McClellan at Antietam

[dale]

I think Pope got the shaft in terms of history. What destroyed Pope was a failure set in motion by McClellan on the Peninsula. Lee could never have sent Longstreet north if McClellan had not abandoned the Peninsula.

Pope fixed himself on destroying Jackson/Hill. The opportunity presented itself and he took it. I commend him for that. Pope's job was to shield Washington and to draw Jackson to the north of Richmond. Pope was never meant to face the entire Army of Northern Virginia. Had McClellan realized how much of a strategic threat he posed by being poised on the Peninsula he would have never abandoned it. But McClellan was only a genius in his own mind.

To this day it amazes me how McClellan could resurrect his career after having failed so completely.

Put Pope in charge of the Peninsula Campaign in March 1862 and he would have been in Richmond by May. Ten thousand Confederates under Magruder would not have stopped Pope for a month.

[Armchair General]

dale wrote:

I think Pope got the shaft in terms of history. What destroyed Pope was a failure set in motion by McClellan on the Peninsula. Lee could never have sent Longstreet north if McClellan had not abandoned the Peninsula.



To this day it amazes me how McClellan could resurrect his career after having failed so completely.

Put Pope in charge of the Peninsula Campaign in March 1862 and he would have been in Richmond by May. Ten thousand Confederates under Magruder would not have stopped Pope for a month.

I think the combined forces of McClellan, Pope, and Burnside, (who had come up from North Carolina and was posted at Newport News) should have been more than enough. The AotP alone had ninety thousand at the beginning of August. But McClellan believed (like he always did) that Lee had thousands more, and if he left Harrison's Landing, then Lee would destroy the forces in detail.

Even if Pope took command in March, I don't know about Yorktown. He certainly would have gone faster than McClellan, no doubt, but just a few days after the siege began Johnston began showing up with reinforcements.

[dale]

The whole point is that the time it took to prepare for a siege was not necessary. Magruder had to spread his 12000 men across the whole width of the Peninsula. The line could easily have been breached with any attack, in fact a probing attack was successfully made and not followed up. McClellan had his heart set on a siege. IMO McClellan felt very insecure in any kind of warfare other than siege warfare (which he had studied in the Crimea campaign). Had an army commander actually seized the initiative in March he would have raced up the Peninsula to the gates of Richmond, before Johnston could fully redeploy, and just as importantly, Jackson could disengage from the Valley. It was Jackson's ability to leave the Valley that enabled the Confederates to go on the offensive against the AOP.

[Kerflumoxed]

Here is a report and a couple of photos of this past weekend's Living History demo at Sharpsburg:

http://www.herald-mail.com/?cmd=display ... ormat=html

[Kerflumoxed]

Perhaps one of the most famous pictures of the ANV was taken as they passed through Sharspburg from a second story window. Citizen comments regarding the appearance of this rag-tag army were less than pleasant and often referred to not only they worn clothing, but also to their "aroma."

A year later, as they passed northward once again, this time through Hagerstown enroute to Gettysburg, they were again assailed with loud choruses of derision. To quote Dr. Robertson in The Sthonewal Brigade: One woman, leaning precariously from her upstairs window, taunted the Rebels for their shabby uniforms. As the Thirty-Third Virginia passed, on large Irishman (probably from the Emerald Guards Co. E) squinted up at her and replied with a familiar retort: 'Bejabbers, lady, we always put on our dirty clothes when we go hog-killing!"

Was wondering if this "shabby" appearance will make it presence known in the game? :huh:

[Hancock the Superb]

I believe that McClellan might have done better if Pinkerton hadn't failed so miserably. McClellan, with an accurate picture at the battle at Rich Mt (I think) allowed Roscrans (or was it Buell) to make the flank march to win the battle. Not that he would have ever done the flank march himself, but he felt secure to let a subordinate fail, or succeed, when the odds were right. I believe that he was going to assault the enemy line right up the slope until Roscrans decided to do the flank march.

On the Peninsula, McClellan was more cautious, because he had a whole lot more at stake. He expected to have the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, the 2nd 5th (not Bank's command), and the 6th on the peninsula. That would have been 150,000 men or so, more than enough for the job. Lee would have never attacked McClellan with such few troops, McClellan would have never sent the V Corps north of the Chickahomy, and just concentrated his efforts against the line at Richmond, where he would have outnumbered the Rebs 2:1. However, Lincoln, an inexperience soldier, decided to hold the I Corps back to protect Washington, which with such fortifications, was never in any real danger, especially with the V Corps (Bank's command) in the Shenandoah valley, able to transfer itself to Manassas in the event of Johnston (who would never attack Washington because he knew he couldn't do it) attacked Washington, and get in his rear. Remember, at this point, Jackson had less than a division of troops.

If Pope had been on the Peninsula, I believe that he would have sent his columns at Magruder, then halted, sent out his cavalry for a reconnaisance, attacked again, but Johnston would have been in the entrenchments by then. It was Johnston's will to go to the Peninsula, a day farther from Richmond.

[Armchair General]

Hancock the Superb wrote:

I believe that McClellan might have done better if Pinkerton hadn't failed so miserably. McClellan, with an accurate picture at the battle at Rich Mt (I think) allowed Roscrans (or was it Buell) to make the flank march to win the battle. Not that he would have ever done the flank march himself, but he felt secure to let a subordinate fail, or succeed, when the odds were right. I believe that he was going to assault the enemy line right up the slope until Roscrans decided to do the flank march.

On the Peninsula, McClellan was more cautious, because he had a whole lot more at stake. He expected to have the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, the 2nd 5th (not Bank's command), and the 6th on the peninsula. That would have been 150,000 men or so, more than enough for the job. Lee would have never attacked McClellan with such few troops, McClellan would have never sent the V Corps north of the Chickahomy, and just concentrated his efforts against the line at Richmond, where he would have outnumbered the Rebs 2:1. However, Lincoln, an inexperience soldier, decided to hold the I Corps back to protect Washington, which with such fortifications, was never in any real danger, especially with the V Corps (Bank's command) in the Shenandoah valley, able to transfer itself to Manassas in the event of Johnston (who would never attack Washington because he knew he couldn't do it) attacked Washington, and get in his rear. Remember, at this point, Jackson had less than a division of troops.

If Pope had been on the Peninsula, I believe that he would have sent his columns at Magruder, then halted, sent out his cavalry for a reconnaisance, attacked again, but Johnston would have been in the entrenchments by then. It was Johnston's will to go to the Peninsula, a day farther from Richmond.

I think no matter who you put in the Union command during this time period on the Eastern Theater, it would result in failure. All of the generals who would eventually present themselves as some of the best commanders in the Aotp still had small commands. (Hancock, Meade, Reynolds, just a few examples, were brigade commanders.) And even when they did remarkable jobs, higher-ups still managed defeat. Hancock breached the Yorktown lines during the first few days of the siege, Meade and Reynolds held off against seemingly impossible odds at Beaver Dam Creek when they fought off Confederate attacks.

[dale]

Ahhh, but once McClellan lost the initiative, allowing Confederates to attack his right flank he went into full retreat mode. He had a marvelous opportunity to attack on the left flank and if he had done so Johnston would have had to ease his attacks because of the direct route to Richmond. He had two corps commanders on the left flank, unscarred by fighting after the first day that were chafing to attack but were held back by McClellan who was envisioning Confederated behind every tree by now. EVERY corps commander in the AOP on the peninsula thought that this fight was winnable but McClellan overruled all. Once the Seven Days battles began McClellan basically abandoned any pretense of attacking Richmond. I think that any of his corps commanders could have done a better job, even the ancient "Bull" Sumner.

Of course in McClellan's world a full scale retreat was called redeploying to a new base.

The stripping of the First Corps away from the AOP was a body blow to McClellan's fragile psyche. I think that in his own mind he was at that point prepared for defeat, and felt like he had to go through the motions of advancing to Richmond. He even pictured himself dying a heroic martyr. Amazingly, he left his right flank hanging in the air, not imagining the Confederates would attack or that Stuart could ride completely around him. The supply base at White House was openly vulnerable to any thrust at it. McClellan basically invited some attack from the north and was horribly prepared when it did happen. Amazing.

In the end McClellan proclaimed his full scale retreat a victory, because in his own mind only he could have saved the Army!