McClellan at Antietam

[Ephrum]

I've read the book "Landscape Turned Red" just recently, and I'm just astounded at how long McClellan was allowed to be in Command. The ANV was handed to him on a silver platter and he allowed the opportunities to just slip away.

Now I know there's no dispute that his soldiers loved him, and he's credited for getting the AoP trained and equipped, which is valid, from all that I've read.

But the man had to be under delusions to call his performance in that battle a "Masterpiece of Art".
It's almost as if he were just one yard from the game winning touchdown, and just purposely stepped out of bounds as the clock expired.

Was he just deep down, afraid? Did he really not care if there was a Conferderate States of America? Was he just plain blinded by his own ego? All the above?

Do you think he ever figured out how badly he blundered the opportunity?

[Kerflumoxed]

One theory that has been advanced is that the re-structuring, re-equipping and re-training of the AoP by Little Mac resulted in a superb fighting force that he was reluctant to see destroyed. Rather then commit the AoP to decisive action and expose it to destruction en masse, he elected to attack "piece-meal" in the vain hope that Marse Robert would retreat after a "solid blow" to his left flank. This theory may or may not "hold water", nevertheless, it is an interesting one.

Of course, it didn't help that he was under undue influence by Alan Pinkerton and accepted the exorbitant "guesstimates" of the size of the ANV.

BTW, there is a living history currently being conducted at the "sunken road" today and tomorrow by some of the top living historians in the country. Will continue through noon tomorrow. :cheer:

[Kerflumoxed]

Ephrum wrote:

I've read the book "Landscape Turned Red" just recently, and I'm just astounded at how long McClellan was allowed to be in Command. The ANV was handed to him on a silver platter and he allowed the opportunities to just slip away.

Now I know there's no dispute that his soldiers loved him, and he's credited for getting the AoP trained and equipped, which is valid, from all that I've read.

But the man had to be under delusions to call his performance in that battle a "Masterpiece of Art".
It's almost as if he were just one yard from the game winning touchdown, and just purposely stepped out of bounds as the clock expired.

Was he just deep down, afraid? Did he really not care if there was a Conferderate States of America? Was he just plain blinded by his own ego? All the above?

Do you think he ever figured out how badly he blundered the opportunity?

PS: To address your last question, "Nope!" As I recall, he continued to assert his judgement of a victory to the end of his life in 1885. You might find a copy of his book to see his rationalization. One modern reviewer wrote: "His autobiography, McClellan's Own Story, published in 1887, is generally considered acutely biased and self-serving."

[Armchair General]

As stated above, McClellan was scared that his army was outnumbered by at least fifty thousand and at most a hundred thousand. I think he was incompetent, he was literally handed Lee's plans and he did nothing with it.

I'm reading another of Sears' works To the Gates of Richmond and Sears says that by the end of the Seven Days, McClellan was physically, and emotionally drained and by Glendale and Malvern Hill was literally trying to run away from the battlefields, passing command down to the corps commanders. It's possible he could still be suffering at the start of the Antietam Campaign (Even though I doubt it.)

All in all, McClellan made the AoTp the fighting force that it was, but he also signed the thousands of death warrants for the soldiers in late 1862 until the end of the war when he gave up on the peninsula and allowed Lee to get away at Antietam.

[Kerflumoxed]

Armchair General wrote:

As stated above, McClellan was scared that his army was outnumbered by at least fifty thousand and at most a hundred thousand. I think he was incompetent, he was literally handed Lee's plans and he did nothing with it.

I'm reading another of Sears' works To the Gates of Richmond and Sears says that by the end of the Seven Days, McClellan was physically, and emotionally drained and by Glendale and Malvern Hill was literally trying to run away from the battlefields, passing command down to the corps commanders. It's possible he could still be suffering at the start of the Antietam Campaign (Even though I doubt it.)

All in all, McClellan made the AoTp the fighting force that it was, but he also signed the thousands of death warrants for the soldiers in late 1862 until the end of the war when he gave up on the peninsula and allowed Lee to get away at Antietam.

Good morning, AC.

As you may know, Sears also wrote a biography on McClellan titled The Young Napoleon It is available through Amazon with used copies beginning at $8.88. Makes a good companion piece to Mac's own autobiography.

I am usually hesitant to be too critical of decisions made by those folks on both sides of the line. I am reminded of the Native American proverb, "Don't judge a man until you walk a mile in his mocassins." For example, the famous "Lost Orders." In hindsight, it is difficult to understand Mac's hesitation when they were presented to him. Paranoia, wartime deception....any number of reasons for his delay may have caused him to hesitate. Just one more of history's mystery's. (Oh, my did I really write that? :S ) But, they sure are fun to talk about, especially with a pint of good Harp Lager! I am sure it is 5 o'clock somewhere!

[Armchair General]

Kerflumoxed wrote:

Armchair General wrote:

As stated above, McClellan was scared that his army was outnumbered by at least fifty thousand and at most a hundred thousand. I think he was incompetent, he was literally handed Lee's plans and he did nothing with it.

I'm reading another of Sears' works To the Gates of Richmond and Sears says that by the end of the Seven Days, McClellan was physically, and emotionally drained and by Glendale and Malvern Hill was literally trying to run away from the battlefields, passing command down to the corps commanders. It's possible he could still be suffering at the start of the Antietam Campaign (Even though I doubt it.)

All in all, McClellan made the AoTp the fighting force that it was, but he also signed the thousands of death warrants for the soldiers in late 1862 until the end of the war when he gave up on the peninsula and allowed Lee to get away at Antietam.

Good morning, AC.

As you may know, Sears also wrote a biography on McClellan titled The Young Napoleon It is available through Amazon with used copies beginning at $8.88. Makes a good companion piece to Mac's own autobiography.

I am usually hesitant to be too critical of decisions made by those folks on both sides of the line. I am reminded of the Native American proverb, "Don't judge a man until you walk a mile in his mocassins." For example, the famous "Lost Orders." In hindsight, it is difficult to understand Mac's hesitation when they were presented to him. Paranoia, wartime deception....any number of reasons for his delay may have caused him to hesitate. Just one more of history's mystery's. (Oh, my did I really write that? :S ) But, they sure are fun to talk about, especially with a pint of good Harp Lager! I am sure it is 5 o'clock somewhere!

And good afternoon to you, sir,

I try not to be critical, taking into consideration what commanders were faced with, but when McClellan started up the Peninsula, he had a hundred and twenty thousand troops (sixty thousand in the first week, the rest landing at Fort Monroe) when he reached Yorktown. John Magruder had something along the lines of 10,000 troops, and his theatrics coupled with Allen Pinkerton's miserable failure prevented McClellan from pushing all the way to Richmond before Johnston could bring his army down from the Rapidan River. Then, at Malvern Hill, almost every Union officer said they wanted to stick at their position after they repulsed the Confederate attacks on July 1st. They just needed more ammunition, but McClellan ordered a retreat. Even a blind man could have seen the sheer beauty of Malvern Hill and its deadly potential. Antietam (and every other battle after it) shouldn't have happened. But maybe I'm just being too critical

[dale]

I believe that McClellan was a general who was not really ever prepared for battle. When the fighting was raging in the Peninsula Campaign battles he was by choice miles away. As already has been noted for the last two battles of Glendale and Malvern Hill he found it necessary to steam EAST down the James to check out wharves. I believe him to be a coward in his heart, making sure that he was surrounded by a headquarters cavalry unit at all times. McClellan was a general who really could not manage two things at once and usually found the least critical thing to lavish his attention on--such as when he saw to the loading of transports while the opening forays into Williamsburg were made. It seemed that McClellan acted with a grand plan A in mind and when the enemy did not respond accordingly he found the perfect excuses to delay and hesitate. Plan B was usually the polar opposite of Plan A--retreat if the attack failed.

McClellan believed that there was a grand conspiracy to deprive him of the supreme victory. He dissipated his energy in focusing on the political battles in Washington instead of immediate battlefield campaign. He carried a newspaper press with him to make sure his side of the story always got out. He compared himself to Napoleon without ever exhibiting the battle field elan of the great general.

At Antietam McClellan really did not want to fight Bobby Lee. To have him against a river like he did without risking even a pinning attack at all on the first day was incomprehensible. To let Lee cross the Potomac unmolested was even more inexcusable. The battle itself was staged in completely uncoordinated attacks--the sign of an utterly incompetent tactician. He attacked AND held back at the same time. Did he really think that Lee was going to outflank him again?

In my opinion, (and yeah when it comes to Little Mac I have a profusion of them), McClellan's praise for training the AOP was overrated. He had good corps commanders who were competently doing the job for him. He was given months to train the AOP after Bull Run, more than enough time. Another commander could have won the war in the East by June 1862, just about any other commander.

[Ephrum]

I appreciate your responses, and I'm pretty much of the same opinion. While all ACW Generals at one point or another, did things that leave us scratching our heads and saying "What the.......? it seems McClellan has more of those moments than most of the rest combined.

Although I think Gen'l Bragg would take second place.

[Armchair General]

Ephrum wrote:

I appreciate your responses, and I'm pretty much of the same opinion. While all ACW Generals at one point or another, did things that leave us scratching our heads and saying "What the.......? it seems McClellan has more of those moments than most of the rest combined.

Although I think Gen'l Bragg would take second place.

I think John Pope's performance during the Second Manassas Campaign can be listed under these conditions as well, leaving the modern historian scratching their heads.

[Ephrum]

Armchair General wrote:

Ephrum wrote:

I appreciate your responses, and I'm pretty much of the same opinion. While all ACW Generals at one point or another, did things that leave us scratching our heads and saying "What the.......? it seems McClellan has more of those moments than most of the rest combined.

Although I think Gen'l Bragg would take second place.

I think John Pope's performance during the Second Manassas Campaign can be listed under these conditions as well, leaving the modern historian scratching their heads.

your right AG, he was another one.

But I get the impression from some historians, McClellan could've actually sent support to Pope, but just wouldn't. How he put it was "...leave Pope to get out of his scrape himself."