Day 1 /Gettysburg

[Ephrum]

As I've read it, on the first day of battle, when Heth's men made contact with Bufords, Heth had about 12,000 men and Buford about 3000.
Now I know the Federal Cav were using repeating rifles. Are the rifles the biggest reason the Federal Cav were able to hold up Heth's men?
Or was it a combination of the rifles, and Heth's deployment of his men? From what I've read, Heth could've hit harder, but didn't expect the Fed. Cav to put up such a determined fight.
And just how long were the two sides fighting, before Reynolds' infantry arrived on the field?






(Yes, I'll get a few books on the battle and read more about it. But I've learned over time, quite a few of the Forum members know a great deal about the ACW. And consequently I've learned as much from the discusions, as from reading the books. Besides, I thought it might be enjoyable to discuss the battle, in a kind of timeline. Starting with the first contact.)

[Ephrum]

What the hell? Nobody here wants to talk about the Battle of Gettysburg?

[Hancock the Superb]

Well, from what I've read, the federal cavalry didn't have repeating rifles. They had single shot carbines, which are faster, but much less accurate.

In addition, Buford organised his defense upon McPhearson's Ridge and Willis' Woods. He left on regiment out behind the first ridge (Knocksville I believe). That regiment delayed the skirmishers, some 200 men from the 5th Alabama Battalion (and some from 13th Alabama, but 200 all together), and 200 sharpshooters under O'Neal from Davis' Brigade.

Assuming that the cavalry was going to give away, Heth decided to keep his troops in road column, along the road, so there was no pressure on the outpost. When the skirmishers cleared the first ridge, they ran into the outpost regiment, which delayed the march for a while, all the while moving back towards McPhearson's Ridge. At Herr's Ridge, Buford decided to send out some 300 more men of Gamble's Brigade, along with some 200 men from Devin's Brigade, to increase the strenght on Herr's ridge to somewhere around 700 troopers (minus the horseholders).

Upon seeing the enemy in force, Heth deployed his first two brigades, while the skirmishers eventually pushed the troopers off Herr's Ridge. Pegram's Battalion was called up, and started banging away at Calef's guns.

Heth ordered two brigades to march forward, but at the same time, the 1st Division, I Corps, was arriving, and so Buford pulled out his troopers. They didn't loose very heavily, somewhere around 200 men by the end of the day (After more fights).

As we know, the four regiments of the Iron brigade clashed with the 3 regiments of Archer's Brigade (the 14th Tennessee was stuck at the quarry tangling with the 84th New York from Cutler's Brigade, and the 13th Alabama was still on skirmishing duty). Cutler's brigade, with only 5 regiments (one was held back to escort the supply trains), marched into lower McPhearson's Ridge, and the three right-hand regiments were mauled.

At this time, the Heth's remaining brigades marched into position behind Herr's ridge. However, Heth refused to send them into combat, for he was unwilling to start a battle, he was only reconaitering.

Then the 6th Wisconsin, supported by the remaining two regiments of Cutler, attacked Davis' Brigade and sent them scurring backwards.

There you go, the brief history of the morning of Day 1, Gettysburg.

[Ephrum]

Thank you Hancock!

That explains quite a bit for me.

It would seem Heth should not have pressed the issue as far as he did, after the initial contact with Buford, and waited until more Confederate forces were within supporting distance, since Lee didn't want a full engagment until all the troops were up.

But I wonder, if Heth had waited, would Reynold have pressed the issue, or set defensive works and wait for more support as well?

Oh yeah, thanks for reminding me Bufords men were using single shot carbines, not repeaters. B)

[Gfran64]

It's my understanding that Buford had been scouting all over this area for a few days prior to Heth's arrival. He had figured which roads the columns might come down if and when Lee turned, and Lee was going to have to turn sooner or later. Buford had time to consider his tactics well in advance of Heth's arrival. He constructed some crude earthworks along planned fallback positions and he and his subordinates executed their plans brilliantly. He had Videttes well forward of his position to give plenty of warning as to which road/roads the ANV may be coming down and had a great observation post in the cupola.

Greg B)

[Ephrum]

Would Heth have been better off to have pulled back after the initial contact, and waited for support?

Maybe Heth should've put his men into battleline much sooner, instead of road column.
But from what I've read, Heth didn't seem to have any indication as to how prepared Bufords men were, to contest his advance.

What I don't know for sure is, how long were Heth and Buford fighting, before Reynolds' men arrived?
And was there enough time, before Reynolds' arrived, for Heth to deploy more men? And would that have made any difference?

[Kerflumoxed]

Excellent summation, General Hancock!

As to Confederate deployment, I have always suspected that General "Harry" Heth was slow in moving to a battle line because 1) of General Lee's order not to bring on a general engagement and 2) there was no definitive information as to size of the opposing Federal cavalry force. In general terms, cavalry could not stand very long against a concerted infantry attack. During the preceding 2 years of war, Federal cavalry had developed less than a sterling reputation and I can imagine that was the prevailing thought when Heth's Division came upon Buford's cavalry: "Just another delaying force that we can easily overcome!"

Pure speculation on my part! :woohoo:

[Gfran64]

I think Heth had orders to recon in force the town of Gettysburg. He was not to bring on a general engagement with infantry. When he started, he hadn't. As I've read when Heth's picket line got jammed up by Gamble, he orders battle lines. This took an hour and 15 minutes and the manuals say it should take 45 minutes. So he was slow to that but he was on a turnpike with high fences on each side and in column and that dosen't make for an easy deployment of troops. Heth had 7,500 men and 15 guns. Buford had 2,750 men and 6 guns. Buford knew his ground well and withdrew to successive ridge lines thus making the confederates reform and assess the next situation. All of this taking up time. Buford was engaged lightly from 6am to 8am and hotly by 9:15am and holds until 10:15am when Reynolds/Cutler arrive and fill in the line. Then Devin jams up Rodes in the north for about 2 hours until he has to retire due to being shelled by his own artillery on Cemetery Hill. Gamble supports the Union left and at 3:30pm smacks Lane so hard that he is out the rest of the battle. All totaled, that puts Buford's men at about 10hrs of fighting. They had 135 casualties. They held long enough.

Pettigrew tried to convince Heth on June 30th that he had more than just a detachment of US cav. in front of them. Pettigrew had sent 2 infantry regiments into Gettysburg to get some supplies and recon. and they were turned back. Pettigrew pleaded his case to Hill and Heth but they discounted it. So he is to blame for that. If consider the carbines they used as significantly increasing their fire that is true. But, his force was decreased by maybe 1/4th from time to time for the horse holders. That puts Buford at about 2100 shooting men. Given that under fire they could get off maybe 4rounds/minute that puts them at 8,400 rounds/min for the entire force. Now Heth had 7,500 men and could maybe get off 2 rounds/min with the muzzle loaders and that puts them at 15,000 rounds/min. Heth also has the advantage in artillery. So all things considered Heth should have won but he got out generaled by Buford. Heth underestimated his adversary because he never took the initiative in finding out what was in front of him on June 30th and he was slow and sloppy early on on July 1st and it cost him dearly.

Regards,

Greg B)

[Zeke]

John Buford was in the right place at the right time or from a confederate point of view the worst person they could hope to run into! Point of fact he was at the time probably the best cavalryman in the federal army.

And the tragedy is he never got the adulation he deserved as he died - I think from a mixture of exhaustion and exposure 6 months later, still only in his mid 30s....Sad end for a very brave and tough fighter.

[Kerflumoxed]

Zeke wrote:

John Buford was in the right place at the right time or from a confederate point of view the worst person they could hope to run into! Point of fact he was at the time probably the best cavalryman in the federal army.

And the tragedy is he never got the adulation he deserved as he died - I think from a mixture of exhaustion and exposure 6 months later, still only in his mid 30s....Sad end for a very brave and tough fighter.

And he looked a lot like Sam Elliot! :S

Anyway, as you all know, the net is a marvelous tool. In the "For What Its Worth" department, here is a nice, concise review of Henry Heth that includes his first day's action. Thought that all might enjoy it! :woohoo: http://www.gettysburgdaily.com/?p=1065

One of the many articles from a quick Google search, "Henry Heat at Gettysburg", is this one showing the remains of a "witness" tree where Harry received a knock in the head that halted his GB participation: http://www.rocemabra.com/~roger/tagg/ge ... ral63.html

And, for General Hancock, a nice story regarding Heth, Hancock, General Scott and "mashing potatoes." http://www.aphillcsa.com/heth.html