Chancellorsville troop reliability question

[garyknowz]

One of the difficult elements that Hooker endured was the potential behavior of a large number of regiments whose 9 month or 2 year commitment would be up in April and May. Some were veterans of the Peninsular campaign, and otherwise veteran troops, but felt spurned by the War Department as to their muster date. Going into battle, Hooker was wary of the reliability of these troops. It is sometime cited as a reason why the Chancellorsville campaign was a failure i.e., some units wouldn’t fight hard and skedaddled at first opportunity so as not to be killed days before being mustered out. But the variability of not knowing who was reliable and who was unreliable was vexing, and was key to his decision not to renew the campaign on the 4th and 5th of May (not to mention the communication debacles).

I was wondering if there would be any provisions aimed to simulate this element, or how/if it could potentially be done.

I really felt bad for Hooker in several ways. Not only the fog of war with regard to the Wilderness (daunting itself), but the communications, untested commanders, troop reliability, Stoneman’s incompetence, and plain bad luck. He seemed a cursed man that spring.

[RebBugler]

Ha, I guess Hooker would report this. When you have a three to one advantage, have time to build and defend a strong network of defensive positions, and get your butt kicked, with your forces placed strategically as you have planned...WELL.

From a Southern standpoint, we thought Hooker did an admirable job...FOR THE SOUTH.

[Little Powell]

Lee was incredibly lucky at Chancellorsville. There were many near misses where he made some extremely risky (some would say even foolish) gambles. But what it comes down to is that Hooker lost his nerve on the first day by pulling his troops out of the first day's fight. After that, Lee had gained the initiative. There were also many failures by Hookers subordinates. Howard was warned many times (by Hooker himself) about the probable flank attack on his XI Corps, yet he largely ignored them. Sickles III Corps was in a position to thwart Jackson's flank attack, yet he determined that Jackson's movement was a retreat.. And don't forget that Sedgwick had 40,000 troops at Fredericksburg in position to crush the Confederates between his VI Corps and the rest of the AOTP at Chancellorsville, yet by the time he finally acted on it, it was too late and Hooker was already withdrawing.

So like many of Lee's victories, it came down to poor decisions and miscommunication between the Union commanders, and bold gambles by Lee that paid off.

[conjotter]

Hi.
I think it would be a big mistake to hobble union regiments over this. From what I've read the vast majority of union regiments that were engaged fought long and hard in this battle, albeit sometimes under very bad commanders (Howard and Devens in XI Corp).

As other posters have said, the rebs were very lucky in this battle, and still suffered a massive loss of 13,000 casualties as well as Jackson.

Two good books worth reading on the battle:

Chancellorsville 1863 by Ernest Fergurson and Chancellorsville by Stephen Sears.

I wonder if the game will feature union observation balloons?

Regards, CJ.

[RebBugler]

conjotter
I wonder if the game will feature union observation balloons?

Hmmm...must have been grounded when Jackson marched all day around to the Union right, and then proceeded to launch his Juggernaut that annihilated the 11th Corps.

Revere was another example of poor Union commanders. Literally abandoned his vital position under fire sending his whole brigade to the rear under the guise of needing to resupply.

Sickles didn't help much either, taking troops from the defensive line that Jackson eventually swooped down upon, pursuing what he thought was the Confederate army retreating. Then sending word back that "the Rebels are in full retreat"...then Jackson struck as they were preparing supper and basking in their false victory report.

[garyknowz]

Lee was incredibly lucky at Chancellorsville. There were many near misses where he made some extremely risky (some would say even foolish) gambles. But what it comes down to is that Hooker lost his nerve on the first day by pulling his troops out of the first day's fight. After that, Lee had gained the initiative. There were also many failures by Hookers subordinates. Howard was warned many times (by Hooker himself) about the probable flank attack on his XI Corps, yet he largely ignored them. Sickles III Corps was in a position to thwart Jackson's flank attack, yet he determined that Jackson's movement was a retreat.

The biggest failures, in my view, were the defective Beardslee telegraph machines. They seemed to always fail at critical moments. Reynolds was supposed to be in place and entrenched on Howard’s right the morning of the May 3rd with his 14,000 man veteran corps. But the telegraph to him was delayed several hours, and Reynolds only got as far as U.S. Ford by morning. Had he been in place, Jackson’s attack would have probably been a failure as Reynolds would have come down smashing into his right flank en force. At the very least, Jackson would have been force to deploy A.P. Hill, the third wave on attack, to face this threat denying Jackson much of the weight of his attack. The same was true of many telegraphs to Sedgwick concerning feigned attacks meant to freeze Jackson’s corps and prevent it from reinforcing Anderson and McLaws (not to mention Sedgwick’s caution and inexplicit orders, so he thought). The communication errors were the catalyst for all else that happened. Hooker had Lee in a perfect vice up to May 1st. Lee admitted that himself. But the house of cards fell apart quickly.

And don't forget that Sedgwick had 40,000 troops at Fredericksburg in position to crush the Confederates between his VI Corps and the rest of the AOTP at Chancellorsville, yet by the time he finally acted on it, it was too late and Hooker was already withdrawing.

It was worse then that. Hooker was in a strong position following the battle. As was Sedgwick at Banks Ford. But another communications error blew up a plan for Hooker to pull out over U.S. Ford and recross at Banks Ford and smash Lee from behind. It was a comedy of errors for Hooker all around.

[garyknowz]

I think it would be a big mistake to hobble union regiments over this. From what I've read the vast majority of union regiments that were engaged fought long and hard in this battle, albeit sometimes under very bad commanders (Howard and Devens in XI Corp).

That is true. That was in hindsight though. Leading up to the battle, there were several mutinies, and troops voiding not to fight. He was very worried about putting them into battle. Even after the battle, Hooker vowed not to fight with troops so near to enlistment termination date, due to this threat. He couldn't afford to trust putting several regiments in critical areas on the battlefield. It adds another difficult element to Hooker's situation as commander of the AotP.

Chancellorsville 1863 by Ernest Fergurson and Chancellorsville by Stephen Sears.

I concur. I read Fergursons’s a while back, and just finished Sears’s. Great books.

I wonder if the game will feature union observation balloons?

Might be need to see on the horizon. But Prof. Lowes balloons were of dubious strategic value anyway, and virtually worthless tactically on the battlefield. Communication times from observer to signal/telegraph to Hooker to troop commander would make any immediate tactical intelligence obsolete. Besides the balloons were at Banks Ford and Stafford Heights behind Fredericksburg, and the Wilderness obscured most of the region in which Hooker fought.


Cheers!

[2nd Texas Infantry]

No on the observation balloons. I thought about it, but they were unsubstantial in their role due to visibility and location. Banks' Ford is on the Salem Church/Fredericksburg map, however, Lou Raider had enough object work on his plate as it was. I guess the balloons will have to wait for the Seven Days/Penninsula Campaign if we ever develop that in the future.

As far as troop reliability, I give the Federal's with little time left the benefit of the doubt. Most 19th Century Americans were proud, brave, and fully commited to their honor. So no! I believe these men as worthy opponents to the best of the Army of Northern Virginia.

[garyknowz]

As far as troop reliability, I give the Federal's with little time left the benefit of the doubt. Most 19th Century Americans were proud, brave, and fully commited to their honor. So no! I believe these men as worthy opponents to the best of the Army of Northern Virginia.

I respectfully think you misunderstand my intention. The beauty of what I see in SOW and previously in TC2M and 1st Bull Run was that it attempted to mimic the conditions and circumstances under which the commanders experienced on the battlefield during the campaign. There was never any intended attempt to besmirch Federal soldiers. I was simply wondering if there was any way to mimic the mindset Hooker experienced due to his apprehension about the troops reliability. It goes allow the same route as mimicking McClellan’s apprehension at Antietam about phantom Rebel divisions, which to me seemed written into the scenario script. I thought that was a fantastic touch, unprecedented in any war game I’ve ever played, and really lets us experience to a large degree what the commanders really felt at that time. That’s all I was trying to ask.

[Flanyboy]

As far as troop reliability, I give the Federal's with little time left the benefit of the doubt. Most 19th Century Americans were proud, brave, and fully commited to their honor. So no! I believe these men as worthy opponents to the best of the Army of Northern Virginia.

I respectfully think you misunderstand my intention. The beauty of what I see in SOW and previously in TC2M and 1st Bull Run was that it attempted to mimic the conditions and circumstances under which the commanders experienced on the battlefield during the campaign. There was never any intended attempt to besmirch Federal soldiers. I was simply wondering if there was any way to mimic the mindset Hooker experienced due to his apprehension about the troops reliability. It goes allow the same route as mimicking McClellan’s apprehension at Antietam about phantom Rebel divisions, which to me seemed written into the scenario script. I thought that was a fantastic touch, unprecedented in any war game I’ve ever played, and really lets us experience to a large degree what the commanders really felt at that time. That’s all I was trying to ask.

I think you answered your own questions. The Historical Scenario's will mimic it because they will mimic reality. The What IFs will be another matter.