Lee - the Strategic Commander vs. the Tactical Commander

[Willard]

Another issue is that Meade is virtually overlooked and unremembered. Meade was an extremely competent and consistent commander at every level of command yet has not received any recognition. That was a result of the press black-balling him and striking him from every press acccount once Grant came east.

I will need to check out the Swinton book. Will see if anyone is carrying re-prints somewhere.

[Shirkon]

Here you are. Swinton's book on Archives.org.

Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac

Downloadable as a pdf file as well. Complete with all the engravings.

[guitarmandanga]

The big thing weighing on Lee's mind was time; was it, or was it not, in the Confederacy's favor?

Plenty of historians have argued the former, to wit, that the Confederacy never had a remote
chance of a crushing military victory against the North, and thus its best policy was to
"play it safe" and stretch out the war until popular opinion in the North turned towards a peace
settlement. Obviously, the success of our Revolution was fresh in Lee's mind and in many others.

Lee, however, felt that time was NOT on the Confederacy's side. Rather than discouraging the
North, Lee feared that a protacted war would encourage further troop levies, ramped up military
production, and greater spending. Here again, the Revolution served as an example; as that war
dragged on, English frustration and determination actually got greater, and envisioned punishments
for the colonial "rebels" got worse. If one looks at the Civil War, vows to "hang Jeff Davis",
"purge the South with fire" and other such sentiments became more common with every year of the
fighting.

If the war could be won by protraction, then Lee's aggressiveness hurt the Confederacy's chance.
If, however, it had to be won before the Confederacy was overwhelmed by the nineteenth-century
equivalent of materialschlacht, then his determination to bring on an Austerlitz in the
United States was exactly correct.

The trouble is, of course, that we can never know for certain whether time really was or wasn't
on Lee & the Confederacy's side. For every primary source that speaks of loss of Northern will
by 1864---until miraculously saved, of course, by victories at Atlanta and the Shenandoah---there
is at least one source that vows a fight to the finish; who was telling the truth? A similar
problem lies in Southern sources, with discouraged Confederates and defiant Confederates in about
equal measure.

It's all speculation in the end, but it's still an entertaining parlor game.

[Hancock the Superb]

I don't doubt that there were large things at stake (or that my spelling my be incorrect on some words), but I wonder just why Lee fought Gettysburg so badly.

Think of this:
Lee is trying to imitate a Napoleonic victory. Take a look at Fredericksburg. The Union just marches right down from Fredericksburg and hurls themselves upon Marye's Heights. The II Corps was torn apart, never fought as well again, as they had in the battles prior to this point. What was decisive about that battle? In the Napoleonic era, the demolishment of a single corps, even in an army of such size, would be devestating.

At Chancelorsville, with the XI Corps in in rags, the III Corps cut-off, why doesn't the Union army collapse?

I think Lee failed to realized that the Union army would not be crushed in a Napoleonic battle, and so gambled. But in his Austrewitz, Gettysburg, Lee fails to capitalize. Why does he rely upon the reports of a scout who appears vague (Lee questioned him and didn't get great answers, according to books, and Lee knew it)? He had trusted his lieutenants to survey the ground and bring him victory, yet he puts in place a plan that based on a field he has never seen and doesn't allow room for manoever? (Yes, I understand Longstreet wasn't very normal acting, though). He allows Anderson to position his division poorly (which was right in front of him), and his manoevers on the left and right flank fail to take place at a set time. There was no support for Longstreet's assault, and while many mistakes made, Lee took no hand in correcting them.

I believe that with the exception of Malvern Hill, Lee fought his worst battle at Gettysburg, mainly due to his lack of control over the mistakes made, and the Confederacy suffered at the time when they needed a victory.

Had everything gone right, the Confederacy at Gettysburg, Day 2, should have been able to seize all important ground at Little Round Top, put pressure on the XII Corps to not allow the VI Corps the ability to move to the threatened flank, and perhaps, successfully defeated the III Corps quickly.

Even then, though, would the Union army still live? I believe so.

[Willard]

Hancock -

Just a couple of things to consider...

#1 - Lee had to shake up his army structure just before the campaign due to Jackson's death. He was going into battle with generals that were both untested at their new level of command and in working with each other.

#2 - Lee was at West Point and taught Napoleonic tactics and theory. He was constantly looking to strike the Napoleonic coup-de-grace victory against the Army of the Potomac. Part of that was because the was situation was dire and part of that was due to his make-up. The problem was that unlike Napoleonic warfare where one battle essentially settled the issue, the AoP did not go away. It would back-off, regroup and come at the ANV again. Those periods of time when the AoP was refitting or switching out commanders gave Lee time that he needed to restore his command or take the initiative. When Grant took command he moved in tight with Lee like a boxer getting pounded up against the ropes.

#3 - One of the most over-looked factors playing into Lee's defeat at Gettysburg was the fact that it was extremely difficult for him to command his strung-out forces aligned around the Union fish-hook. It was difficult to coordinate complicated attacks as Lee learned early on in WVA and only more so at Gettysburg given his new commanders and the distances/delays involved. Many of Lee's successes were predicated upon him having the benefit of interior lines with the ability to shuffle and mass forces at the decisive point. Gettysburg did not offer him that opportunity as he had to throw his troops in piecemeal over 3 days.

#4 - The LRT issue needs to be put to bed. Lee didn't have the force ratio necessary to make it happen. The assault started too late, had to go too far on bad ground and Sickles corps - by mistake not design - really served as a speed bump and took alot out of the rebel attack. The fact that they got as far as they did is really a credit to the troops and their commanders. It was a poorly designed attack and Lee should have known better.

#5 - Lee can be faulted for many things, but you can't fault him for not micromanaging the battle more. One of the things that made Lee a fantastic general is that he put his generals into positions to succeed and let them worry about the details. That style accounted for the majority of his great successes - so you can't just say that at Gettysburg he should have taken the reins more. Obviously he became a more hands on general after Gettysburg, but some of that was by design (depending upon the commander) and some of it was by necessity (he was running out of commanders). I agree that style was a negative factor at Gettysburg given the circumstances, but it was also a positive factor during countless instances during other battles that the rebs won.

[NY Cavalry]

Lee was taking a risk by invading the north and he knew it. He had a fantastic army that was generally well led. He thought that his men, if properly led, could do anything. He only had to bring the Army of the Potomac to battle, and his men would win it. By invading the north, he could have the initiative in bringing the battle on. In previous battles he always had to react to what movements the AOP made.

He knew that once he made contact with the Union army that it would grow in numbers daily. He couldn't match the Union man power, but if he could engage it and quickly, he might be able to defeat parts of it before the whole of it was brought up. If he delayed in attacking that would give the Union time to bring up all of its forces.

His troops were victorious on day one and this furthered his confidence. He felt that he had no time for maneuver and this was the place for his battle. He wanted to move Ewell to the right, but Ewell was against that and finally Ewell said that he could accomplish something on his end. So Ewell sent his men to fight on Culp's Hill. A position that he was never going to take and effectively took the confederate 2nd corps out of the battle. It only accomplished casualties for the next 2 days. Lee had to trust his corp commanders, that was his style. He didn't want to run things on the corp level and that bothered him later in the war when he had to constantly be aware of Hill's 3rd corp, because Hill never performed on the corp level very well.

At Getty, Lee made several mistakes the first was to fight the Union where they were. The union position had many advantages that Lee didn't fully understand. The things that really hurt him at Getty was that his cavalry was lost to him until day 2. He was moving almost blind and was lucky he decided to bring the army together when he did. That Jackson was dead and no one could replace him. Ewell did a good job up to Early's attacks, then he fades badly until Lee gets rid of him the next year. Anderson's division should have remained in Longstreet's corp. Longstreet with 4 divisions Hill with 2. And finally, Lee should have listened more to Longstreet and shifted right. He should have learned more about the Union position before sending his army into battle.

Lee's lieutenants didn't serve him very well at Getty. Longstreet became a baby, and what was Hill doing the entire time anyway. He allowed Heth's division to get mauled and wasn't clear to any of his division heads at any time. He never adequately supervised his divisions on any of the three days. As for Ewell, we discussed him already.

[Hancock the Superb]

I would say that both of you have excellent points. However, I would just like to point out that Lee had never even come close to defeating the AotP in one battle, what made him think that he could do it at Gettysburg?

In addition, Lee allowed less leiancy for Longstreet and ordered no flanking movement, just a straight ahead assault. Why, when he didn't even see the ground or the enemy positions?

[NY Cavalry]

On the peninsula, McClellen retreated to a defensive position and under the guns of the navy. Malvern Hill was a rebel assault that showed to Lee the difficulties of further assaults. He also soon after had to send troops to shadow Pope's new army.

At 2nd Mananas, he immediately sent Jackson after the yanks. He wanted to complete the victory and only called it off after Pope ran all the way into Washington's defenses. This was probably the AOP worst defeat. Completely driven from the field. Of course, this wasn't officially the AOP. It was the Army of Virginia, I believe. To Lee it didn't matter.

At Chancellorsville, an assault was ordered for the morning, but Hooker retreated that night. Lee was very upset. If he had attacked, I believe he would have been repulsed.

At Fredericksburg the union position was across the river and the river was covered by union artillery. Fredericksburg was the battle that Lee was most distraught after because he couldn't get to the Union. Empty victory.

By invading the north, Lee took the initiative and sought to get a complete victory.

[Armchair General]

and what was Hill doing the entire time anyway. He allowed Heth's division to get mauled and wasn't clear to any of his division heads at any time. He never adequately supervised his divisions on any of the three days.

Hill's disease that he had gotten at West Point (an STD) was finally catching up with him. He was bedridden for most of the battle.

[Little Powell]

and what was Hill doing the entire time anyway. He allowed Heth's division to get mauled and wasn't clear to any of his division heads at any time. He never adequately supervised his divisions on any of the three days.

Hill's disease that he had gotten at West Point (an STD) was finally catching up with him. He was bedridden for most of the battle.

Indeed. Imagine having constant abdominal pain that is so severe that you can barely stand up and when you attempt to urinate, it's the most excruciating pain imaginable. James I. Robertson gives a pretty detailed description of his illness in his AP Hill book.

Hill was in no shape to command anything at that point and you almost have to blame Lee for allowing him to stay in command in such a state..