Lee actually reported to General Winfield Scott in Washington DC. He went from Texas to Washington DC by land, wearing his US uniform. En route he was promoted to Colonel by Scott. During the interview Lee told Scott that he could not take up arms against his home state. Lee considered resigning from a military life altogether. Once Virginia seceeded Lee accepted Davis' offer of administrative command of all the Southern armies.
Virginia was still part of the Union until Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers to occupy the forts that had been seized (including Sumpter). Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee and Arkansas did not seceede until Lincoln's call up of volunteers. Each state in the Union was asked to supply about 3 regiments of troops for the call up. Lincoln's request pushed these "border states" over to the seccessionist's camp. These states had Southern leanings but were biding their time hoping that the Federal government would accede to peaceful withdrawl of the cotton states as well as relinquish all Federal property in those states. Maryland and Kentucky asked that the troops raised within their states only be used for defense within their state borders. Lincoln acceded to the "neutrality" of these two states.
February 13th, 1861
Re:February 13th, 1861
Dale
There is no dening you are a student of the CW, Thanks, Hoistingman4
There is no dening you are a student of the CW, Thanks, Hoistingman4
HOISTINGMAN4
Drafted in Boston
Drafted in Boston
Re:February 13th, 1861
Dale,
The info on the CS artillery ammo shortage comes from The Long Arm of Lee, vol 1 by Jennings Croppers Wise, page 76-77. "Again on August 27, "Most of the very small stock of ammunition on hand when you left has been issued and in fact, I may say that the stock is entirely exhausted...". This was a telegram from the chief ordnance officer of the ANV to Pendelton. The stock being referred to was of 6lb SB only, they apparently had no 12lb ammo of any description beyond what was in the limber chests of the guns. Johnston stated that the artillery ammo was enough for only 1/2 a battle.
IMO, if Lee had accepted the command of Union forces, his strong sense of duty would have superseded his affection for his home state.
McClellan was paralyzed by his Pinkerton inspired fantasy that the ANV numbered 150,000 trained and well fortified troops. Lee, having some common sense, would have had a more realistic view and could have gotten the AOP organized and back in the field by September IMO. Here, the 1/2 battle would have exhausted the stocks of CS artillery ammo. At that point, Johnston would have been trying to keep Lee out of Richmond with whatever demoralized infantry had stayed together after the 1/2 battle. I suspect that the CSA would have been terminated by Christmas and the CW would be relegated to a couple of paragraphs in US history texts. That's my alternate history script anyway, everyone is free to come up with their own version.
-Jim
-Jim
The info on the CS artillery ammo shortage comes from The Long Arm of Lee, vol 1 by Jennings Croppers Wise, page 76-77. "Again on August 27, "Most of the very small stock of ammunition on hand when you left has been issued and in fact, I may say that the stock is entirely exhausted...". This was a telegram from the chief ordnance officer of the ANV to Pendelton. The stock being referred to was of 6lb SB only, they apparently had no 12lb ammo of any description beyond what was in the limber chests of the guns. Johnston stated that the artillery ammo was enough for only 1/2 a battle.
IMO, if Lee had accepted the command of Union forces, his strong sense of duty would have superseded his affection for his home state.
McClellan was paralyzed by his Pinkerton inspired fantasy that the ANV numbered 150,000 trained and well fortified troops. Lee, having some common sense, would have had a more realistic view and could have gotten the AOP organized and back in the field by September IMO. Here, the 1/2 battle would have exhausted the stocks of CS artillery ammo. At that point, Johnston would have been trying to keep Lee out of Richmond with whatever demoralized infantry had stayed together after the 1/2 battle. I suspect that the CSA would have been terminated by Christmas and the CW would be relegated to a couple of paragraphs in US history texts. That's my alternate history script anyway, everyone is free to come up with their own version.
-Jim
-Jim
"My God, if we've not got a cool brain and a big one too, to manage this affair, the nation is ruined forever." Unknown private, 14th Vermont, 2 July 1863
Re:February 13th, 1861
Good reference, Jim. I had wondered why there had been no quick follow up to the Confederate routing of the Union at Manassass. Washington appeared very vulnerable.
I was just reading in Catton's "The Coming Fury" that Halleck strenuously opposed the use of the units assembling around Washington for an offensive to Richmond. He wanted the focus to be the drive down the Mississippi River and the capture of New Orleans. It was the politicians who demanded that the army be used as a "mass" to force itself to Richmond. McDowell had wanted to organize and train the units further before the operation at Manassass. He actually had no further plan other than striking the force immediately to his front. He only had one section of engineers, and only the outline of a supply system. No one was prepared to do a sustained campaign.
Oddly enough, McClellan had proposed using his column of troops that had successfully forced the Confederates out of the western part of Virginia to march to Richmond from the west. Halleck cooled that idea because of the clamor to strike from Washington. For about the only time in his career McClellan was biting at the bit to be let loose on the attack.
If by some chance Richmond was taken by Christmas the war would have still gone on for quite some time. The capitol of the Confederacy could have been moved to the west or deeper in the south. The Tradegar Iron Works were of immense value and that blow would have been severe. The South had the will and determination to fight and it still had a great deal of space that had to be occupied. Some have argued that making Richmond into the forward defense point was a strategic curse for the Confederacy because it took away resources and focus from the war on the Mississippi and in Tennessee. Halleck's strategy ultimately doomed the Confederacy after all.
I was just reading in Catton's "The Coming Fury" that Halleck strenuously opposed the use of the units assembling around Washington for an offensive to Richmond. He wanted the focus to be the drive down the Mississippi River and the capture of New Orleans. It was the politicians who demanded that the army be used as a "mass" to force itself to Richmond. McDowell had wanted to organize and train the units further before the operation at Manassass. He actually had no further plan other than striking the force immediately to his front. He only had one section of engineers, and only the outline of a supply system. No one was prepared to do a sustained campaign.
Oddly enough, McClellan had proposed using his column of troops that had successfully forced the Confederates out of the western part of Virginia to march to Richmond from the west. Halleck cooled that idea because of the clamor to strike from Washington. For about the only time in his career McClellan was biting at the bit to be let loose on the attack.
If by some chance Richmond was taken by Christmas the war would have still gone on for quite some time. The capitol of the Confederacy could have been moved to the west or deeper in the south. The Tradegar Iron Works were of immense value and that blow would have been severe. The South had the will and determination to fight and it still had a great deal of space that had to be occupied. Some have argued that making Richmond into the forward defense point was a strategic curse for the Confederacy because it took away resources and focus from the war on the Mississippi and in Tennessee. Halleck's strategy ultimately doomed the Confederacy after all.