into what Lee said to Heth, in regards to his mistakes never being told to him.
I'll keep reading more on the battle, but I don't think there's really anything new about the battle, that suggests that ANV had a chance of victory, after day1, with Lee's plans.
I agree completely. Even on the first day, there often seems to be an assumption that if Ewell had attacked Cemetery Hill, they would have taken it and won the battle. I am not sure that either would have been a forgone conclusion.
The Army of the Potomac took the defensive position and decided to hold it. They showed resolution to fight it out and win from the rank and file to the corps and army leadership. I think a study in leadership would also be interesting. I find Meade's war council very inspiring. Meade brought his generals together at night, they talked it out and had a strong consensus to stay and fight it out. That was quite different from the kind of leadership being shown on the other side of the battlefield. (I am not sure if Lee ever tried to get all of his corps commanders in one place during the battle.)
During the American Centennial in 1876, as one might expect, a huge day of celebration was held in Philadelphia on July 4th. Included in one of the parades on that day, just 13 years and 3 days after the beginning of the Gettysburg battle, a "special Centennial Legion" comprised of marchers from the original 13 colonies was organized. "In a spirit of intersectional reconciliation, the legion was commanded by former Confederate general Henry Heth."
Hooray for Harry! :woohoo:
J
Jack Hanger
Fremont, NE[/size] "Boys, if we have to stand in a straight line as stationary targets for the Yankees to shoot at, this old Texas Brigade is going to run like hell!" J. B. Poley, 4th Texas Infantry, Hood's Texas Brigade
Lincoln: You know very well that councils of war never fight.
Jackson: I will never hold another council again. (After his officers were against his counter-attack of Winchester, the first time it became in Federal hands, before Kernstown)
Grant: The only council you need to worry about is the one in my head.
Lee: I have grown tired of the bickering. (During the seven days)
Lincoln: You know very well that councils of war never fight.
Jackson: I will never hold another council again. (After his officers were against his counter-attack of Winchester, the first time it became in Federal hands, before Kernstown)
Grant: The only council you need to worry about is the one in my head.
Lee: I have grown tired of the bickering. (During the seven days)
Seemed to work for Meade at Gettysburg though.... His command was in agreement on what they would do and... they did it. Maybe the fact that he was only days old to the command of an army was an influence on his style.
Some of those Union commanders in the war council at Gettysburg were also the same ones who disagreed with Hooker at Chancellorsville, when he wanted to fall back across the river. From what I've read, most of them were furious with Hooker for falling back.
I can't help but wonder how much their experience at Chancellorsville figured into their decision to stay and fight it out at Gettysburg.
I that how the 2nd day went is a tell-tale factor.
I have a list of what everyone was thinking (as much as I can elaborate):
Meade, unsure about staying or leaving - would prefer the Pipe Creek line, but difficulties in the withdrawl. Uncertain in command, not a superior officer, peers with the others more than anything. Worried about losing.
Hancock, aggressive. Saw that the enemy was repulsed at all points (along Cemetary Ridge and Hill). Expects Lee to either a) flank them and manoever into Pipe Creek, b) flank and hit them at the rear of LRT, c) attack, probably towards the center. Believes in a limited counter-attack on Culp's Hill to relieve tension, make sure Lee doesn't move around the flank.
Slocum, cautious. Prefers to have a limited attack on his wing, with his corps and the sixth corps. Worries about his flank. Vouches to rectify position - if his attack is not going to happen - to Wolf Hill.
Sedgwick, cautious. Doesn't want to do anything with his corps due to forced marching. He doesn't want to force march them back, either.
Sykes, cautious. Has defended his ground, and is still able to. Would like to extend to the BRT. Wonders about his open flank.
Humphreys, aggressive. Cannot do anything of any value with the III Corps. Doesn't want to leave. Worries about the flank.
Williams, reserved. Technically is under command of Slocum, and has little to say. Feels out of place - not actually a corps commander.
Reynolds was already coming up the Emmitsburg Road, and he would have probably lined his troops up on McPherson's Ridge or Seminary Ridge. He wouldn't have fallen back to Cemetery Hill since Buford and Reynolds presumably wanted to protect the Gettysburg road network.
Things could have gone differently and the I. and XI. Corps could have been completely destroyed by the AoNV on day one. What if Ewell had had Johnson's division to use in his initial attack? What Hill had been more aggressive and thrown in R.H. Anderson's division? What if Longstreet would have allowed McLaws division to deploy and help take Cemetery Hill or Cemetery Ridge?
Lots of what ifs. Not taking Culps Hill and Cemetery Hill probably did decide the battle though. Although if Hood would have been allowed to flank LRT, maybe things would have gone a bit differently, but I doubt it.
I was under the assumption that Longstreet, upon seeing the actual Federal lines, reordered Hood into a position that would enable him to make the most out of the situation presented to him. (Remember, Lee gave Longstreet direct orders to not go around the Union flank.)
There were problems with the assault:
1. Law's Brigade became divided up because of a nasty knoll covered in brambles (worse than Heavy Woods in TC2M in terms of movement - probably like trying to cross rivers). So, instead of 5 regiments attacking the Union flank, there were only 3.
2. Robertson's Brigade was mixed up by Law's diversion, so 2 regiments headed towards the front of LRT, instead of MASHING (reference to article) up Devil's Den. I believe that had these regiments all taken Devil's Den by front and flank (like planned), they would be able to march straight up to the LRT (bloodied, but victorious). This would equal 9 regiments on LRT.
3. Benning's Brigade (I believe, or it's Anderson's...anyway, Law's supports) got Law's call for help - but saw Robertson's 2 regiments and headed towards Devil's Den. They helped clear Devil's Den, but had Robertson had all his troops, it should have been already done. Add another 4 (or 5) regiments to the fight on LRT. (13-14 total.
4. Anderson's Brigade (I believe, or Robertson's supports) stepped off as Law's supports stepped off, and so headed towards de Trombiand's position (because Law's supports headed towards Devil's Den, so dT's position was next one in line). So, 4 (or 5) regiments that could be outflanking the Union position in the Wheatfield and Peach Orchard are now bloodied along the Rose Woods.
5. Kershaw's Brigade - the mistake of half of his brigade, instead of driving off the Union gunners (which were almost driven off), three regiments wheeled and marched to Stony Hill. This attempt would have driven off the support of Sickles' salient, and enabled complete Confederate artillery control. Also, it would have outflanked Humphrey's division.
6. Barksdale's Brigade - after first taking out Graham's Brigade, three of his regiments and him headed towards Humphrey's division, instead of driving towards the Wheatfield (if Caldwell is there, outflanking him) and really sending the cannon off the Wheatfield Road. He then crashes upon Cemetary Ridge (lower) and with Kershaw and Anderson, engulfs a large portion of the V Corps (depending upon how quickly they move).
7. Semmes's Brigade - envisioned to support Kershaw, adds a fourth brigade to the attack on Cemetary Ridge.
8. Wofford's Brigade - instead of marching down to the Wheatfield, he was envisioned to march behind Barksdale - and would most likely enfield Humphrey's line, or add another brigade to the fight along Lower Cemetary Ridge.
9. Anderson's Division - the whole thing was supposed to be put in, but since Anderson was paying no attention to his command, and was uninformed about the change in plans, did little service to the confederate attack. However, as planned (and what actually happened), two of his brigades assisted in cleaning up Humphreys' Division, and his three others would have contributed to the gap of Caldwell's Division (if moved to the Wheatfield, if not, then the 4 brigades on Lower Cemetary Ridge would be outflanking him).
So - problems arose during complete of battle. However, since war isn't perfect, and mistakes happen - it is really the army with the least mistakes that wins, not the army with the most men, best fighting condition, best ground, etc.
So - problems arose during complete of battle. However, since war isn't perfect, and mistakes happen - it is really the army with the least mistakes that wins, not the army with the most men, best fighting condition, best ground, etc.
My 2 cents on Day 2.
Great post Hancock! I especially liked your conclusion about the army with the least mistakes wins! I would also add the least mistakes and most good fortune to exploit the other army's mistakes (or misfortune).
Your description of Longstreet's attack makes me wonder if Longstreet forgot to TC his brigades and just left them to AI! :laugh: Kind of like Meade forgetting to TC Sickles' Corps when he initially assigned their position. As much as we sometimes get frustrated by our units doing their own thing when under AI, can you imagine how frustrating it must of have been for both sides to see things unfolding completely NOT according to plan? Everytime I get annoyed at AI making an advance without orders, I always am reminded of Meade on the 2nd. Just imagine how furious he must have been. It was one crazy fight on both sides.
I am still a firm believer in ground though. Good ground can cover a lot of minor mistakes.
