South never seceded to begin with.

[MrSpkr]

Armchair General wrote:

Hampton Legion HQ wrote:

You realize that lots of lives could have been saved by Lee winning Sharpsburg?

More lives could have been saved had the South never seceded to begin with.

But then we would have been denied the pleasure of this totally awesome game . . .

And, frankly, I believe secession and civil war were inevitable. Better to have fought it in the 1860s than with the even more devastating weapons of the 1870s. Imagine the carnage had both sides been generally equipped with breechloading cartridges, gatling guns, and repeating rifles.

Steve

[Sweeney]

I have heard that Lee had a horrific case of diarhea during the battle of Gettysburg and spent more time in the bushes than on the battlefield. Any truth to that?

[Willard]

Gentlemen -

A couple things to consider in the discussion...

The South did not have an overall war strategy until 1865, when Lee was given the job. By then the Southern position was untenable and it really is hard to judge what Lee could/could not have done in essentially the same position that Grant had to begin 1864.

From an operational standpoint, Lee - IMO - had no equal until he met Grant. At that point though, Grant had considerable logistical and manpower advantages that dictated the end game of punishing Lee's army into submission. Grant could absorb the losses and Lee could not. Many call Grant a "butcher" but that is an unfair criticism. He had the looming spectre of the fall 1864 elections when AT THE TIME, there was a very real belief that Lincoln would lose. He had to force the issue with Lee as he was out of time and used those logitistical and manpower advantages to his benefit. IF Lee had those advantages, he would have used them as well.

From a tactical standpoint, Lee was no better/no worse than anyone else. Civil War battles were a much more muddled affair of colliding friendly and foe columns and lines with very little nuance once the battle was at hand. Of course there are individual instances of creativity on both sides, but as a general rule the tactics were blunt force trauma at the decisive point.

Where Lee excelled, until he met Grant, was his force of will to make the critical decision at the decisive point. Hooker had him beat at Chancellorsville, yet it was Lee's force of will to split his forces twice that brought victory. The same could be said at Antietam, as Lee refused to leave the field and McClellan was more interested in how pretty his troops looked instead of ending the war.

As for Lee's aggressiveness and propensity to take the offensive, I belief those were a by-product of two things. First, Lee knew the North possessed advantages that the South could not match until recognition and support from a foreign power came into play. Because of these comparative disadvantages, Lee had to take risks because the odds were long. He couldn't sit back and let the North methodically march down to Richmond (which is essentially what Grant did). Second, Lee was a student of the Napoleonic wars which meant he wanted to create the circumstances whereby he could fight a decisive battle of destruction of the AoP. This was important for two reasons: first, it would lead to recognition and second it would mean the South would not fight a long battle of attrition which it could not win.

That is why the Gettysburg campaign was fought and why Lee gambled on Day 3. Pickett's Charge must be looked in that greater context, especially when combined with Stuart's battle with 5000 cavalrymen and mounted infantry. That force was to meet Pickett's troops in the middle of the Union lines. IF Lee was successful, then he could destroy the Union army piecemeal - first the surrounded northern half and then the southern half would be outmanned and outgunned and ripe for the taking.

In both a literal and figurative sense, the South was at their HIGH TIDE mark at 3:00pm on July 3, 1863. Lee knew that, and like the gambler he was, he threw all his chips on the table to win it all. Unfortunately for the Southern cause, Lee crapped out at the table.

*S*
Willard

[RDBoles]

Willard, You certainly have grasped the real history of the Civil War. I concure in all aspects of your few paragraphs. It is interesting about the term Grant being the Butcher. From my reading it appears that term was coined by William Swinton a newspaper man who was covering the war with the Army of the Potomac. I think he was not to highly regarded by the military and was even escorted out of the camps for writing uncomplementary articles, for the New York rags. Swinton even wrote a book in 1866 about the Army of the Potomac. Which by the way was a fantastic work of history for it's time and even today. At any rate the butcher theme didn't catch on until after the war, when Grant had to face all the Political opposition.